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← 556 SW2D 774 - Rucker v. State

Rucker v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1977

Citation profile

3
cited by 3 later decisions
1
states following
April 2001
most recently cited

1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently April 2001

1 state decisions

101977198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Doyle v. Hampton

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “* * * Upon reviewing the present petition, the trial [hearing] court, in an order entered October 1, 1976, ordered the five (5)[-]year sentence to run consecutive [sic] to the life sentence. The trial judge, by this order, appears to have abrogated the agreed order of April 28, 1976. * # # * * * * * * A sentence for life does not expire but continues so long as a person serving such sentence lives, or, until a pardon has been granted. Doyle v. Hampton, 207 Tenn. 399 , 340 S.W.2d 891 (1960). * * * A commutation would also terminate a life sentence. The granting of parole does not terminate a sentence but merely suspends the execution of the penalty thereon. Doyle v. Hampton, supra. Therefore, so long as the life sentence remains in effect, service of the five (5) [-]year sentence shall not commence and eligibility for parole does not exist. [Emphasis added by the writer.] * * * The courts have no authority or jurisdiction to terminate a valid sentence of confinement. The authority to grant pardons and commutations of sentences rests solely with the executive authority of this State. Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution of Tennessee, T.C.A. § 40-3501 — § 40-3508. The granting of parole is vested exclusively in the Board of Pardons and Paroles. T.C.A. § 40-3613. Therefore, the agreed order entered in the trial court on April 28, 1976, was void and had no binding effect on the Board of Pardons and Paroles. The trial court [sic] order of October 1st, 1976, recognized the imp”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.