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← 557 F.2d 122 - Grossgold v. Supreme Court

Grossgold v. Supreme Court’s Empirical Analysis

557 F.2d 122 · 1977

Citation profile

47
cited by 47 later decisions
2
states following
March 2026
most recently cited

22 federal appellate · 7 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 47 later decisions — most recently March 2026 · most notably Commonwealth v. Vickey (1980), Levin v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Supreme Court of Illinois (1996)

22 federal appellate · 7 district · 4 state decisions

180197719801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 6002

Relies on Goldberg v. Kelly · Pierson v. Ray · Dann v. Johnston · In re Summers · Bornstein v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““It is settled that disciplinary orders of the highest court of a state may be reviewed federally only in the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and not by suit in the district courts.” (Grossgold v. Supreme Court of Illinois, 557 F.2d 122 at 125 (7th Cir. 1977)).”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “He asserts that there was jurisdiction because otherwise there would be no judicial forum to pass upon his federal constitutional claim that the three-year suspension granted by a state “administrative agency” unconstitutionally interfered with the presidential pardon ... If no court could review the constitutional question, the alleged constitutional deprivation could be redressed in district court under the Section 1343(3) subject matter jurisdiction grant. If indeed judicial review of a claimed constitutional deprivation were cut out entirely, grave constitutional problems would be posed . The flaw in plaintiff’s contentions is that it overlooks the judicial review already accorded him. The Illinois Supreme Court, which is fully competent to pass on federal constitutional questions, has passed upon this constitutional question, and its decision became final when the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari. Since the Illinois Supreme Court was bound to pass on the constitutional question posed by the pardon, the court’s denial of Grossgold’s petition for reconsideration necessarily implied that the constitutional question was being decided against the plaintiff. Consequently, there was no arguable constitutional “deprivation” . . . The doctrine of res judicata bars any further litigation of this question.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Assuming federal jurisdiction arguendo, the presidential pardon did not wipe out the moral turpitude inherent in the factual predicate supporting plaintiffs mail fraud conviction. As Judge Sprecher carefully explained in Bjerkan v. United States, 529 F.2d 125 , 128 n. 2 (7th Cir.1975), a pardon does not blot out guilt nor restore the offender to a state of innocence.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.