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← 557 F. Supp. 2d 843 - Sowell v. Collins

557 F. Supp. 2d 843 - Sowell v. Collins’s Empirical Analysis

2008

Citation profile

2
cited by 2 later decisions
November 2011
most recently cited

1 federal appellate ·

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Brady v. State of Maryland · Williams v. Taylor · In the Matter of Samuel Winship · Gregg v. Georgia

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The appropriate standard of review for claims of prosecutorial misconduct on a writ of habeas corpus is “the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 , 106 S.Ct. 2464 , 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 , 94 S.Ct. 1868 , 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)). For prosecutorial misconduct to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the conduct of the prosecutor must have “ ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ ” Broom v. Mitchell, 441 F.3d 392, 412 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643 , 94 S.Ct. 1868 ); see also Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 , 106 S.Ct. 2464 . Thus, “Petitioner’s burden on habeas review is quite a substantial one.” Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 529 (6th Cir.2000). When analyzing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a federal court must first determine whether the challenged statements were improper. Boyle v. Million, 201 F.3d 711, 717 (6th Cir.2000). If improper, the court must examine whether the statements were so flagrant as to constitute a denial of due process and warrant the granting of a writ. Even if the prosecution’s conduct was improper, or even “universally condemned,” a federal court can only reverse a conviction or sentence if the statements were so flagrant as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair. See e.g., Slagle v. Bagley, 457 F.3d 501, 516 (6th Cir.2006).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “Dr. [Nancy] Schmidtgoessling’s mitigation report noted that petitioner had a “rough childhood” and “an unhappy home life.” She reported that petitioner experienced a “lack of adequate food, clothing and material goods as well as [a] lack of close parental nurturance.” According to her report, petitioner felt “abandoned, angry, without significant stable relationships, and conscious of the need to defend himself in a dangerous, hostile environment.” She relayed that petitioner was “on his own” at a young age, that he skipped school, and that he ran away for days at a time. Dr. Schmidtgoessling noted petitioner’s history of depression and alcohol abuse. Likewise, Dr. [James] Titchener reported that petitioner’s mother was distant, that she frequently left her family, and that her abandonment was responsible for much of the anger and hostility petitioner experienced. Dr. [William] Walters noted that petitioner’s father was a “strict disciplinarian” and that the So-well family was very poor. Walters, Schmidtgoessling, Titchener and [Dr. Emmett] Cooper all noted that alcohol and marijuana use contributed to that events leading up to the murder.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[T]he shootings did not occur as a result of an instantaneous eruption or one continuous course of events. There was an initial encounter and an exchange of hostile words between petitioner and Bill-ups that generated a decision on petitioner’s part to shoot and kill Billups. After arguing with Billups about whether she had taken his money, petitioner announced his intention to get his gun and kill Billups, and he put into action a plan to achieve that result. To that end, petitioner left Graham’s apartment, went down the hall to his own apartment, and retrieved his gun. Although the period of time that elapsed between the initial encounter and the shootings was brief, there was a break in the encounter, or an intervening period, during which there was a time for reflection and planning. During that time, petitioner retrieved his weapon from a different location and devised a plan to regain entry to Graham’s apartment under false pretenses by using Lenora Waugh. Accordingly, ... there was sufficient time, under all of the circumstances, for petitioner to plan the killing.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.