Commonwealth v. Chester’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 107 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 116 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[a]s certain penalty phase claims, which are not waived or otherwise forfeited are cognizable on traditional habeas corpus review, section 9542 plainly requires that they must be considered exclusively within the context of the PCRA. Such claims could not be legislatively foreclosed, since the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, with limited exceptions not here applicable, that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended. Pa. Const, art. I, § 14. Given that the choice was between a unified statutory procedure or bifurcated review having statutory and common law components, it seems clear that the General Assembly intended to channel all claims requiring review through the framework of the PCRA.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 2003 Pa. Super. 203 - Commonwealth v. Kohan · Commonwealth v. Lantzy

2. “[W]e do not read the phrase “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place” to preclude review of claims arising from the penalty phase of a capital case. Accordingly, we hold that claims alleging a violation of the constitution of this Commonwealth or the United States, or alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, which affected the reliable adjudication of the penalty in a capital case are cognizable under the PCRA in a first PCRA petition.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Rivers · Commonwealth v. Faulkner

3. “§ 9543. Eligibility for relief (a) General rule.—To be eligible for relief under this subchapter, the petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence all of the following: (1) That the petitioner has been convicted of a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth and is at the time relief is granted: (i) currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime; (ii) awaiting execution of a sentence of death for the crime; or (iii) serving a sentence which must expire before the person may commence serving the disputed sentence. (2) That the conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the following: (i) A violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. (ii) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. (iii) A plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the circumstances make it likely that the inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is innocent. (iv) The improper obstruction by government officials of the petitioner's right of appeal where a meritorious appealable issue existed and was properly preserved in the trial court. (v) ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Commonwealth v. West