Vasquez v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1977
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 31 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 33 later decisions — most recently March 2017 · most notably 108 Wash. 2d 662 - State v. Hodgson (1987), Proctor v. State (1998)
2 federal appellate · 31 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 146 Tex. Crim. 333 - Hill v. State · Cooper v. State · 63 Tex. Crim. 519 - Ex Parte Hoard · 163 Tex. Crim. 132 - Barrera v. State · 57 Tex. Crim. 570 - Brown v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(b) The time during the pendency of an indictment, information, or complaint shall not be computed in the period of limitation. (c) The term “during the pendency,” as used herein, means that period of time beginning with the day the indictment, information, or complaint is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, and ending with the day such accusation is, by an order of a trial court having jurisdiction thereof, determined to be invalid for any reason.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Bonner v. State · State v. Hall“As a general proposition, it may be stated that there is no such thing as a common law statute of limitation in criminal cases. Such statutes of limitation are matters of legislative grace; they are a surrendering by the sovereign of its right to prosecute. Since they are measures of public policy only, and subject to the will of the Legislature as such, they may be changed or repealed in any case where the right to a dismissal has not been absolutely acquired by the completion of the running of the statutory period of limitation. This is not to say that a prosecution once barred by the running of the applicable statute of limitation can be revived by the Legislature; it cannot be. The classic explanation is that of Judge Learned Hand: Certainly it is one thing to revive a prosecution already dead, and another to give it a longer lease of life. The question turns upon how much violence is done to our instinctive feelings of justice and fair play. For the state to assure a man that he has become safe from its pursuit, and thereafter to withdraw its assurance, seems to most of us unfair and dishonest. But, while the chase is on, it does not shock us to have it extended beyond the time first set, or, if it does, the stake forgives it. Accordingly, “[ujntil the statute has run it is a mere regulation of the remedy ... subject to legislative control. Afterwards it is a defense, not of grace, but of right, not contingent, but absolute and vested, ... not to be taken away by legisla”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. State v. O'NEILL“The burden of proof is always on the State to show that the offense alleged was committed ... within the period of limitation regardless of the date alleged.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Lemell v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.