11/12/2024
DA 24-0265
Case Number: DA 24-0265
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2024 MT 268N
KEENYA WALKER, an individual,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
SIDNEY WALKER, an individual,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DV 23-649
Honorable Andrew Breuner, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Sidney Walker, Self-Represented, Bozeman, Montana
For Appellee:
Keenya Walker, Self-Represented, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: October 23, 2024
Decided: November 12, 2024
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Sidney Walker (Sidney) appeals a Default Judgment entered in the Eighteenth
Judicial District Court, Gallatin County. He contends (1) that he did not receive proper
notice of the proceedings resulting in a due process violation; (2) that the District Court
erred by failing to consider his requests for extension and fee waiver; and (3) that the
District Court erred in granting “summary judgment,” which we interpret to mean the
default judgment. The District Court is affirmed.
¶3 This Court is forced to work from an extremely limited set of facts. The record
before us consists of a three-page brief from Sidney and limited proceedings in the District
Court. In June 2023, Keenya Walker (Keenya) sued Sidney for breach of contract; breach
of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; promissory estoppel; and actual fraud.
Summons were issued on June 30 and Sidney was served on July 23. On August 4, Sidney
filed a request for fee waiver. On August 17, the District Court granted Sidney’s request.
On August 22, Sidney filed a request and supporting affidavit for time to obtain an attorney,
and on October 18, the District Court granted Sidney’s request, providing him until
November 3, 2023, to file and serve a responsive pleading.
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¶4 On October 16, Keenya filed an application for default judgment and entry of
default based on Sidney’s failure to respond within the time required by the Montana Rules
of Civil Procedure. She requested a $47,382.92 judgment including actual damages as
alleged in the complaint, fees and costs, and $25,000.00 in punitive damages. On
November 13, Keenya notified the District Court that the default was ripe for review; due
to Sidney’s continued non-response, the application for default was deemed uncontested
by operation of law. The District Court set a hearing for December 15. Sidney failed to
appear. On March 25, 2024, the District Court entered a $30,165.91 default judgment
against Sidney from which he appeals.
¶5 We do not have a defined standard of review for the direct appeal of a default
judgment, as relief is typically sought first under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b), where a defendant
who has failed to respond or otherwise defend can more fully develop the district court
record. There are two main standards of review for the more typical review of a motion to
set aside default judgment. We review a district court’s grant of a motion to set aside
default judgment for manifest abuse of discretion, and denial of such a motion for “only a
slight abuse of discretion” because of our preference for litigated cases to be decided on
the merits. Carter v. Badrock Rural Fire Dist., 2021 MT 280, ¶ 11 n.3,
406 Mont. 174,
512 P.3d 241; Whitefish Credit Union v. Sherman,
2012 MT 267, ¶ 7,
367 Mont. 103,
289
P.3d 174. We need not resolve an exact standard of review for the direct appeal of a default
judgment in this case because the District Court did not abuse its discretion even under the
higher “slight abuse of discretion” standard.
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¶6 Under M. R. Civ. P. 55, a default judgment is appropriate “[w]hen a party against
whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend,
and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise . . . .” Unless the plaintiff’s claim is for
a sum certain, “the party must apply to the court for a default judgment . . . . If the party
against whom a default is sought has appeared personally or by a representative, that party
or its representative must be served with written notice of the application at least 7 days
before the hearing.” M. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
¶7 It is undisputed that Keenya sought affirmative relief against Sidney, that Sidney
failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that Sidney was served with Keenya’s application
for default judgment—by mail—on October 16, 2023, well before the hearing and over
five months ahead of when the District Court ordered the default judgment. Thus, we find
that the District Court did not even “slightly” abuse its discretion in ordering the default
judgment.
¶8 Turning to Sidney’s remaining arguments, the assertion that the District Court did
not consider his fee waiver and extension requests is belied by the record. Each of these
requests was duly granted. Nor does Sidney have a valid argument that he did not receive
notice. The record indicates that Sidney was served—by mail, to an address consistent
with his own filings—as required. He asserts that the clerk of court used an incorrect email
address “despite having the correct email on file,” and that “[u]pon investigation, the
clerk’s office confirmed the error in communication.” However, Sidney provides no
information to support this alleged error or investigation, nor is it supported elsewhere in
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the admittedly sparse record. “Appeals can only be taken on the record made, not on the
record which should have been made.” State v. Lewis, 2007 MT 16, ¶ 13,
335 Mont. 331,
151 P.3d 883 (internal quotation omitted). Based on the record made, we cannot indulge
these arguments.
¶9 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
applicable standards of review.
¶10 Affirmed.
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ JIM RICE
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