Moss v. Kopp’s Empirical Analysis
559 F.3d 1155 · 2009
Citation profile
9 federal appellate · 16 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 55 later decisions — most recently April 2025 · most notably Cox v. Glanz (2015), Brown v. Buhman (2016)
9 federal appellate · 16 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York · Kentucky v. Graham · Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit · Stump v. Sparkman · City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 55 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action in question, (2) the prior action has been finally adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[T]o establish a claim for damages under § 1983 against municipal entities ..., the plaintiff must prove (1) the entity executed a policy or custom, (2) that caused the plaintiff to suffer deprivation of constitutional or other federal rights.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“[W]e have acknowledged that even assuming that an order is infirm as a matter of state law, it may be facially valid, as “facially valid” does not mean “lawful,” and erroneous orders can be valid. We explained: State officials must not be required to act as pseudo-appellate courts scrutinizing the orders of judges, but subjecting them to liability for executing an order because the order did not measure up to statutory standards would have just that effect. Further, [t]o allow plaintiffs to bring suit any time a state agent executes a judicial order which, does not fulfill every legal requirement would make the agent a lightning rod for harassing litigation aimed at judicial orders. Simple fairness requires that state officers not be called upon to answer for the legality of decisions which they are powerless to control. We have also noted that a narrow conception of facial validity would deprive the court of most of the benefit it derives from the existence of quasi-judicial immunity for officers carrying out its orders because the unhesitating execution of court orders is essential to the court’s authority and ability to function, and state officers subject to litigation might neglect to execute these orders. Even worse, a fear of bringing down litigation on the [officer executing the order] might color a court’s judgment in some cases. In short, [t]he public interest demands strict adherence to judicial decreés.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.