2024 UT App 158
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
RHUAN CAMPBELL,
Appellant.
Per Curiam Opinion
No. 20230192-CA
Filed November 7, 2024
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Dianna Gibson
No. 221909364
Emily Adams and Freyja Johnson,
Attorneys for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and Connor Nelson,
Attorneys for Appellee
Before JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN, RYAN D. TENNEY,
and JOHN D. LUTHY.
PER CURIAM:
¶1 Rhuan Campbell appeals his convictions for electronic
communication harassment and stalking. Campbell alleges that
the district court erred in denying his request to represent himself.
We affirm.
¶2 Campbell contends that the district court erroneously
denied his constitutional right to represent himself. However,
although the record demonstrates that Campbell at times
requested leave to represent himself, he withdrew or abandoned
each such request before the court could rule on it. “A defendant
may abandon an unequivocal request for self-representation
where the district court did not conclusively deny the request.
State v. Campbell
And we will consider the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether a defendant has in fact abandoned such a
request.” Sims v. State, 541 P.3d 130, 137 (Nev. App. 2023) (per
curiam); see also State v. Campbell, No. 16-0550,
2017 WL 2464070,
at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. June 7, 2017) (stating that “there was no pre-trial violation of [the defendant’s] right to self-representation,
either because [the defendant] withdrew his request to represent
himself or because he impeded the court in establishing that his
waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and intelligent”);
People v. Kenner,
272 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (Ct. App. 1990) (stating
that the right to self-representation “may be waived through [the]
defendant’s subsequent conduct indicating he is vacillating on the
issue or has abandoned his request altogether” (cleaned up)).
¶3 At a pretrial conference on January 12, 2023, Campbell
complained that his counsel was not following Campbell’s
preferred trial strategy. During the ensuing discussion with the
court, the possibility was raised of Campbell representing
himself. In response, the court informed Campbell that he had
three options: keep his current appointed counsel, hire his own
counsel, or represent himself. Campbell responded that he did not
want to represent himself. The court concluded the hearing by
encouraging Campbell, his trial counsel, and trial counsel’s
supervisor to get together to work out the issues between them.
¶4 The issue arose again at a status conference about two
weeks later. Trial counsel’s supervisor appeared at that hearing.
The supervising attorney initially indicated that the defense was
working well together and getting most of their issues resolved.
However, Campbell soon began complaining that his counsel
would not file a complaint against the West Valley City Police.
The court attempted to explain to Campbell that his appointed
counsel could not pursue any such action and that counsel’s only
job was to defend Campbell against the criminal charges. At the
end of that conversation, Campbell said, “I want to stand by
myself. I don’t want an attorney.” The court cautioned Campbell
20230192-CA 2
2024 UT App 158
State v. Campbell
about making such a hasty decision in the heat of the moment. It
then told Campbell that there was going to be a hearing on
February 10, 2023. The court stated that if at that time Campbell
still wanted to represent himself, it would conduct the
appropriate colloquy with him. At the hearing on February 10,
2023, trial counsel informed the court that the defense was ready
to proceed to trial. Campbell was at the hearing and did not raise
the issue of self-representation.
¶5 Trial began on February 28, 2023. Trial counsel gave his
opening statement, which Campbell apparently did not like. In
front of the jury, Campbell stated, “I have no attorney here, and I
already [told] you twice I fired these people.” He added, “I want
to do it myself.” At this point, the court took a recess to allow
Campbell to have a private conversation with his counsel, noting
that Campbell and the court could discuss the issue afterward.
When Campbell returned, the court engaged in an extensive
conversation with him in which the court discussed the perils of
representing oneself without an appropriate understanding of the
law or how to present evidence in support of the defense. During
this conversation, Campbell stated that he wanted a new attorney
or to represent himself. After the discussion, the court informed
Campbell, “If you want to proceed without attorneys, then we can
have that discussion.” The court added that if he chose to
represent himself, “there’s several things that we have to
address.” The court specifically told Campbell that he had the
right to represent himself but that it did not advise him to do so.
Campbell responded that he was going to represent himself. At
this point the court asked, “Are you asking for a continuance? Do
you want to move forward [today] on your own? Do you want to
move forward with representation?” Campbell then answered
that he wanted his case heard and he wanted to be represented
but that he just wanted different counsel.
¶6 Based on that statement, the court discussed with the trial
attorneys what they thought should be done. They responded that
20230192-CA 3 2024 UT App 158
State v. Campbell
they were ready for trial but that it was Campbell’s choice as to
whether and how to proceed. At that point, Campbell again spoke
up, saying, “[I]f you want to represent me, I want to hear your
statement before you present it to the jury . . . .” The court then
advised Campbell to speak with his counsel in private one more
time rather than discussing attorney-client matters in front of the
court. The court then informed Campbell of his remaining
options: move forward with counsel or represent himself. The
court told Campbell that if he chose the second option, the court
would have to decide if he could represent himself and whether a
continuance would be proper where the jury was already seated.
Upon returning, Campbell told the court that he agreed to let the
attorneys represent him but that he did not want to stay in court
to hear the “lies” that people would be saying about him. At this
point, the court had another conversation with Campbell,
explaining how important it was for Campbell to assist counsel in
his defense. Eventually, Campbell agreed to stay in the courtroom
and assist counsel in his defense. The trial took place with no
further issues.
¶7 The record demonstrates that Campbell clearly invoked his
right to represent himself on two occasions and at least raised the
issue on a third occasion. However, the record also demonstrates
that the district court never specifically ruled on Campbell’s
requests. Instead, each time, the court deferred making a decision
on the issue and encouraged Campbell to discuss the matter with
his attorneys. On each occasion, Campbell eventually resolved his
issues with counsel and allowed them to continue representing
him. Campbell now argues that the court’s deferral of its ruling
operated as a de facto denial of his oral motions. However, “[a]
trial court is entitled to defer ruling on an otherwise proper
motion to self-represent.” State v. Kinney, No. 47867-6-II, 2017 WL
359102, at *1–2, *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2017) (concluding that
the trial court did not violate the defendant’s right to self-representation when, after raising the request and after the court
discussed the serious risks of self-representation, the defendant
20230192-CA 4
2024 UT App 158
State v. Campbell
ultimately changed his mind before the court ruled on the issue);
see also State v. Englund, 345 P.3d 859, 866 (Wash Ct. App. 2015)
(concluding that the trial court did not violate the defendant’s
right to self-representation when it deferred his request until he
filed a written motion). Further, each time the district court
deferred its decision, it also expressly informed Campbell that if,
after he had time to think about the decision and confer with
counsel, he still wanted to invoke his right to self-representation,
the court would have a conversation with him concerning the
rights he was waiving and whether that waiver was knowing and
voluntary. Thus, the district court’s deferral of its ruling did not
effectively deny the motions.
¶8 Campbell then withdrew or abandoned his motions for
self-representation before the court could rule on them. Each time
before the district court had the opportunity to rule on one of
Campbell’s motions, Campbell changed his mind. When at a
status conference Campbell first stated, “I want to stand by
myself. I don’t want an attorney,” the court told Campbell to think
about the decision and discuss it with his attorney and that if he
still wished to pursue self-representation at the pre-trial hearing,
the court would entertain the motion. At that hearing, neither
counsel nor Campbell raised the issue of Campbell representing
himself. Instead, counsel indicated that they were ready for trial.
Under the circumstances of this case, which included Campbell’s
numerous vacillations between wanting new counsel, wanting to
represent himself, and being willing to work with his appointed
counsel, such statements demonstrated a withdrawal of the
motion or, at a minimum, a deferral of his request. See Brown v.
Wainwright,
665 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir. 1982) (concluding that after
the court had deferred a ruling on a motion for self-representation
to allow the defendant to see if his differences with counsel could
be resolved, the attorney’s subsequent statement that he and the
client had resolved their differences supported the conclusion that
the motion had either been withdrawn or abandoned). Similarly,
after hearing opening statements at trial, Campbell indicated that
20230192-CA 5
2024 UT App 158
State v. Campbell
he wanted to represent himself. The court took a recess to allow
Campbell and his counsel to discuss the issue. After conversations
with the court and his counsel, Campbell eventually told the court
that he agreed to allow counsel to represent him. Therefore,
Campbell’s words and conduct demonstrate that he withdrew or
abandoned his motions to represent himself. Accordingly, the
district court did not err in failing to rule on those motions.
¶9 The decision of the district court is affirmed.
20230192-CA 6 2024 UT App 158