Commonwealth v. Martorano’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

28 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “We now hold that the double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits retrial of a defendant not only when prosecutorial misconduct is intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial, but also when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Washington · 2014 Pa. Super. 5 - Commonwealth v. Minnis

2. “evinces the prosecutor's intent to deprive Appellant of a fair trial; to ignore the bounds of legitimate advocacy; in short, to win a conviction by any means necessary[,]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2005 Pa. Super. 184 - Commonwealth v. Basemore · 2011 Pa. Super. 233 - Commonwealth v. Anderson

3. “Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982), [the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania] followed federal law in recognizing two types of prosecutorial misconduct that would implicate double jeopardy principles: First there is the prosecutorial misconduct which is designed to provoke a mistrial in order to secure a second, perhaps more favorable, opportunity to convict the defendant. [Citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 , 96 S.Ct. 1075 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976) ]. Second there is the prosecu-torial misconduct undertaken in bad faith to prejudice or harass the defendant. [Citing Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 32 , 97 S.Ct. 2141 , 53 L.Ed.2d 80 (1977); Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611 , 96 S.Ct. 1075 ]. In contrast to prosecutorial error, overreaching is not an inevitable part of the trial process and cannot be condoned. It signals the breakdown of the integrity of the judicial proceeding, and represents the type of prosecutorial tactic which the double jeopardy clause was designed to protect against. Commonwealth v. Starks, 490 Pa. 336 , 416 A.2d 498, 500 (1980). In Kennedy , though, the United States Supreme Court appeared to limit the scope of federal double jeopardy protection, holding that, “the circumstances under which ... a defendant [who has successfully moved for a mistrial] may invoke the bar of double jeopardy in a second effort to try him are limited to those cases in which the condu”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2011 Pa. Super. 233 - Commonwealth v. Anderson