Chastain v. Chastain’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[3] An examination of the pertinent statutes indicates that recrimination is allowed as a defense only to a complaint for divorce based upon the ground of defendant’s adultery ... However, the reported cases indicate that our courts have sometimes mistakenly treated the defense defined in T.C.A., § 36-818, as one of recrimination. See Canning v. Canning, 59 Tenn.App. 678 , 443 S.W.2d 502 (1968). ... [4] Therefore, it is our opinion that in a ease such as this in which the ground for divorce is one of the “causes of divorce” specified by T.C.A., § 36-802, the “ill conduct” of the complainant may constitute a defense to the complaint only if such “ill conduct” is shown to be “a justifiable cause for the conduct complained of.” For instance, the defendant may neutralize ihis abandonment and failure to support his wife by showing that such misconduct on his part was brought about by her ill conduct toward him. See McClanahan v. McClanahan, 104 Tenn. 217 , 56 S.W. 858 (1900). [5] Applying this rule to the facts of the instant ease, it is obvious that the adultery of the plaintiff committed after the defendant husband had abandoned her and turned her out of doors and refused or neglected to provide for her could not have been “a justifiable cause” for the alleged abandonment on the part of the defendant. Therefore, in the circumstances of this particular case, plaintiffs adultery does not disentitle her to a divorce. This Court recently denied cer-tiorari in a case in which the Cou”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bush v. Bush

2. “Although some of our cases contain language to the effect that divorce cases are to be “tried as equity cases” or “according to the forms of chancery,” the substantive law governing divorce in Tennessee is purely statutory; there is no common law of divorce. Both grounds for divorce and defenses against divorce actions are statutory. See Perrin v. Perrin, 201 Tenn. 354 , 299 S.W.2d 19 (1957); Mount v. Mount, 46 Tenn.App. 30 , 326 S.W.2d 493 (1959).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Atchley v. Atchley