Berghuis v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

64 federal appellate · 53 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 177 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this un-derrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hill v. Humphrey · United States v. Snarr

2. “the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ambrose v. Booker · Garcia-Dorantes v. Warren

3. “The defendant in Duren successfully challenged Jackson County’s administration of a Missouri exemption permitting any woman to opt out of jury service. 439 U.S., at 360, 99 S.Ct. 664 . The Court explained why it was plain that defendant Duren had established a prima facie case. First, women in Jackson County were both “numerous and distinct from men.” Id., at 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S., at 531 , 95 S.Ct. 692). Second, Duren’s “statistical presentation” showed gross underrepresentation: Women were over half the jury-eligible population; in stark contrast, they accounted for less than 15% of jury venires. 439 U.S., at 364-366, 99 S.Ct. 664 . Duren also demonstrated systematic exclusion with particularity. He proved that women’s underrepresentation was persistent-occurring in every weekly venire for almost a year-and he identified the two stages of the jury-selection process “when ... the systematic exclusion took place.” Id., at 366 , 99 S.Ct. 664 . First, questionnaires for prospective jurors stated conspicuously that women could opt out of jury service. Less than 30% of those summoned were female, suggesting that women in large numbers claimed the exemption at the questionnaire stage. Ibid. “Moreover, at the summons stage women were ... given another opportunity to [opt out].” Id., at 366-367 , 99 S.Ct. 664 . And if a woman ignored the summons, she was deemed to have opted out; no further inquiry was made. Id., at 367 , 99 S.Ct. 664 . At this “final, venire,”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State of Iowa v. Kenneth L. Lilly · 717 F. Supp. 2d 310 - Parker v. Phillips