Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

56 Ark. 267

Organ v. State

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Decided May 28, 1892

Supreme Court of Arkansas · decided 1892-05-28

Organ was convicted of a violation of the act prohibiting the exportation of fish and game from the State. It is conceded that he was master af a steamboat plying the Mississippi river between West Memphis, in Crittenden county, Arkansas, and Memphis, Tenn., and that as such master he received and transported a barrel of fish from the former to the latter place, and that the fish were taken from public waters in Crittenden county.

Relies on McCready v. Virginia · Magner v. People · American Express Co. v. People

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1892-05-28

How this case has been cited

Cited by 25 later decisions — most recently October 1948 · most notably Geer v. State of Connecticut (1896), State v. Rodman (1894)

4 district · 17 state decisions

60189219001910192019301940decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Hemingway, J.

¶1The ownership of fish is in the' . State for the benefit of its people in common, and the legislature has the right to permit individuals to’ catch them upon such terms and conditions as it may impose, and to restrict the property acquired in them, when caught, to such extent as it deems proper. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391 ;American Express Company v. People, 133 Ill. 649; Magner v. People, 97 Ill. 333.

¶2It may prohibit catching them entirely, or for a specified season ; of it may permit them to be caught for the use of the person who makes the catch, and withhold the right to sell them, or ship them for sale. When preserved for the common benefit of the people of the State, they are not articles of commerce in any sense, and we cannot see that they become such simply because the legislature permits them to be caught by individuals for use within the State only.

¶3One who catches them had originally no separate property in them, and no right to acquire it except as the legislature might provide.; as all right of property in them is derived from the State, it is subject to such terms as the legislature imposes. It saw fit; in the act assailed, to confer a right of property, but to so limit it that the article should not be shipped from the State, the purpose being to restrict the use to those who originally owned it in common. The restriction was imposed by right of ownership, and not in the exercise of any assumed power to regulate the commercial uses of private property.’

¶4Under this limitation fish never pass from the dominion of the State as proprietor or become articles of commerce in the sense contended for by the defendant, because the qualified property right is conferred upon condition that the use shall be restricted and shipment from tbe State not allowed. It follows that the act does not violate the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, and it could not be seriously contended that it violated any other constitutional provision.

¶5We are aware a different conclusion has been reached by the courts of Kansas and Idaho. State v. Saunders, 19 Kas. 127; Territory v. Evans (Idaho), 23 Pac. Rep. 115. But that announced seems to us the better one, and is sustained by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in an opinion to which we refer for a more extended discussion of the subject. State v. Geer, 61 Conn. 144.

¶6Affirm.

/56/ark/267 · .json · Public domain