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56 Ark. 45

Hawkins v. Taylor

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Decided April 9, 1892

Supreme Court of Arkansas · decided 1892-04-09

Taylor was plaintiff in a judgment in the circuit court of Franklin county against P. R. Cravens & Co., upon which execution was issued on February 26, 1890, and on same day placed in the hands of J. D. Hawkins, sheriff of Crawford county.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““If any officer to whom execution shall he delivered shall neglect or refuse to execute or levy the same according to law s * * or if any officer shall not return any execution on or before the return day therein Specified ⅛ ⅛ ⅜ then, and in any of the eases aforesaid, each officer shall be liable and bound to pay the whole -amount of money in such execution specified or. thereon endorsed and directed to be levied. * * *””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Grubbs v. Needles

Relies on Haley v. Young · Jett v. Shinn · Reeves v. Sherwood

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1892-04-09

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently October 1960 · most notably Shorter University v. Franklin (1905), Storey v. Brewer (1960)

6 federal appellate · 20 state decisions

9018921900191019201930194019501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

CoCKRlLL, C. J.

¶1L ^ability failure to return execution

¶21. “Por failure to return an execution ’ ’ the statute imposes upon a sheriff a penalty # equal to the amount of the judgment and costs and ten per cent, thereon. Mansf. Dig. sec. 3964.

¶3Por failure to “ return any such execution on or before the return day therein specified” a statute, which was in force when the first was enacted, imposed a penalty of the “whole amount of money in such execution specified,” and no more. Id. sec. 3061. There is no such plain repugnance between the two provisions that the latter must yield and give place exclusively to the former. Zerger v. Quilling, 48 Ark. 157.

¶4■ The two may stand together by applying the latter, according to its terms, in cases where there is a failure to return the execution “on or before the return day therein specified; ” and by confining the other to cases wherein no return has been made at all.

¶5The statute is highly penal, and its terms should not be extended .by construction to cases not within its plain meaning. The ten per cent, penalty has never been, enforced in any case where the execution had been . returned. In this case the return was made before suit was instituted. As the return was legal, although after the return day, there could be uo recovery of the ten per cent, penalty inflicted by the first section above.

¶62. Rule where return day fails on Sunday.

¶72. The execution was returnable, by its terms and by the law, “within 60 days” from its date. The six-f . J tieth day after its date was Sunday, and the execution was returned the next day thereafter. It is argued that, as no return could be made on Sunday, the officer might legally postpone the act until Monday. But the statute ■ will not admit of that construction. It does not require the return to be made upon the sixtieth day only. If it did, and that day were Sunday, then the argument would be forcible. But executions are returnable ‘ ‘ in sixty days from their date” (Mansf. Dig. sec. 2971), and a legal return may be made by the sheriff at any time after the writ comes to his hands — even a return of nulla bona, if he knows that the defendant is insolvent, and is willing to take ■ the hazard of his remaining so. Reeves v. Sherwood, 45 Ark. 520.

¶8The penal statute moreover prescribes that he shall be liable for a failure to make his return “ on or before the return day.” “ Oh or before the return day ” does not mean after the return day. Alston v. Falconer, 42 Ark. 117. And as the last day fell upon Sunday, it was the officer’s duty to- make the return on the preceding Saturday. Crocker on Sheriffs, sec. 40; Sedgwick, Stat. & Const. Law, p. 358 ; Sutherland, Stat. Const. sec. 115 ; Haley v. Young, 134 Mass. 364 ; ex parte Simpkin, 105 Eng. C. D. 392; see Endlich, Int. of Stat. sec. 393.

¶9The return was not made on or before the sixtieth day, and the penalty was incurred under section 3061.

¶103. irrepufailure to objeet

¶113. The proceeding was instituted by motion for iudgment under sections 3963-4, and it is jo o argued that the plaintiff’s cause should fall because those sections, as held above, do not apply. But the complaint contains all the allegations necessary to a recovery under section 3061. The defendant demurred to it, and, after the demurrer had been overruled and the cause continued to another term, consented to an order setting aside the continuance, filed his answer and went to trial. Efither of these acts was sufficient to enter his appearance and waive the formal issue and service of summons. The defendant was therefore in court, and cannot now be heard to object that he was brought in by notice instead of summons.

¶124. validity against “a°&

¶134. The judgment was against P. R. Cravens & Co., and the execution followed it. It was good as to P. R. Cravens. Adding the words “and company” after his name was at most an irregularity, and it afforded no excuse to the officer for refusing or neglecting to return it. Jett v. Shinn, 47 Ark. 373.

¶14The judgment will be reversed, and judgment entered here for the amount of the execution and interest without damages.

¶15It is so ordered.

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