In Re Cregler’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 federal appellate · 326 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 337 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The rule of the common law, that penal statutes are to be strictly construed, has no application to this code. *Page 642 All its provisions are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2 Cal. 3d 619 - Keeler v. Superior Court · 63 Cal. 2d 614 - People v. Grubb

2. “one will not be heard to attack a statute on grounds that are not shown to be applicable to himself”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 4 Cal. 5th 658 - People v. Buza · 161 Cal. App. 3d 1 - People v. Trantham

3. “Guided by these canons of construction we have therefore concluded that the term loiter in the context of the statute under consideration proscribes only that species of ‘lingering’ and ‘idling’ about schools or public places which is engaged in for an evil or sinister purpose. As pointed out above, section 647a was enacted to protect children. Subdivision (1) thereof makes guilty of a misdemeanor or felony as the case may be every person who annoys or molests any child under the age of 18.... Subdivision (2) provides additional protection for children by removing any opportunity for the child molester to carry out his evil purpose. Both subdivisions label the offender a ‘vagrant.’ Nevertheless it is obvious that the purpose of the first subdivision is largely punitive while that of the second subdivision is largely preventive. ... But, as we have said, the loitering condemned by the second subdivision is not loitering in its general sense but in its restricted and sinister sense. It includes lingering, waiting and delaying but only for a sinister or wrongful purpose and therefore excludes such activities for a lawful purpose. ‘Loitering as forbidden includes waiting, but mere waiting for any lawful purpose does not constitute such loitering.’ Therefore as we construe the statute before us, persons who merely sit on park benches, loll on public beaches, pause in the vicinity of schools or linger in the many public areas frequented by children cannot be reasonably considered a”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. McSherry v. Block