Daun v. Truax’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 district · 33 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"If a party to this action violated any of the sections of the Vehicle Code just read to you, a presumption arises that he was negligent. This presumption is not conclusive. It may be overcome by other evidence showing that under all the circumstances surrounding the event, the conduct in question was excusable or justifiable. "To prove that a violation of a section of the Vehicle Code such as that charged in this case was excusable or justifiable so as to overcome the presumption of negligence, the evidence must support a finding that the person who violated the code section did what might reasonable (sic) be expected of a person of ordinary prudence who desired to comply with the law, acting under similar circumstances.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 196 Cal. App. 2d 482 - Anderson v. Low · 206 Cal. App. 2d 582 - Brown v. Connolly

2. ““ ‘It is quite clear,' therefore, that the instructions are not only ambiguous but actually conflicting. ■ The respondent contends that no conflict appears because the instructions should be read together, and when the contributory negligence instruction is read with the presumptive negligence instruction the conflict disappears. Of course, the rule has frequently been stated that instructions must be read together and considered as a whole. But that rule will not cure the error here. Here the. jury was told .that a child’s contributory negligence is to be measured by a special limited subjective standard, and, in very, general,and ambiguous words, that such special standard applies to his general conduct on the highway. Then, later in the charge, and apparently unconnected with these instructions, the jury was told that under a specific state of facts;—violation of a statute—contributory negligence is presumed unless the violators act with ordinary prudence. Obviously, even when read together, the specific instruction controls the general. In such a case the later instruction is not only ambiguous but clearly erroneous! ’”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 206 Cal. App. 2d 582 - Brown v. Connolly

3. “In the Cummings ease, supra (ante, at p. 263) this court had the following to say about substantially similar instructions: ‘ Standing alone, the [per se] instruction is clearly erroneous. Its vice is that it states that a breach of the statute creates a presumption of negligence that can only be overcome by the violator, whether he be child or adult, by doing”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 206 Cal. App. 2d 582 - Brown v. Connolly