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← 56 F.3d 265 - United States v. Ford

United States v. Ford’s Empirical Analysis

56 F.3d 265 · 1995

Citation profile

49
cited by 49 later decisions
8
states following
January 2024
most recently cited

25 federal appellate · 4 district · 14 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 49 later decisions — most recently January 2024 · most notably Sharrar v. Felsing (1997), 196 W. Va. 104 - State v. Lacy (1996)

25 federal appellate · 4 district · 14 state decisions

2101995200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 924 · 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act)

Relies on Terry v. Ohio · Katz v. United States · Coolidge v. New Hampshire · Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden · Mincey v. Arizona

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 49 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"The law enforcement officers who arrested Ford lacked a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area searched harbored a dangerous individual, which would justify Bute's second type of sweep. In its brief, the Government argues that the officers had the requisite articulable facts for Buie's second type of sweep: because the background check revealed that appellant had prior arrests and that the present arrest warrant was for homicide, the officers could assume that Ford might be armed and dangerous. However, when Godfrey began his sweep, appellant had already been arrested and placed in the custody of the police officers. As we recently stated in another protective sweep case, `the officers' awareness that [appellant] had a previous weapons conviction and could be dangerous did not itself directly justify the sweep. Once [appellant] was in custody, he no longer posed a threat to the police.' United States v. Henry, 48 F.3d 1282, 1284 (D.C.Cir.1995) (finding articulable suspicion based on informant's warning that appellant would have weapons, that appellant's `boys' or 'counterparts' might be with him, and that, when arrested just outside his front door, appellant said `they got me'); see also United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d 1095, 1097 (10th Cir.1990) (`[T]he danger which justifies a protective sweep comes from the possible presence of other armed and dangerous persons in the vicinity.'), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 986 , 112 S.Ct. 596 , 116 L.Ed.2d ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “contain spaces which were not immediately adjoining the place of” arrest. Moreover, the evidence in this case was seized from a television stand that was visible the moment Officer Riddle entered the bedroom. 6 . The defendant does not contend there was any infirmity in the proof of the “during and in relation to” element of the offense. 7 . The district court advised the defendant that he would be pleading guilty to the following charge:”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “in the small hallway, which was three to five feet in length. The bedroom entered by officer Walker opened into the hallway and was a place immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.