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56 Miss. 318

Levy v. Gray

Mississippi Supreme Court

Decided January 15, 1879

Mississippi Supreme Court · decided 1879-01-15

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of Claiborne County.</p> <p>Hon. J. B. ChrismaN, Judge.</p> <p>The nature of the action is stated in the opinion, of the court. On the trial, the court below gave the following instruction for the plaintiff: —</p> <p>“ 4. If the jury believe from the evidence that Bettie Gray refused to sign the deed of trust when it was presented to her, and before its execution, then she will not be bound by it.”</p> <p>The court refused to give an instruction asked for the defendant, as follows : =—</p> <p>“ If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff’s ■claim to the cotton is fraudulent, and that she stood by and saw her husband mortgage the mule to procure supplies, and did not disclose any claim to the mule, then they must, find for the defendant for said cotton and said mule, no matter who really owned the mule, or who nominally rented the land, and no matter whether the plaintiff signed said deed or not.”</p> <p>The effect of the evidence is stated in the opinion of the court. The verdict and judgment were in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant sued out a writ of error, and assigned as grounds therefor the giving of the fourth instruction for the plaintiff, and the refusal of that asked for the defendant.</p> <p>1. The defendant in error is estopped lew her conduct to claim the property in controversy. Ferguson v- Bobo, 54 Miss. 121; Upham v. Gibson, 53 Miss. 34.</p> <p>2. The evidence entitled the plaintiff in error to the instruction asked for him in the court below.</p> <p>1. The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied against the defendant in error, as she neither joined in the deed of trust nor acknowledged it, as required by statute. Code 1871, sect. 1778. .</p> <p>2. There was no evidence to warrant the giving of the instruction asked for by the plaintiff in error.</p>

Relies on Ferguson v. Bobo · Upshaw v. Gibson

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1879-01-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently March 1942

5 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Chalmers, J.,

¶1delivered the opinion of the court.

¶2Mrs. Bettie Gray brought this action of replevin to recover the possession from Levy, trustee of Stern, Levy & Co., of two bales of cotton and a mule, which had by said trustee been taken under the provisions of a trust deed executed by the husband of said Bettie.

¶3The court below refused to chai’ge the jury, at the instance of defendant, that plaintiif could not recover the cotton if they believed her claim to be fraudulent. This refusal, it is said, was justifiable, because there was no testimony tending to show a fraudulent claim on her part, and none, therefore, to which the charge was applicable.

¶4We cannot adopt this view. While perhaps most of the testimony adduced was in support of the boná ftdes of the claim, there was some (we refer especially to that delivered by the witness Abner Gray) which tended to show that it was fraudulent. This portion of defendant’s charge, therefore, should have been given.

¶5The mule was clearly shown to be the property of plaintiif, Bettie Gray, but it had been mortgaged by her husband; and there was testimony to the effect that the wife was present when the mortgage was executed on the mule and the crops; that the same was read to her, and she was asked to-sign it, and that she declined to sign, because, as she said,, “she was sickly, and did not expect to work in the crop,”— thereby acquiescing in it, so far as the mule was concerned, and giving no notice of any claim on her part as to it; that she on that day took up goods on the faith of the mortgage, and continued so to do during the year; that ever since she had owned the mule her husband had been in the habit of mortgaging it in his own name, with her knowledge, for supplies; that she had given no notice to any one of her title to the animal, until the bringing of this suit; that the mortgagees had no. knowledge of such title, and, in taking the security, acted upon the statement of the husband, in her presence, that he owned the animal.

¶6*321If these facts are true, the wife is estopped to claim the mule as against the mortgagees.

¶7There are no restrictions, by our statute, upon the power of a married woman to dispose of her separate personal property ; and she will be held, when of full age, estopped to reclaim it when by her silence, at a time when she was called upon to speak, she has induced others to act upon the belief, thereby engendered, that it does not belong to her. This principle was distinctly announced in Upham v. Gibson, 53 Miss. 341, in which case we failed to apply it because of the minority of Mrs. Upham. If minority existed in this case, it should have been shown. Bettie Gray sues in her own name, and neither her husband nor a jgrochein ami is joined. The presumption is that she is of full age. Infants, even, are frequently estopped in equity, at least from the perpetration of frauds. Ferguson v. Bobo, 54 Miss. 121.

¶8The instruction asked by defendant should have been given, and the fourth instruction given for plaintiff should have been refused.

¶9Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

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