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56 Miss. 394

Elson v. Barrier

Mississippi Supreme Court

Decided January 15, 1879

Mississippi Supreme Court · decided 1879-01-15

Hon. J. S. Hamm, Judge. In April, 1876, J. C. Ward executed a deed of trust on his crop to be grown that year, to B,. Wilson, as trustee, to secure a debt of $93 which he then owed B. J. Barrier, and $70 to be advanced in supplies to him during the year by Barrier. The parties resided in Neshoba County, the crop was to be produced there, and the deed of trust was executed and recorded in that county.

Relies on Westmoreland v. Wooten · Cloud v. State ex rel. McAlexander

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1879-01-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently April 1934

1 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

201879188018901900191019201930decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Campbell, J.,

¶1delivered the opinion of the court.

¶2The result reached in the Circuit Court in this case is correct, and will not be disturbed, although the contest was made on what we do not regard as the real ground of controversy suggested by the facts.

¶3Plaintiffs in error were purchasers of the cotton conveyed by the deed of trust, with full legal notice of the right of defendant in error as the beneficiary in the deed of trust. The fact that the cotton was sold in a county other than that in which the deed of trust was recorded, did not release it from the deed of trust. Code, sect. 2305; Bogard v. Gardley, 4 Smed. & M. 302.

¶4It is claimed .that the cases of Westmoreland v. Wooten, 51 Miss. 825, and Cloud v. The State, 53 Miss. 662, deny the liability of the purchasers of the cotton to answer in assumpsit for the value of the cotton. Not so. A deed of trust does not create a mere lien ; it confers title ; and, after condition broken, the legal title is in the grantee, and he may maintain any action which an owner can maintain. A lien is a charge upon a thing, a right to resort to it for satisfaction, but is neither jus in re nor jus ad rem; and, therefore, no action can be maintained by the lien-creditor which requires title for its maintenance, for the obvious reason that he has not title. *397Hence, the manifest distinction between the two classes of cases. The difference is between a mere right to fasten a charge on a thing, and a title to a thing, with all the incidents of title.

¶5Affirmed.

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