Dworman v. Lee

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[The plaintiff in Dworman contended that the Appellate Division had dismissed the complaint for failure to plead the circumstances of the alleged fraud with particularity.] Thus, the Dworman brief in the New York Court of Appeals devoted Point III to the position that “THE FRAUD CAUSES OF ACTION ARE PLEADED WITH SUFFICIENT SPECIFICITY,” stated that “The Appellate Division held that the fraud causes of action had not been pleaded with sufficient specificity,” and argued, as does Aeronca here, that the allegations of fraud are sufficient to meet the requirements of sections 3013 ánd 3016(b) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. It concludes this point [by repeating] that “the plaintiffs [sic] fraud allegations have been pleaded with sufficient specificity to permit the case to proceed through discovery.” However, the Court of Appeals rejected this misstatement of the decision of the Appellate Division, which the Court of Appeals affirmed because it was plain that the [Appellate Division] was not dealing with the requisite particularity or specificity under sections 3013 and 3016(b), but rather held that the [Dworman complaint failed to state a cause of action for fraud]. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 41-42 (footnote and citations omitted). This Court, however, does not see how the Court of Appeals decision clarifies matters. The Court of Appeals simply affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, “with costs, for the reasons stated in the memorandum at the Appe”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Aeronca, Inc. v. Gorin