56 Va. App. 569 - Armstead v. Commonwealth’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

40 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[Fjaced with a suppression motion, a court should not limit itself “to what the stopping officer says or to evidence of his subjective rationale,” Raab v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 577, 583, n. 2 , 652 S.E.2d 144, 148, n. 2 (2007) (en banc) (citation omitted), but should look instead to what a reasonable, objective officer could have concluded from the totality of the circumstances. “Just as a subjective belief by the arresting officer would not establish probable cause where none existed, a subjective belief by the arresting officer cannot destroy probable cause where it exists.” United States v. Anderson, 923 F.2d 450, 457 (6th Cir. 1991); cf. Jones v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 665, 673 , 691 S.E.2d 801, 805 (2010) (holding an “officer’s subjective characterization of observed conduct is not relevant to a court’s analysis concerning whether there is a reasonable suspicion because the Court’s review of whether there was reasonable suspicion involves application of an objective rather than a subjective standard” (citation omitted)).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Augustus