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← 560 F.3d 404 - Lytle v. Bexar County

Lytle v. Bexar County’s Empirical Analysis

560 F.3d 404 · 2009

Citation profile

130
cited by 130 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
June 2025
most recently cited

26 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 130 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2025 · most notably Mullenix v. Luna (2015), Lamont v. New Jersey (2011)

26 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions

890200920102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

Relationships

Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Graham v. Connor · Mitchell v. Forsyth · Pearson v. Callahan

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 130 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[a]llegations that an officer used excessive force in conducting a seizure complicates the Saucier inquiry. This complexity stems from having to make two “overlapping objective reasonableness inquiries].” ... We must first answer the constitutional violation question by determining whether the officer’s conduct met the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement ... If we find that the officer’s conduct was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we must then answer the qualified immunity question by determining whether the law was sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated the constitution. In other words, at this second step, we must ask the somewhat convoluted question of whether the law lacked such clarity that it would be reasonable for an officer to erroneously believe that his conduct was reasonable. Despite any seeming similarity between these two questions, they are distinct inquiries under Saucier, and we must conduct them both.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “If the determination of qualified immunity would require the resolution of a genuinely disputed fact, then that fact is material and we lack jurisdiction over the appeal.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “a passing risk to a police officer is not an - 79 - In holding that the officers' testimony was entirely consistent as to Root's movements immediately prior to the shooting, my view is that the majority has taken an unduly narrow view of the evidence. Op. 35, 36-37. It is readily apparent that the officers' accounts contain many inconsistencies as to Root's movements directly before the shooting. While some officers stated that Root was seated or kneeling, others recalled Root standing on two feet, and one officer first testified that Root was standing but later said that Root was merely attempting to stand. There were also officers who testified that Root's hand was by his chest the entire time, while others said Root moved his hand up to his chest. Some of the officers observed Root reaching into his jacket, others testified that they fired because Root was removing his hand from his jacket, and yet another officer testified that ongoing license to kill an otherwise unthreatening suspect.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.