IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 49953
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Boise, August 2024 Term
)
v. ) Opinion filed: December 4, 2024
)
GERARDO RAUL CHAVEZ, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Twin Falls County. Benjamin J. Cluff, District Judge.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Nevin, Benjamin & McKay, Boise, for Appellant. Dennis Benjamin argued.
Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Kenneth Jorgensen
argued.
_______________________________________________
MOELLER, Justice.
Gerardo Raul Chavez appeals his conviction of second-degree murder for the 2016 killing
of Vason Widaman. While Chavez was in custody at the Twin Falls County jail on a probation
violation, he was recorded making a series of incriminating statements to another inmate who was
acting as a confidential informant on behalf of the State. The State sought to introduce those
recordings in its case-in-chief at trial. Chavez moved to suppress his statements to the informant.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, ultimately suppressing just a few
of the recorded statements.
The jury acquitted Chavez of first-degree murder but convicted him of the lesser-included
charge of second-degree murder with a firearm enhancement. The district court later sentenced
Chavez to an indeterminate life sentence with a 42-year fixed term. After sentencing and entry of
judgment, Chavez filed a motion for a new trial, along with a motion for permission to contact
jurors to support his motion for a new trial. The court denied both motions.
1
On appeal, Chavez argues that the district court (1) erred in denying his motion to suppress,
(2) abused its discretion by imposing a 42-year fixed sentence, (3) violated the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by considering acquitted conduct at
sentencing, and (4) erred in denying the post-trial motion for permission to contact jurors. For the
reasons stated below, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 7, 2016, fifteen-year-old Vason Widaman was killed in a “drive-by-type
shooting,” allegedly over a $700 drug debt. Chavez was arrested and charged with first-degree
murder for the crime. In July of 2016, two months after the murder but prior to Chavez being
charged, Chavez was jailed for a probation violation in connection with another criminal case.
While held in the Twin Falls County jail on that probation violation, Chavez was cellmates with
Manuel Acevedo, who was also in custody for a probation violation and three new felonies. After
being housed with Chavez, Acevedo reached out to the Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney’s
Office multiple times, asserting that he had information he learned from Chavez regarding
Widaman’s murder. On one such occasion, Acevedo informed the State that Chavez “had
confessed to murdering Widaman,” and offered to wear a wire in exchange for a deal in his own
case. By this point, Chavez had already been charged with first-degree murder for the killing.
Thereafter, Acevedo was interviewed twice by police about the information Chavez was
telling him regarding Chavez’s involvement in Widaman’s murder. Acevedo “signed a proffer to
the effect that [Chavez] confessed to Acevedo that [Chavez] was the person who shot Widaman.”
Acevedo eventually reached a plea agreement with the State. As a part of that deal, he agreed to
wear a wire to record Chavez and to testify truthfully as needed at a future trial. As found by the
district court, Acevedo then proceeded to wear a concealed wire over a period of six days:
On June 27, 2017, Twin Falls Police Detective Ken Rivers and FBI Special
Agent Kyle Wright met with Acevedo and provided him with a special jumpsuit
containing an electronic recording device. Acevedo was instructed to not initiate
any conversation with [Chavez] regarding the shooting, nor to actively question
[Chavez], but to simply record when [Chavez] voluntarily began discussing the
shooting. Over a period of six days, involving numerous conversations with
Acevedo, [Chavez] described in detail what happened the day Widaman was killed,
and actions taken by [Chavez] following the killing. During these conversations,
[Chavez] consistently, repeatedly, and in detail, implicated himself in the shooting
of Widaman. On July 3, 2017, the electronic recording device was returned to
Detective Rivers who created an electronic record of the conversations between
[Chavez] and Acevedo.
2
When the State sought to introduce evidence of these conversations, both through
Acevedo’s testimony and admission of the recordings themselves, Chavez moved to suppress the
statements as violative of his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. 1 Chavez argued that because he
had asserted his right to counsel long before the time of the recordings, any incriminating
statements recorded by Acevedo were elicited in violation of his constitutional rights. The State
broadly objected to the motion, and then identified “thirteen portions of the recordings that it
intend[ed] to introduce at trial.” Accordingly, the district court limited its ruling to only the
portions of the conversation the State sought to admit.
Prior to analyzing the conversations, the district court found that Acevedo was explicitly
instructed not to initiate any discussions with Chavez, nor to ask him any questions. Instead,
Acevedo was “instructed to simply turn on the recording device whenever [Chavez]’s conversation
began to turn to the shooting.” Detective Rivers even took the additional step of speaking with
Acevedo’s attorney, “so that his instructions to Acevedo not to ask any questions would be further
impressed upon Acevedo.”
The district court then addressed each of the thirteen statements individually, finding that
eleven of the thirteen proffered excerpts were admissible. For two of the eleven admitted
statements, the district court redacted portions from each conversation. Thus, the district court
excluded two statements, redacted portions of two statements, and admitted the remaining nine
statements in toto.
Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial before a Twin Falls County jury. After deliberating
for just over three days, the jury acquitted Chavez of first-degree murder, but convicted him of the
lesser included offense of second-degree murder and a firearm enhancement under Idaho Code
section 18-4003. The district court later sentenced Chavez to an indeterminate life sentence with
the first 42-years fixed. He was granted credit for the time he served in custody pending trial.
After trial, and in accordance with its normal practice, the State moved to release juror
contact information so that it could send jurors a questionnaire “to allow the prosecuting attorney’s
office to more efficiently present its cases to jurors.” Finding good cause, the district court granted
1
The district court noted that Chavez “did not appear [to seek suppression of] of the non-recorded statements made
by [Chavez] to Acevedo prior to the recordings. . . .” Nevertheless, the district court addressed those statements as
well, concluding that since Acevedo was not yet an agent of the government there was no violation of Chavez’s
constitutional rights. Fields, 127 Idaho at 910, 908 P.2d at 1217. Chavez does not challenge this on appeal.
3
the motion, permitting both parties access to certain information about the jurors. The district
court’s order specifically stated:
A request has been filed in this case where an attorney seeks contact information
concerning the jurors who rendered verdict in this case. The motion asserts the need
for this contact information so counsel may inquire of those jurors concerning
performance of counsel. The [c]ourt finds good cause for this motion and authorizes
and directs the jury commissioner to release the phone number, address and any
email address to the attorneys for both parties in this case for the sole and limited
purpose of permitting counsel to contact jurors, provided however that the jury
commissioner SHALL NOT release such information if juror has specifically
request [sic] that this information remain confidential. Further, the [c]ourt orders
that this contact information shall not be disseminated to third parties and shall be
strictly retained in counsel’s files.
When contacting jurors, counsel are reminded of the [c]ourt’s admonition to jurors
that they are not required to participate in post-verdict interviews.
On June 24, 2022, the district court set a hearing with the parties to address reports that a
third party had been in contact with multiple jurors from the trial. At the hearing, the district court
explained that the Jury Commissioner had advised the district court that she had received a report
from one of the jurors from the trial.2 The juror disclosed that a private investigator named Stuart
Robinson had gone to the juror’s home to convince the juror that the prosecutor in the case had
been glaring at and otherwise intimidating the jurors through his body language during trial. The
juror reported that Robinson’s visit made her feel “uncomfortable” and “extremely concerned that
anybody would have her name and address.” The district court also noted that a second juror had
reported to the court an uncomfortable interaction with Robinson. This juror felt frightened and
concerned by the contact, not only about safety, but also because the juror’s name and contact
information had been disclosed to the defense in a murder trial.
At the hearing, both the State and Chavez’s trial counsel told the district court that neither
of them had disclosed any juror contact information to a third party. However, attorney Dennis
Benjamin, who would later substitute as counsel for Chavez, explained that Robinson was an
investigator in his employ. Mr. Benjamin explained that he had retained Robinson to assist him in
some investigation related to Chavez’s post-sentencing matters; however, citing attorney-client
privilege, he declined to further expand on the nature of the relationship. The district court
2
While some of the information discussed here is contained in documents sealed at the request of the State, both
parties have freely referenced such information in their respective briefs, which were not submitted under seal.
Accordingly, this Court will reference such information as needed.
4
determined that the actions taken by Mr. Benjamin and Robinson were contrary to the district
court’s prior order relating to juror contact. To that end, the district court made clear that there was
to be no further contact with any jurors absent a further order from the district court.
At sentencing, Chavez’s argument centered on the 15-year sentence his co-defendant (who
was the driver of the car during the murder) received and urged the district court to give the same
sentence to Chavez. During the hearing, counsel for Chavez explained that he did not “go into
details of all -- why all the -- all the factors and the like because I think there is mitigation simply
because of the age and the codefendant in this matter, [in whose case the prosecuting attorney]
agreed to a 15-year sentence to the person that pled guilty to second-degree murder should be 15
years.” Chavez’s trial counsel additionally stated that: “I think that should be what the sentencing
is in Mr. Chavez’s case, the same as the person that pled guilty to the second-degree.”
Prior to announcing its sentence, the district court reviewed in detail the relevant sentencing
factors, including those listed in Idaho Code section 19-2521. In discussing the mitigating factors
set forth in section 19-2521(2), the district court highlighted subsection (b), noting:
The second factor is whether or not you contemplated that your criminal conduct
would cause or threaten harm. It’s clear through the evidence that was presented at
trial that you contemplated that your conduct would cause harm. The evidence
demonstrated that you went looking for Vason Widaman in order to harm or kill
him. And when you did find him, you pointed your loaded gun at him and
discharged your weapon several times, multiple times. This was no accident. You
contemplated that your actions would kill the defendant – or excuse me – would
kill Mr. Widaman.
Ultimately, the district court sentenced Chavez to “a unified sentence of life, which include[d] the
weapons enhancement . . . . [and incarceration] for a fixed period of time of 42 years with the
indeterminate portion, a life sentence.”
Following sentencing, Mr. Benjamin filed a notice of substitution of counsel. The same
day, Chavez filed a motion for a new trial. A day later, Chavez filed a motion for permission to
contact jurors and a motion to disqualify both the Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney and the
Twin Falls County prosecutor’s office. The district court denied the motion to disqualify and the
motion for permission to contact jurors. Later, the district court denied the motion for a new trial.
Thereafter, Chavez timely appealed to this Court.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court ordinarily applies a bifurcated standard of review when considering an appellate
challenge to a district court’s decision on a suppression motion. State v. Maahs, 171 Idaho 738,
5
744, 525 P.3d 1131, 1137 (2023) (citing State v. Phipps,
166 Idaho 1, 4,
454 P.3d 1084, 1087
(2019). “When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial court’s
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found.” Phipps,
166 Idaho at 4,
454 P.3d at 1087 (quoting
State v. Mullins,
164 Idaho 493, 496,
432 P.3d 42, 45 (2018)). However, “where this Court has
exactly the same evidence before it as was considered by the district court . . . we do not extend
the usual deference to the district court’s evaluation of the evidence.” State v. Andersen,
164 Idaho
309, 312,
429 P.3d 850, 853 (2018). “Under these limited circumstances, this Court has determined
that its role on appeal is to freely review the evidence and weigh the evidence in the same manner
as the trial court would do.” State v. Lankford,
162 Idaho 477, 492,
399 P.3d 804, 819 (2017). But
where the district court “also heard live testimony at the motion to suppress hearing and drew on
that testimony when making its factual findings,” this Court applies “the usual standard of review
and consider[s] whether the district court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous.” Maahs,
171
Idaho at 744,
525 P.3d at 1137. “A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by
substantial and competent evidence.” Hood v. Poorman,
171 Idaho 176, 186,
519 P.3d 769, 789
(2022) (citation omitted).
In reviewing a sentence that has been challenged for being excessive, we apply an abuse
of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8,
368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016). Additionally,
“[a] trial court’s decision to permit post-verdict discovery of jurors is reviewed according to an
abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Garcia-Ongay,
169 Idaho 1, 3,
490 P.3d 1, 5 (2021) (citing
Hall v. State,
151 Idaho 42, 45,
253 P.3d 716, 719 (2011)). Under the abuse of discretion standard,
this Court reviews “[w]hether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason.” State v. Villa-Guzman,
166 Idaho 382, 384,
458 P.3d 960, 962 (2020) (quoting
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163 Idaho 856, 863,
421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
IV. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Chavez argues that the district court (A) erred in denying his motion to suppress
statements allegedly obtained in violation of his right to counsel, (B) abused its discretion by
imposing an indeterminate life sentence with a fixed term of 42 years, (C) violated the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by considering acquitted conduct at sentencing,
6
and (D) erred in denying his post-trial motion for permission to contact jurors. We will address
each argument in turn.
A. The admission of Chavez’s statements to his cellmate did not violate his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.
The first issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in denying Chavez’s motion to
suppress the incriminating statements Chavez made to Acevedo. Chavez asserts that Acevedo,
acting as an agent of the government, deliberately elicited incriminating information from Chavez
without his attorney present in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Before
addressing the merits of this contention, we must determine the applicable standard of review.
1. Because the district court heard and considered live testimony in ruling on the motion to
suppress, we will not conduct a de novo review and will instead review the district court’s
factual findings and determine whether they were clearly erroneous.
Chavez argues that this Court should review the suppression motion de novo, contending
that the evidence before us on appeal is the same as the evidence considered by the district court.
Chavez maintains that the standard established in State v. Andersen should apply in this instance.
164 Idaho 309, 312,
429 P.3d 850, 853 (2018).
In Andersen, the district court considered a motion to suppress at a hearing where “neither
party presented testimony.” Id. Instead, “the parties stipulated to introduction of the preliminary
hearing transcript and a video recording created by [the police officer] of her contact with [the
defendant].”
Id. On appeal of that motion to this Court, we noted that the case “present[ed] the
unusual situation where this Court ha[d] exactly the same evidence before it as was considered by
the district court: the transcript of the preliminary hearing and the video recording. . . .” Id. at 312,
429 P.3d at 853. (Emphasis added). In those limited and unusual circumstances, we “freely review
the evidence and weigh the evidence in the same manner as the trial court would do.”
Id. (quoting
Lankford,
162 Idaho at 492,
399 P.3d at 819).
However, we later distinguished the situation presented in Andersen from the one in State
v. Maahs. 171 Idaho at 744,
525 P.3d at 1137. There, in ruling on a motion to suppress, the district
court not only considered the preliminary hearing transcript and the officer’s body camera footage,
but also “heard live testimony at the motion to suppress hearing and drew on that testimony in
making [its] factual findings.”
Id. Because the evidence before this Court on appeal was not the
same that was before the district court, the case did not fit within “the same unique and narrow
7
circumstances as Andersen.” Id. Thus, we applied “the usual standard of review and consider[ed]
whether the district court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous.”
Id.
In this case, the district court considered the audio recordings and the transcripts of the
conversations between Chavez and Acevedo, both of which are before this Court on appeal.
However, both Chavez and Detective Rivers testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress, and
the district court relied, at least in part, on that testimony in making its factual findings. 3 Thus,
because the district court considered both the weight and credibility of live witness testimony in
making its factual findings, the situation is equivalent to the one in Maahs, where the evidence
before this Court is not identical to the evidence before the district court. For this reason, we apply
the usual standard of review and consider whether the district court’s factual findings were clearly
erroneous.
2. The district court did not err in determining that the admitted portions of Chavez’s
incriminating statements were not deliberately elicited.
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held that “once the adversary
judicial process has been initiated, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have
counsel present at all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings.” Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S.
778, 786 (2009) (first citing United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 227–228 (1967); and then citing
Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)). Importantly, “[i]nterrogation by the State is such a
stage.”
Id. (first citing Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 204–205 (1964); and then citing
United States v. Henry,
447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980)). The United States Supreme Court has further
explained that “an accused is denied ‘the basic protections’ of the Sixth Amendment ‘when there
[is] used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents . . .
deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.’ ”
Fellers v. United States,
540 U.S. 519, 523 (2004) (emphasis added) (alteration in original)
(quoting Massiah,
377 U.S. at 206) (other citations omitted).
This Court has recognized this protection in the context of both the United States
Constitution and the Idaho Constitution: “The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
3
For example, the district court noted in its memorandum decision and order on the motion to suppress that “[Chavez]
testified at the hearing of this matter that the recorded conversations did not include everything that he and Acevedo
spoke about. [Chavez] further testified that Acevedo asked him questions about his case.” The district court then noted
that it “had the opportunity to observe [Chavez] while on the witness stand, and the [c]ourt affords very little weight
to [Chavez]’s testimony in this regard.” The district court also made clear that Chavez “presented no testimony as to
what specific questions were asked by Acevedo, what specific answers were given, and whether any of the questions
or answers were incriminating in nature.”
8
and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution clearly bar admission of statements deliberately
elicited by governmental agents from an incarcerated defendant who is represented by counsel.”
State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904, 910,
908 P.2d 1211, 1217 (1995) (emphasis added) (first citing
Henry,
447 U.S. at 270; then citing Massiah,
377 U.S. at 206; and then citing State v. Fain,
116
Idaho 82, 85,
774 P.2d 252, 255, cert. denied,
493 U.S. 917 (1989)).
In the context of inmate informants, “this prohibition does not require that testimony be
excluded where inmate informants have not made any affirmative effort to elicit statements from
the defendant or initiated conversations about the alleged crime.” Fields, 127 Idaho at 910,
908
P.2d at 1217. Instead, “[i]n order to establish that he was subjected to an unconstitutional
interrogation, [the defendant] must ‘demonstrate that the police and their informants took some
action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.’ ”
Fields,
127 Idaho at 910,
908 P.2d at 1217 (quoting Fain,
116 Idaho at 85,
774 P.2d at 255). Thus,
in Fields, this Court articulated the two-part test for evaluating an alleged Sixth Amendment
violation of this nature: “The inquiry . . . requires that this Court determine whether (1) the inmates
were acting as agents of the police, and (2) the informants affirmatively and deliberately elicited
the incriminating statements.”
Id. (citing Depree v. Thomas,
946 F.2d 784, 793 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Acevedo was not acting as an agent of the government when he initially contacted law
enforcement and informed them that Chavez had made incriminating statements regarding the
killing of Vason Widaman. However, it is undisputed that Acevedo was acting as an agent of the
government when he recorded Chavez making additional incriminating statements. Thus, the only
question is whether Acevedo “deliberately elicited” the incriminating statements from Chavez that
are contained in the State’s recordings.
In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, the United States Supreme Court analyzed what it means to
deliberately elicit incriminating statements from a defendant. 477 U.S. 436 (1986). Discussing
Massiah and the subsequent cases in its wake, the Supreme Court noted that the Massiah test was
adopted “to protect accused persons from indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those
conducted in the jailhouse.”
Id. at 457 (citation omitted). “Thus, the Court made clear that it was
concerned with interrogation or investigative techniques that were equivalent to interrogation
. . . .”
Id. Further, because the Sixth Amendment is not violated when the State obtains
incriminating statements from the defendant by luck or happenstance, “a defendant does not make
9
out a violation of that right simply by showing that an informant, either through prior arrangement
or voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to the police.” Id. at 459.
In determining whether the recorded statements made by Chavez to Acevedo were
deliberately elicited, the district court reviewed the transcript of their conversations, listened to the
actual audio recordings of the conversations, and heard the live testimony of Chavez and Detective
Rivers regarding the conversations. The district court individually addressed each of the thirteen
portions of the conversations the State sought to admit, referring to each portion in order (such as
“Acevedo 1” for the first, “Acevedo 2” for the second, and so on; for ease of reference, this Court
will do the same) and ruled on each as follows.
As for Acevedo 1, the district court admitted a portion of the conversation containing a
long, uninterrupted monologue by Chavez. The conversation started out as an unremarkable
discussion of each other’s legal woes, with both Chavez and Acevedo lamenting their current
situations. As the conversation went on, Chavez began to provide more detail about his situation
and involvement in Widaman’s murder. During Chavez’s long monologue, Acevedo did ask
questions of Chavez, but they were general, conversational questions such as: “You alright, man?”
and “What do you mean?” Acevedo also made general statements such as “Uh huh,” and “Yeah,”
as Chavez shared his story, as if to let Chavez know he was still listening and following him.
Eventually, Chavez launched into a lengthy discussion of his mental state in relation to the murder,
stating he “never had nightmares about it” and felt that “everything [he] did was justified to a
certain level.” He also relayed that he felt pressure from his co-defendant in the moment of the
shooting, and ending by stating “that’s when everything went fucking wrong. You know what’s
fucked up, though?”
The district court, in applying the relevant standard, found the initial statements and
questions from Acevedo (such as “You alright man?” and “What do you mean?”) as being “clearly
general in nature and not interrogating questions seeking incriminating statements.” The district
court then found that Chavez’s monologue was “not the product of any deliberate elicitation by
Acevedo. Indeed, Acevedo did not even speak for several minutes before [Chavez] made these
statements.” Accordingly, the district court denied the motion to suppress Acevedo 1.
The same conversation from above continued in Acevedo 2. After Acevedo responded to
the question at the end of Chavez’s first monologue by simply stating, “No,” Chavez launched into
another lengthy monologue, describing his behavior immediately following the murder. Chavez
10
described the location of the murder, the location of a witness at the scene, and expressed doubt
and frustration about a witness’s account of the murder. The district court admitted the statements,
finding that they “were not the result of Acevedo affirmatively and deliberately eliciting
incriminating statements from [Chavez].” However, the district court suppressed the final two lines
of Acevedo 2, where Acevedo asked Chavez a specific question about the location of a witness to
the shooting that he described in his preceding monologue. Acevedo asked, “Dang, okay, so… she
was where?” The district court found that the question deliberately elicited an incriminating
statement from Chavez; therefore, it suppressed the question and accompanying answer.
In Acevedo 3, the conversation turned to the topic of orange juice. After Acevedo asserted
that he thought oranges tasted “like clay,” Chavez responded in the following manner: “Oranges
taste nasty. I don’t like them. Damn, I don’t like talking about it, but it all happened so quick. I
should have got out and beat the kid up, you know what I mean?” The district court admitted this
statement, again finding it to be a spontaneous comment that was not deliberately elicited by
Acevedo’s comment about oranges. However, Acevedo subsequently responded to the statement
about “beating up a kid” with a question by asking, “Who?” and Chavez responded by saying,
“The kid that was shot,” and “I should have got out and beat him up. I’d way rather take an
aggravated assault than this charge, you know what I mean? Fuck.” The district court suppressed
the question by Acevedo and the answer by Chavez, finding that because the “clarification sought
further incriminating information from [Chavez],” it was a deliberate elicitation of incriminating
information.
The same themes and structure of the conversations continue throughout each excerpt.
Acevedo 4 consists of multiple unsolicited, lengthy monologues from Chavez, detailing the
circumstances leading up to the murder, focusing on events from several months beforehand. The
district court noted that throughout the day that Chavez made the statements in Acevedo 4, he
“would randomly begin speaking about his involvement in the crime. This [was] true even when
other subjects were being discussed by the parties.” The district court provided specific examples:
“For example, prior to the statements made in Acevedo 4, [Chavez] was discussing the amount of
money to be made by apparently dealing drugs. [Chavez] then unexpectedly changes the direction
of his comments.” Therefore, the district court concluded that the “statements made in Acevedo 4
clearly resulted from [Chavez] spontaneously launching into a monologue about how he ‘didn’t
want to do it.’ ”
11
At one point in Acevedo 4, Chavez referenced the murder victim’s name, “Vason.”
However, Acevedo misheard Chavez, thinking he said “Mason,” the name of Acevedo’s son.
Acevedo asked, “What was his name?” When Chavez replied with, “Vason,” Acevedo followed
up by asking, “With a V?” to which Chavez responded in the affirmative. The district court found
that Acevedo simply misheard Chavez and was seeking clarification due to confusion with his
son’s name, and was not deliberately eliciting incriminating information. Accordingly, the district
court denied the motion to suppress as to Acevedo 4.
Acevedo 5 and 6 were excerpts from the same dialogue as Acevedo 4. The conversation
continued as follows:
Acevedo: Where my socks at?
Chavez: What?
Acevedo: Not that one.
Chavez: I have your socks.
Acevedo: Oh, then what happened?
Chavez: I have your socks. Lift the head up. There should be a pair of socks in
there, I think. They are clean. Anyways, and so about four months down the road
after all this shit happened, like, what the hell? Fold them back up (the socks).
Anyways . . . .
Chavez then went on to describe the situation between him and Widaman four months
before the murder, tracking the events up to the point where he “smoked his ass.” This
monologue was very lengthy, uninterrupted by Acevedo, except for the occasional,
“Yeah,” to let Chavez know he was still listening. The district court found the statements
were not the result of deliberate elicitation, explaining:
In addressing the portions of the recorded conversations titled Acevedo 5
and 6, which are excerpts of the same monologue by Defendant, the [district court]
finds that Defendant’s statements were not the result of Acevedo affirmatively and
deliberately eliciting incriminating statements from Defendant. As with the other
parts of the recording, the [c]ourt listened to the actual dialogue between the two
cellmates. Following Defendant’s statements in Acevedo 4, there is a clear break
in Defendant’s monologue while Acevedo is attempting to locate his socks. After
some discussion about Acevedo’s socks and what may have happened to them,
Defendant launches into another lengthy and uninterrupted monologue regarding
his interactions with, and the killing of, Widaman. At certain points in the
recording, Defendant pauses to ask if Acevedo understands what Defendant is
saying, to which Acevedo responds simply “yeah,” with no encouragement to
12
continue. Accordingly, the [c]ourt denies Defendant’s Motion to Suppress as it
relates to Defendant’s statements as set forth in Acevedo 5 and 6.
In Acevedo 7, Chavez went on to relate in detail the events that occurred after the shooting,
discussing how he attended a party at his house later that night. Acevedo occasionally chimed in
with comments such as, “Yeah. You told me about that,” or just “Yeah.” Following a discussion
of the rap music scene in Twin Falls, Chavez stated:
I still don’t feel bad about it. I mean after I did it, I never felt bad about it. I don’t
feel like, ‘Oh hell yeah, I just smoked that kid’ you know what I mean? I don’t feel
like that either, but, I hate myself for a lot of other reasons though. Cause this, this
is what I wanted, dawg. This is what I wanted. I wanted everyone to know my
name. I wanted to be that one dude that nobody would fuck with, know what I
mean? Nobody stole from me.
The district court found that the statements in Acevedo 7 were simply the result of Chavez
“spontaneously stating that he did not feel bad about it (presumably killing Widaman).” The
district court found that the statement was spontaneous because it “was completely off the topic of
partying and rappers that was being discussed by [Chavez] and Acevedo at the time.”
The district court similarly found the statements in Acevedo 8 to be spontaneous. In
Acevedo 8, Chavez was again loquacious as he shared his insights about the murder. The
conversation was one-sided, with Acevedo intermittently responding by stating, “Uh huh,” and
“Yeah.” At the end of the conversation, Chavez stated: “I shouldn’t have given a fuck what they
thought. I should have done me and just… stuck to my gut feeling and got out and pistol whipped
that little bitch. You know what I mean?” The district court concluded that these statements from
Chavez were “clearly wholly spontaneous,” and Acevedo “did nothing to provoke [Chavez]’s
statements.” Thus, the district court found that the statements in Acevedo 8 were not deliberately
elicited by Acevedo.
In Acevedo 9, the district court noted that it could not discern what Acevedo said to Chavez,
finding it “unintelligible.” Because it could not determine whether the statements sought to
deliberately elicit incriminating information from Chavez, the district court found that Chavez had
not “borne his burden of demonstrating that [Chavez’s] subsequent statements were deliberately
elicited by Acevedo.”
The district court also denied the motion to suppress Acevedo 10, finding that Chavez
“launch[ed] into an unsolicited monologue regarding his feelings about the killing.” Acevedo made
statements such as, “Huh?” and “What?” and “Yeah” and “Uh huh” throughout the exchange. At
13
one point, Chavez asked Acevedo about his view on his own criminal conduct, to which Acevedo
responded. The district court found that “Acevedo’s responsive comments do not appear to be
designed to provoke further incriminating statements by [Chavez]; rather, such statements were
simply engaging in the conversation that clearly [Chavez] wished to have.” Accordingly, the
district court found that Chavez’s statements were not deliberately elicited and denied the
suppression of the statements.
In Acevedo 11, Chavez again freely discussed his feelings about the murder. At one point
in the conversation, the following exchange occurred:
Chavez: I was thinking this is where shit gets real, dawg. This is where my life is
going to change forever or I’m going to fucking - you know what I mean? I’m going
to punk out and fucking, I feel like I would be a punk if I didn’t do it. You know
what I mean? I don’t know why. But I feel like I wouldn’t be me if I didn’t do it,
you know what I mean?
Acevedo: Huh?
Chavez: That is just how I feel.
Acevedo: That you wouldn’t be you if you, that you did it?
Chavez: If I didn’t do it.
Acevedo: If you didn’t do it. Oh, Christ.
The district court again found that Chavez’s statements resulted from Chavez “spontaneously
discussing the killing of Widaman,” and “were clearly not the result of any deliberate elicitation
by Acevedo.”
Finally, the district court agreed with the defense and found that Acevedo 12 and Acevedo
13 “were the result of Acevedo affirmatively and deliberately eliciting incriminating statements
from [Chavez].” The district court explained that: “Although the discussion between Defendant
and Acevedo is lengthy, and it is clear that Defendant independently desired to talk extensively
about the murder, the [district court was] unable to determine where the conversation would have
ended had Acevedo not questioned [Chavez].” Accordingly, the district court granted the motion
and suppressed Acevedo 12 and 13.
On appeal to this Court, Chavez argues that Acevedo “took action, beyond merely
listening, that was deliberately designed to elicit incriminating remarks from Mr. Chavez.” In
Chavez’s view, “[i]n every one of the admitted clips, Mr. Acevedo was engaging Mr. Chavez in
conversation and was not merely a passive listening post. This alone was enough to constitute
deliberate elicitation of the statements, rendering them inadmissible.” Chavez asserts that Acevedo
14
was an active participant in conversation and encouraged Chavez to make the incriminating
statements, thereby deliberately eliciting incriminating statements.
Chavez cites Kuhlmann, which recognized the notion of an informant acting as a mere
“listening post” and, thus, not deliberately eliciting incriminating information from a defendant.
Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 456, n.19. Contrasting that idea to the present case, Chavez argues that by
engaging in general conversation and making passive comments to Chavez, Acevedo was not
simply acting as a “listening post.” In making such an assertion, Chavez argues for an expansive
reading of the Massiah line of cases, positing that any affirmative action taken by the informant is
an improper deliberate elicitation.
While it is true that Kuhlmann suggests that an informant may permissibly act as a mere
“listening post,” it does not go so far as to require the informant to remain totally silent. To hold
that a cellmate informant must literally remain silent—refusing to engage in standard
conversational norms by making ordinary expressions intended to convey that the listener is
following the speaker4—would be contrary to the practical application of Massiah and
misapprehend the purpose of the Sixth Amendment’s protections. This is underscored by
Kuhlmann’s important reminder that “the primary concern of the Massiah line of decisions is
secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police
interrogation.” Id. at 459 (Emphasis added). A cellmate informant making passive and general
statements that maintain a normal conversation, on its own, does not rise to the level of direct
interrogation or its equivalent. See United States v. Lentz,
524 F.3d 501, 521–22 (4th Cir.
2008) (finding no deliberate elicitation where a jailhouse informant was instructed to, and engaged
in, personalized conversations to bring up matters of common interest, but did not directly elicit
incriminating information); Sinock v. State,
76 P.3d 323, 333 (Wyo. 2003) (finding that there is no
Sixth Amendment violation in the context of a jailhouse informant “if the incriminating statements
made by the defendant to the informant are voluntary.”); People v. Williams,
940 P.2d 710, 744
(Cal.1997) (holding that incriminating statements were not deliberately elicited even when the
4
In linguistics, this is known as “backchanneling” and refers to statements made “to show that you are listening to
someone who is talking to you, by making a sound or sign,” such as “OK,” “Uh huh,” “I see,” or “yeah.”
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/backchannel (last visited September 6, 2024). Backchanneling
implies two channels of communication in a conversation, with the “main channel” used by the primary speaker, and
the secondary “backchannel” used by the listener. See Sheida White, Backchannels across cultures: A study of
Americans and Japanese, Language in Society 18, 59-76 (1989). By backchanneling, a person assumes the role of the
primary listener in the conversation.
15
informant and defendant engaged in conversations about each other’s cases, as the informant did
not actively question the defendant about the details of his case); State v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921,
966 (Conn. 2004) (scrutinizing the record to determine whether the exchanges between the
defendant and the jailhouse informant “look like government interrogations.”); United States v.
Stevens,
83 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that the right to counsel is not violated when a
defendant voluntarily admits a crime to an informant without any urging from the informant, as
that situation does not look like a government interrogation).
In analyzing each of Chavez’s incriminating statements, the district court applied the
correct standard, seeking to determine whether the statements were deliberately elicited by
Acevedo. The district court relied on the transcript, the audio of the conversations, and the
testimony of Chavez and Detective Rivers from the suppression hearing. In each instance where it
denied the suppression of particular statements, the district court concluded that Acevedo’s
comments and actions did not rise to elicitation of incriminating statements because they were not
the equivalent of police interrogation. On appeal, Chavez has not established that any of the district
court’s findings were clearly erroneous.
Chavez points to instances where Acevedo “encouraged further statements” from Chavez
by making statements such as “Yeah,” or asking questions such as, “What do you mean?” But as
stated above, merely being a participant in a conversation, or asking a clarifying question when
the agent has misheard the defendant, does not automatically amount to an elicitation equivalent
to direct police interrogation—the defendant must show something more. An informant may
respond to a defendant’s voluntary oration with comments that merely maintain a conversation
without transforming a conversation into a de facto interrogation. See Matteo v. Superintendent,
SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 880 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that the informant asking clarifying
questions in direct response to the defendant’s voluntary statements did not alter the fundamental
nature of the conversation, and thus was not a Sixth Amendment violation); United States v.
Jacques,
684 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that when an informant asked clarifying questions
about the defendant’s role in a plan to tamper with a witness, it did not rise to the level of a Sixth
Amendment violation). Likewise, Acevedo making passive comments and asking simple
clarifying questions, such as “Yeah,” and “What do you mean?” did not change the fundamental
and overarching nature of the conversations at hand—Chavez voluntarily and repeatedly
incriminating himself to his cellmate through a series of long, uninterrupted monologs. The district
16
court recognized this fact and consistently made clear that it found Acevedo’s comments in the
admitted portions of the excerpts to be general, passive, and not designed to deliberately elicit
incriminating statements.5
Though the exact test established in Massiah and its progeny is less than crystal clear, the
underlying core guidance is nonetheless discernable. The determination of whether a defendant
was subjected to an impermissible interrogation will undoubtedly vary from case-to-case based on
the totality of the circumstances present. In this instance, we conclude that the district court
properly concluded that Acevedo did not deliberately elicit information from Chavez in a manner
forbidden under Kuhlmann; thus, we find no error in the district court’s admission of the
statements.
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a life sentence with the first
42 years determinate.
As noted, after Chavez was found guilty of second-degree murder, the district court
imposed a sentence of life with 42 years determinate, which Chavez argues on appeal is excessive.
Notably, Chavez is appealing only the fixed portion of his sentence. 6
Challenges to a sentence are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. McIntosh,
160 Idaho at 8,
368 P.3d at 628 (“When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, this Court
considers the entire length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.” (citing State v.
Stevens,
146 Idaho 139, 148,
191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008)). As this Court has explained, a “sentence
fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of
discretion by the trial court.” State v. Anderson,
172 Idaho 133,
530 P.3d 680, 690 (2023) (quoting
McIntosh,
160 Idaho at 8,
368 P.3d at 628). “To show an abuse of discretion, the defendant must
show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive, considering any view of
the facts.” McIntosh,
160 Idaho at 8,
368 P.3d at 628 (citation omitted). “The governing criteria
are: ‘(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.’ ” Anderson, 172
Idaho at__,
530 P.3d at 690 (quoting McIntosh,
160 Idaho at 8,
368 P.3d at 628); see also State v.
5
Acevedo additionally testified at trial about similar remarks Chavez made to him before he was equipped with a
recording device.
6
This Court has previously ruled that an indeterminate life sentence following a conviction for second-degree murder
is not excessive. State v. Kaiser,
108 Idaho 17, 18,
696 P.2d 868, 869 (1985) (“The Court of Appeals ruled that the
indeterminate life sentence for second degree murder was not excessive. We agree with this decision of the Court of
Appeals and affirm the holding that the indeterminate life sentence was not excessive.”).
17
Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568,
650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). Further, “[t]his Court will set
aside the sentence only where reasonable minds could not differ as to the excessiveness of the
sentence.”
Id. (quoting State v. Farwell,
144 Idaho 732, 736,
170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007)).
Here, the relevant statutory sentencing range is found in Idaho Code section 18-4004,
which states: “Every person guilty of murder of the second degree is punishable by imprisonment
not less than ten (10) years and the imprisonment may extend to life.” I.C. § 18-4004. Chavez’s
sentence also included a statutory enhancement under Idaho Code section 19-2520, which provides
that a defendant who uses a firearm during the commission of certain felonies “shall be sentenced
to an extended term of imprisonment,” which is calculated by “increasing the maximum prison
sentence authorized for the crime” by fifteen years. Chavez’s 42-year fixed sentence falls squarely
within the limits prescribed by the effect of both statutes. Therefore, in order to establish that the
district court abused its discretion by sentencing him within the statutory range, Chavez must
demonstrate that, “considering any view of the facts,” reasonable minds “could not differ as to the
excessiveness of his sentence.” Anderson, 172 Idaho at__, 530 P.3d at 690.
Chavez argues that his punishment “is unreasonable because it far exceeds the sentence
needed to meet the purposes of sentencing.” The predominant basis for this argument is that
Chavez was young (19 years old at the time of the murder and 24 years old at the time of
sentencing) and that a lesser punishment would sufficiently meet the objectives of criminal
punishment. Additionally, he points to the 15-year sentence given to his co-defendant (the driver
of the car during the shooting), arguing that his 42-year fixed term is disproportionate and that he
should receive a similar punishment.
On appeal, Chavez addresses each of the four governing Toohill factors in an attempt to
show that his sentence was excessive. 103 Idaho at 568,
650 P.2d at 710. First, Chavez argues that
a shorter fixed sentence would sufficiently serve to protect society, as he will “age out of [his]
criminal behavior” well before the end of the imposed 42-year fixed sentence. 7 Second, Chavez
asserts that the lengthy sentence will have no specific deterrent effect on him as it will “encourage
[him] to engage in criminal conduct in prison.” Likewise, he argues that the “extraordinary amount
of confinement will not create any additional general deterrent effect,” as compared to a lesser
sentence. Third, Chavez contends that his youth gives rise to the possibility of rehabilitation.
7
To this end, Chavez summarily references a chart utilizing FBI and U.S. Census Bureau data purporting to show
that arrest rates for violent males decrease after they reach the age of 24.
18
Finally, Chavez simply asserts that “[a] life sentence with twenty years fixed is sufficient for both
punishment and retribution.”
At sentencing, the district court carefully addressed the relevant sentencing factors,
standards, and arguments. It then applied these factors, explaining how each factor did, or did not,
apply to the facts of the case. The district court ultimately concluded that while all the aggravating
factors enumerated in Idaho Code section 19-2521 were present, none of the mitigating factors
applied to Chavez. In addressing each one, the court first observed that the harm caused by
Chavez’s conduct was the ultimate one—taking the life of another person. The court noted that
Chavez must have contemplated that his actions would cause harm or death when he “went looking
for [Widaman] in order to harm or kill him.” It found that there was no “excuse” or “justification”
for Chavez’s behavior, explaining that killing a child over a $700 drug debt was simply
indefensible conduct. It found that his actions were not induced by the victim, as Widaman was
simply riding his bike home at the time of the murder. It found that the harm to the victim was not
compensable, because nothing could restore the victim’s life or return him to his family. Next, the
court noted Chavez’s ongoing criminal activity and delinquency while incarcerated, evidenced by
thirty-seven disciplinary actions during his time in jail. It determined that Chavez’s criminal
conduct, murder over a small drug debt, was a result of circumstances likely to reoccur due to
Chavez’s willingness to perpetrate violence over such a small amount of money simply because
he felt disrespected. The court observed that Chavez had shown no remorse and that he continued
to display unlawful and disobedient behavior in jail. Finally, the court noted that Chavez had not
demonstrated any amenability to treatment.
The district court then analyzed the aggravating factors, finding that all were applicable to
Chavez and that each indicated that a long sentence of imprisonment was appropriate. The district
court found that there would be an undue risk that Chavez would commit another crime if released,
noting that Chavez himself stated his intention to try to kill the investigating officer in the case if
released. The district court found that any sentence that did not include a significant amount of
imprisonment would depreciate the severity of the crime, noting that the manner in which Chavez
killed Widaman was both brutal and appalling. The district court then found that imprisonment of
Chavez would be the most appropriate punishment that it could impose, and would serve to deter
both Chavez himself and others in the community.
19
Considering the district court’s findings and the totality of the record on appeal, Chavez
has failed to demonstrate that his sentence was unreasonable under any view of the facts. Instead,
Chavez merely asserts that a lesser sentence would have been sufficient, mostly due to his youth
and the lesser sentence imposed on his co-defendant. This argument is unavailing. There was no
abuse of discretion by the district court in concluding, based on the unique circumstances of this
case, that there was a marked difference in criminal culpability between the person who shot and
killed the victim and the person who drove the car. While the behavior of both the shooter and the
driver was reprehensible, the district court acted reasonably and within the parameters of its
discretion by considering their respective culpabilities and imposing a much stiffer sentence for
the shooter. Although this Court recognizes that Chavez’s sentence is a heavy one, even if a lesser
punishment would have been appropriate, that is not the standard we apply in reviewing a sentence
on appeal. In this case, the district court considered the relevant sentencing factors, stating
explicitly on the record how each mitigating factor did not apply and how each aggravating factor
did indeed apply. The district court did so with clarity and attention to detail. Through an exercise
of reason, the district court reached its decision to sentence Chavez to a sentence of life with 42-
years determinate. Chavez has failed to establish that his sentence was excessive under any view
of the facts. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err in sentencing Chavez.
C. The district court did not violate either the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments by
considering acquitted behavior at Chavez’s sentencing.
As stated above: “Sentencing decisions are reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard.” State v. Barr, 166 Idaho 783, 785,
463 P.3d 1286, 1288 (2020), as amended (June 25,
2020) (citing McIntosh,
160 Idaho at 8,
368 P.3d at 628). Further, “[t]his Court will not overturn
a district court’s factual findings regarding aggravating and mitigating factors unless those
decisions are clearly erroneous.” State v. Haws,
167 Idaho 471, 480,
472 P.3d 576, 585 (2020), as
amended (Oct. 2, 2020) (citing State v. Bodenbach,
165 Idaho 577, 592,
448 P.3d 1005, 1020
(2019)).
Chavez assigns error to the district court’s consideration of factor (b) of Idaho Code section
19-2521(2). That section states that if “[t]he defendant did not contemplate that his criminal
conduct would cause or threaten harm[,]” it shall weigh in favor of avoiding a sentence of
imprisonment. I.C. § 19-2521(2)(b). Chavez argues that because he was acquitted of first-degree
murder (an element of which is premeditation), the district court erred in considering this factor
because it “used evidence of premeditation when sentencing him.” Chavez does not contest the
20
veracity of the evidence considered, but instead maintains that the district court should not have
considered premeditation at all.
In addressing that factor, the district court explained:
The second factor is whether or not you contemplated that your criminal conduct
would cause or threaten harm. It’s clear through the evidence that was presented at
trial that you contemplated that your conduct would cause harm. The evidence
demonstrated that you went looking for Vason Widaman in order to harm or kill
him. And when you did find him, you pointed your loaded gun at him and
discharged your weapon several times, multiple times. This was no accident. You
contemplated that your actions would kill the defendant – or excuse me – would
kill Mr. Widaman.
(Emphasis added). Chavez asserts that these comments demonstrate that the district court
unconstitutionally considered evidence of premeditation during sentencing. Chavez maintains that
when a court, during sentencing, considers conduct for which the defendant has been acquitted by
a jury, it undermines his right to a jury trial and his right to due process.
Chavez’s argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, it is not at all clear that the district
court actually determined that Chavez “premeditated” the crime. Indeed, the district court found
that Chavez “went looking for Vason Widaman in order to harm or kill him.” (Emphasis added).
This determination is consistent with evidence presented at trial and with the verdict reached by
the jury. As the State observes in its brief, the “[e]vidence at trial indicated that Chavez had not
decided whether he was going to pistol whip [Widaman] or shoot him until the moment of
confrontation, and even then only decided to shoot [Widaman] when he tried to get away.” While
the jury found that Chavez did not premeditate the murder, it found that Chavez had committed
the murder with malice aforethought. I.C. §§ 18-4001, 4003(g); Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction
No. 705. Thus, the district court’s finding that Chavez contemplated that his conduct would cause
death or harm is not the same as finding that the murder was premeditated.
Second, and more importantly, even if the district court found the murder to have been
premeditated, it did not commit error in considering that information at sentencing. When
sentencing a defendant, a district court may consider “the defendant’s prior conduct for which he
was tried and acquitted.” State v. Flowers, 150 Idaho 568, 574,
249 P.3d 367, 373 (2011) (first
citing Witte v. United States,
515 U.S. 389, 397 (1995); and then citing United States v. Watts,
519
U.S. 148, 156 (1997) (stating that “a district court may properly consider ‘evidence adduced in a
trial that resulted in an acquittal’ when choosing a particular sentence within a guideline range.”
(citation omitted))); see also State v. Ogden,
171 Idaho 258, 275–76,
519 P.3d 1198, 1215–16
21
(2022). While Chavez acknowledges the directly applicable precedent from Flowers and Ogden,
he asks this Court to reconsider and overrule the holdings in those cases. We decline to do so.
We conclude that the district court properly applied the statutory factors at sentencing. One
of those factors specifically required the court to consider whether Chavez contemplated that the
consequences of his actions—searching for the victim with the intent to either beat him or kill him,
and ultimately shooting the victim multiple times—might cause harm. We find no constitutional
violation or abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that the evidence supporting
Chavez’s conviction for second degree murder shows that he contemplated that his actions would
cause harm. Finding no error, we affirm the district court
D. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Chavez’s motion for
permission to contact jurors.
In Hall v. State, we explained the appropriate test to apply when ruling on a motion for
permission to contact jurors is whether “good cause exists, suggesting that juror misconduct
occurred.” 151 Idaho 42, 50,
253 P.3d 716, 724 (2011). See State v. Garcia-Ongay,
169 Idaho 1,
3,
490 P.3d 1, 5 (2021) (“We hold that the good cause test from Hall is the appropriate standard to
apply in ruling upon motions such as the motion being appealed in this case[,] [a request to
interview jurors.]”). As this Court has previously explained, “[a] trial court’s decision to permit
post-verdict discovery of jurors is reviewed according to an abuse of discretion standard.” Garcia-Ongay,
169 Idaho at 3,
490 P.3d at 5 (citing Hall,
151 Idaho at 45,
253 P.3d at 719).
The basis of Chavez’s motion for permission to contact the jurors was “to investigate
allegations that the lead prosecutor in the case and the members of the prosecution team stood in
view of the jurors with their arms folded and stared at the jurors in an intimidating manner as the
jurors left after ending the day’s deliberations.” To show good cause, Chavez submitted copies of
audio interviews of two separate jury members from the trial, conducted by Robinson (the private
investigator hired by Chavez’s counsel). 8 Chavez also submitted affidavits in support of the motion
from various people, including Chavez’s mother, father, and brother. 9
The affidavits from Chavez’s family members all relayed similar accounts of the lead
prosecutor’s behavior on one occasion, stating that he “had his arms crossed and was staring at the
8
Notably, the district court found the interviews to be inadmissible, as the statements therein were not made under
oath. However, for the sake of judicial economy, the district court considered them nonetheless in an alternative ruling,
and ultimately reached the same conclusion as in its initial ruling.
9
Chavez also submitted an affidavit from Mr. Benjamin; however, the district court found the affidavit to constitute
“rank hearsay,” and thus did not consider it in making its ruling. Chavez does not challenge that decision on appeal.
22
jurors with an angry look.” It was the personal impression of each family member “that the
prosecutor was trying to tell the jurors that he was mad and disappointed in them for not reaching
a verdict.” With respect to the evidence contained in the juror interviews taken by Robinson,
Chavez pointed to statements made during the interview by each juror indicating that the lead
prosecutor glared at the jury once, and had his arms crossed in a “little bit of an intimidating” way.
All things considered, the evidence presented by Chavez amounted to the same basic revelation:
that at one point, the lead prosecutor had frowned or glared at the jury as they exited the courtroom,
while the jury was still deliberating.
In opposition of the motion, the State submitted the affidavits of six bailiffs and security
personnel, the Twin Falls County jury commissioner, the trial court administrator for the Fifth
District, and the lead detective for the State in the case. Each affiant rebutted the claim that the
lead prosecutor or the prosecuting team had engaged in intimidating behavior or ever attempted to
contact the jury, and noted that no juror had commented or complained about any prosecutors’
behavior.
In considering the motion, the district court correctly recognized this Court’s recent
decision in Garcia-Ongay, specifically noting that the good cause standard applied to the motion
before it. See Garcia-Ongay, 169 Idaho at 3,
490 P.3d at 5 (holding that the good cause test is the
correct standard to apply in ruling on motions requesting to interview jurors). The district court
then turned to the evidence submitted in support and in opposition of the motion. The district court
completed an extensive review of all the submitted evidence, addressing each item. The district
court concluded that “[i]n evaluating the evidence advanced by [Chavez], even when completely
ignoring the affidavit testimony submitted by the State, the [district court] concludes that [Chavez]
has not submitted any good cause for the [district court] to grant its motion for a post-verdict juror
investigation.” Importantly, the district court observed that:
[Chavez had] not submitted any evidence that [the lead prosecutor] contacted any
juror in any manner; that [the lead prosecutor] spoke to any juror; that [the lead
prosecutor] attempted to speak with any juror; that [the lead prosecutor] made any
physical movements toward the jurors (apart from using the same sidewalk to return
to his office); that [the lead prosecutor] touched any juror; that [the lead prosecutor]
attempted to touch any juror; that [the lead prosecutor] invaded the space of the
jurors; that [the lead prosecutor] was mouthing words at the jury; that [the lead
prosecutor] was making suggestive, obscene, derogatory or threating hand signals
to the jury; or, that [the lead prosecutor] engaged in any type of improper,
indecorous, or otherwise wrongful conduct.
23
Addressing the affidavits from Chavez’s family members, the district court noted:
Each of these affidavits recounts how they viewed [the lead prosecutor] standing
near the courthouse doors with arms folded and an “angry look” on his face. Each
describes how [the lead prosecutor] walked down the sidewalk that leads to the
parking lot in the same direction of the juror. The affiants then offer their own
speculative interpretation of why they thought [the lead prosecutor] looked “angry”
and [the lead prosecutor’s] perceived intent behind the “angry look.”
The district court noted that each of the family members had “a vested interest in imputing
impropriety upon the State.” Thus, the district court found that each of the affiant’s “factual
statements regarding the [the lead prosecutor’s] physical location and body movements to be
truthful, but the interpretation of those actions to be biased and inaccurate based upon the other
evidence submitted in this matter.”
As an alternative basis for its ruling, the district court reviewed the recorded interviews of
the two jurors. The district court expressed great concern over the way the interviews were
conducted, stating that it was “highly troubled by the overly suggestive and improper questioning
implemented by Robinson during the interviews. Furthermore, such questioning included
Robinson’s misstatement of fact to the jurors in an attempt to persuade them to agree with
Defendant’s position.” But even after putting aside its concerns and considering the interviews,
the district court concluded that no outside influence was exerted on the jurors, and noted that
neither of the jurors indicated that the lead prosecutor’s conduct had any effect on deliberations or
the verdict.10 Thus, it similarly found that the interview evidence did not establish good cause to
suspect juror misconduct.
The district court also reviewed the evidence submitted by the State, and after evaluating
it, concluded that “[t]he weight of this evidence demonstrates that the [the lead prosecutor] was
not glaring or staring down any jurors.” Further, the district court also concluded that there had
been “no evidence submitted to the [district court] that even remotely suggest[ed] that [the lead
prosecutor] improperly influenced, or even attempted to influence, any member of the jury.” Thus,
considering evidence presented by Chavez alone, the district court concluded that there was no
10
On appeal, Chavez briefly argues that the district court erred in considering statements from the jurors indicating
that the verdict was not influenced by the lead prosecutor’s conduct, contending that the evidence is barred under
Idaho Rule of Evidence 606(b)(1). This argument fails for three reasons. First, the district court held the entirety of
the recorded interviews to be inadmissible and addressed them only in an alternative ruling. Next, Chavez invited the
error by presenting the evidence to the district court for consideration and cannot argue that the district court erred in
doing so on appeal. Finally, Idaho Rule of Evidence 606(b)(2) allows a court to consider juror testimony regarding
whether an outside influence was brought to bear on any juror.
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good cause to suspect jury misconduct. Moreover, when additionally considering the evidence
from the State, there was no evidence that the alleged underlying conduct occurred at all.
While the district court noted that it was “plausible” that the lead prosecutor had a
countenance that was “neither pleasant, nor cheerful,” the district court concluded that Chavez’s
argument was blind to the nature of trials in the real world.11 The district court explained:
[Chavez]’s argument seeks to ignore the reality of trial, specifically a
murder trial, and what had been occurring in the courtroom for a period of nearly
two weeks. The [c]ourt finds it plausible that [the lead prosecutor] had a look upon
his face that was neither pleasant, nor cheerful. The fact that [Chavez]’s family
members describe [the lead prosecutor]] as having an “angry look” is entirely
unsurprising. However, the unbiased evidence before the [c]ourt reveals that [the
lead prosecutor] did not stare down the jury. No allegations of any misconduct by
any party, including any member of the prosecution, were made at any time during
the trial or jury deliberations. [The lead prosecutor] was present in places he was
permitted to be in the judicial building. [The lead prosecutor] utilized the sidewalk
outside the judicial building to walk to the stairs that lead to his office in the Old
Courthouse. There is no evidence of [the lead prosecutor] having any
communication with the jury. There is no evidence of [the lead prosecutor] having
any interactions with the jury. There was clearly no improper influence that was
brought to bear upon any member of the jury.
Ultimately, the district court concluded that Chavez had not presented “any ‘good cause’
for conducting an investigation into the jury’s deliberations or verdict in [the] case.” Moreover,
the district court concluded that, “based upon the sheer paucity of evidence… [Chavez]’s motion
is without any basis in law or fact.”
Chavez argues that he is “not required to show the perceived external contact actually
affected the verdict in order to show good cause to investigate . . . .” This argument is unavailing
as the district court, after reviewing the evidence presented, concluded that there was no good
cause to believe that any jury misconduct had occurred in the first place. On appeal, Chavez does
not challenge the district court’s factual findings; instead, he restates the facts and argues that the
district court “did not act consistently with applicable legal standards.” However, the district court
applied the correct legal standard—the good cause test articulated in Hall. In applying that
standard, the district court determined that Chavez did not present evidence establishing good
cause to believe juror misconduct had occurred.
11
The district court also noted that the lead prosecutor had very recently lost his father at the time of the trial, which
may have understandably affected his general demeanor.
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By failing to challenge the factual findings or point to error in the application of the legal
standard in this matter, we conclude that Chavez has not shown that the district court abused its
discretion. In his attempt to show good cause to investigate prosecutorial misconduct, Chavez
could only point to a singular allegation that the lead prosecutor crossed his arms and stared at the
jury with an unpleasant look on his face as they exited the courthouse. Based on the district court’s
careful reasoning as set forth above, the district court determined that Chavez failed to establish
good cause and correctly rejected the motion for permission to further contact jurors. We affirm
that decision.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Chavez’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
Additionally, we hold that the district court did not err in denying the post-trial motion for
permission to contact jurors.
Justices BRODY, ZAHN, and MEYER and Pro Tem Justice BURDICK
CONCUR.
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