Richmond Elks Hall Association v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency and the City of Richmond, (Richmond Redevelopment Agency, Appellant.) Richmond Elks Hall Association v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency and the City of Richmond’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

35 federal appellate · 4 district · 14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 79 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[w]hen a public entity acting in furtherance of a public project directly and substantially interferes with property rights and thereby significantly impairs the value of the property, the result is a taking in the constitutional sense and compensation must be paid.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 496 F. Supp. 530 - Thompson v. Tualatin Hills Park & Recreation District · Amen v. City of Dearborn

2. “"It has been held that the acquisition of property by eminent domain does not involve a taking of the legal services which are needed in order to establish a claim for compensation. Unless provision is made therefor by statute, a claimant is not entitled to reimbursement either for loss of time consumed in prosecuting his claim or for counsel fees. Attorney's fees are not generally considered payable under statutory provisions for costs, expenses or just compensation. Nevertheless, judicial opinion has occasionally questioned whether an owner has been made whole so far as money is a measure of compensation, if he is denied recovery of attorney's fees necessarily expended by him in the trial of a condemnation proceeding. "Where statutory provision is made for the inclusion of counsel fees in the just compensation to which an owner is entitled when his property is taken by eminent domain such fees may be treated like any other element of damage involved in such a case. Such statute is amply justified by the equities of the situation. As one court has stated the case: `The constitution requires that private property shall not be taken for public use, except on the payment of just compensation, and a man who is forced into court where he owes no obligation to the party moving against him, cannot be said to have received just compensation for his property if he is put to an expense appreciably important to establish the value of his property. He does not want to sell; the property”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. ADA COUNTY HIGH. DIST. v. Acarrequi · 24 Cal. 3d 266 - Agins v. City of Tiburon

3. ““The approval by HUD of the instant project, including its funding, was given on August 15, 1966. The district court specifically found that the taking of Elks’ property occurred on July 23, 1968. Further, HUD funds were withdrawn from the project on December 23, 1969. Each of these events preceded the effective date of the Act, which is January 2, 1971. Section 305 and 24 C.F.R. § 42.145 (a) deal with ‘acquisition[s] of real property on and after’ January 2, 1971. Elks’ property was acquired several years before this date. Therefore, to the extent that these sections create a statutory right to litigation expenses, a point that is debatable and not addressed here, we hold that they do not create a right to such expenses in this case.” [Emphasis added.]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Richmond Elks Hall Ass'n v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency · Richmond Elks Hall Association v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency