¶1dissenting.
¶2I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion in setting aside the thirty (80) year enhancement by reason of appellant's status as a habitual offender.
¶3The majority opinion takes the position that appellant's convictions are "ultimately based upon a conviction for conduct that the legislature has classified as a misde meanor," thus not justifying an enhancement for his status as a habitual offender. I would point out that appellant's convietion was "ultimately" a Class D felony. This matter was presented fully to the trial court who had the discretion to determine whether a presumptive sentence should be enhanced because of aggravating factors and whether the term of imprisonment should be served concurrently or consecutively. Parrish v. State (1987), Ind., 515 N.E.2d 516. As recognized by the majority, this Court will not alter a sentence imposed by a trial judge if it is within statutory bounds unless it appears that the sentence is manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Menifee v. State (1987), Ind., 512 N.E.2d 142.
¶4I cannot agree with the majority opinion that multiple offenses of driving while intoxicated are so minor as to be dealt with as misdemeanors. Drunken drivers in Indiana cause more deaths annually than any other group of criminals, including armed robbers. In rendering sentence in the case at bar, the trial court stated:
"The Court accepts [the] Probation Department's finding of no mitigating circumstances and the aggravating circumstances of recent violation of probation, history of criminal activity; the deff's need for correction and rehabilitation that can be provided by commitment to penal facility, and that imposition of a reduced sentence would deprecate [the] seriousness of [the] offense. Court further accepts State's aggravating cireum-stances of lack of remorse and lack of respect for [the] criminal justice system."
¶5In the case at bar, we have a defendant who showed a lack of remorse and a lack of respect for the criminal justice system. It is obvious that removing his license did not deter him from jeopardizing the lives and property of citizens using our public roads. I cannot consider this conduct so lightly as does the majority.
¶6I would affirm the trial court's imposition of a thirty (80) year enhancement by reason of appellant's habitual offender status.