State v. Molina

               THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

                         STATE OF UTAH,
                            Appellant,
                                v.
                          JESUS MOLINA,
                            Appellee.

                             Opinion
                         No. 20220853-CA
                     Filed November 21, 2024

          Thid District Court, West Jordan Department
                 The Honorable Chelsea Koch
                         No. 171404311

       Sean D. Reyes, Christopher A. Bates, and Andrew F.
                Peterson, Attorneys for Appellant
         Andrea J. Garland, E. Rich Hawkes, and Justin F.
                  Knell, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion,
  in which JUDGES JOHN D. LUTHY and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1      The State of Utah offered Jesus Molina a plea deal: in
exchange for his plea of guilty to a reduced charge of felony
manslaughter, the State would affirmatively recommend that the
district court sentence him to serve an additional year in jail and
then place him on probation. But before Molina entered his guilty
plea, the State rescinded its offer. Molina sought to enforce the
plea agreement, and the district court ordered specific
performance of the plea deal after determining that Molina had
detrimentally relied on the State’s promise.

¶2     The State petitioned for interlocutory review of the district
court’s order. We determine the court erred in finding that Molina
                            State v. Molina


detrimentally relied on the State’s offer. Accordingly, we reverse
and remand the case for further proceedings on the charges.


                          BACKGROUND 1

¶3     On Halloween night in 2017, Molina, Dominic, 2 and several
other people were “driving around . . . to look for a party.” Later
that night, as they were dropping off Dominic, “an argument . . .
broke out” between Molina and Dominic. The argument escalated
into a fight, and Dominic “fell to the ground” and died from a
“[g]unshot wound to the chest.” After the fight, Molina fled to
Mexico but was later arrested.

¶4     In December 2017, the State charged Molina with one count
of murder. The case suffered numerous delays due to
“continuances requested by one or both parties, as well as
additional delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.” In June
2021, Molina requested a pretrial justification hearing, as
authorized by Utah Code section 76-2-309. 3 After the justification


1. Because this case comes to us on interlocutory appeal and there
has not yet been a trial, we recite the alleged facts from relevant
case documents. Molina retains the presumption of innocence
that attaches prior to conviction.

2. A pseudonym.

3. “The recently enacted pretrial justification statute . . . allows for
a district court to assess claims of self-defense at an earlier stage
in a criminal case. The statute provides that if a criminal
defendant files a motion requesting a pretrial justification hearing,
then the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant was
justified in the use or threatened use of force. At the evidentiary
hearing, the defendant must first make a prima facie claim of
                                                       (continued…)


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                          State v. Molina


hearing had been rescheduled twice—once on the State’s motion
and once to accommodate the district court’s calendar—the State
agreed that if Molina pleaded guilty to second-degree felony
manslaughter, it would recommend that Molina serve only one
additional year in jail before being released on probation. Molina
agreed to the plea offer.

¶5     At a telephone conference held on the Friday before the
Monday morning on which the justification hearing was to begin,
the State and Molina informed the district court they had reached
a tentative plea agreement and presented the agreement to the
court for advanced approval under rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 4 After the agreement was presented, the
prosecutor expressed to the court that “the likelihood of the State
surviving the justification hearing [was] low enough” that the
proposed agreement was “the appropriate resolution.” The court




justification. If the court determines the defendant has made a
prima facie claim, then the State has the burden to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the defendant’s use or threatened
use of force was not justified. If the State meets this burden, the
defendant’s motion is denied, the case proceeds, and the
defendant may raise the issue of justification to the jury at trial.
But if the State fails to meet its burden, the district court must
dismiss the relevant charges against the defendant.” State v. Clara,

, 

 (quotation simplified).

4. Rule 11(i)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states,
       When a tentative plea agreement has been reached,
       the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit
       the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the
       reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of
       the plea. The judge may then indicate to the
       prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether
       the proposed disposition will be approved.


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                          State v. Molina


indicated that the proposed disposition was acceptable and set the
plea hearing for Monday morning.

¶6     Later that evening, however, at the direction of his
supervisors, the prosecutor informed Molina that the State was
withdrawing its offer because the supervisors had told the
prosecutor that he did not have the authorization to make the
contemplated sentencing recommendation. The prosecutor
advised Molina that he could still plead guilty to manslaughter
but that the State would seek a presentence report and
affirmatively recommend that the court sentence Molina based on
that report.

¶7     When the parties appeared before the district court on
Monday morning, Molina moved the court to order enforcement
of the plea deal because he had “substantially relied on [the]
agreement already.” He informed the court that after he “entered
the agreement on Friday” he “called off” his justification
witnesses. He argued that under State v. Francis, 

, 424
P.3d 156—wherein the supreme court laid out the legal
framework for determining whether a defendant has
detrimentally relied on a withdrawn plea agreement—he had
detrimentally relied on the State’s promise by presenting
“otherwise privileged plea negotiations to the judge,” signaling
his willingness to plead guilty, and diluting his right to a speedy
trial by calling off his witnesses. Regarding the last point, he
explained that due to the age of the case and the number of times
the witnesses had already been subpoenaed, it would be “very
difficult to get [his] witnesses back on board” and that he would
not be able to move forward with the justification hearing that
week. The State opposed Molina’s motion.

¶8     After considering the parties’ arguments, including
briefing the parties prepared at the court’s request, the district
court granted Molina’s motion. The court concluded that while no
one factor alone established that Molina had detrimentally relied
on the plea agreement, “the cumulative effect of all of the factors”



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                           State v. Molina


did. These factors included that (1) Molina’s “decision to accept
the plea agreement caused him to admit to facts on the record,”
(2) Molina had “forfeit[ed] his justification hearing for another six
months,” and (3) Molina had “risked his ability to secure
witnesses” for a future hearing.

¶9      In assessing these factors, the district court found that in an
attempt to persuade the court to accept and enforce the
agreement, Molina had admitted on the record that he was willing
“to plead guilty to manslaughter and serve an additional year in
jail,” which was “detrimental” to Molina and “would never have
been placed on the record prior to a justification hearing had he
not anticipated a plea.” The court found that this admission was
“even more significant” to its analysis given the State’s concession
made at the rule 11 conference “that it was unlikely to prevail at
the justification hearing.”

¶10 The district court also found that by calling off his
witnesses, Molina “likely [knew] that he would have to wait
another lengthy period of time for another justification hearing”
and that the court’s busy calendar could not accommodate a new
hearing “for almost six additional months.” Further, both parties
had already “experienced difficulty in securing the appearance of
the witnesses given the number of times they had been
subpoenaed and the age of the case.”

¶11 The State filed a petition for interlocutory review, which
we granted.


              ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court
correctly determined that Molina detrimentally relied on the plea
agreement offered by the State. “The enforceability of a plea




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                          State v. Molina


agreement presents a question of law we review for correctness.”
State v. Francis, 

, ¶ 8, 

. 5



5. Molina does not dispute that the district court’s ultimate
decision to enforce the plea agreement is a question of law that we
review for correctness. However, he contends the court’s
subsidiary determination that he detrimentally relied on the
agreement is entitled to deference. To that end, Molina devotes a
significant portion of his appellate brief explaining the framework
our supreme court has adopted for analyzing differing standards
of appellate review, see, e.g., Randolph v. State, 

, ¶¶ 17–
26, 

, and he argues that under this framework, the
court’s findings regarding detrimental reliance are findings of fact
that should be reviewed for clear error. He further argues that to
the extent the court’s detrimental reliance determination involves
a mixed question, it is fact-like and must be accorded deference.
Molina’s argument is unavailing on both fronts.
        First, a determination that a defendant detrimentally relied
on a plea agreement necessarily means the agreement is
enforceable. See State v. Francis, 

, ¶ 14, 

.
Thus, applying a different, more deferential standard of review to
the detrimental reliance inquiry would effectively transform the
standard of review for the enforceability inquiry into a more
deferential standard as well. And this would directly conflict with
the correctness standard of review that Molina agrees applies
when evaluating the enforceability of a plea agreement.
        Second, the question of whether a defendant detrimentally
relied on a withdrawn plea agreement is a law-like mixed
question. To determine whether a mixed question should be
deemed law-like or fact-like, we apply a “balancing test” that
involves the consideration of three factors: “(1) the degree of
variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule is to be
applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court’s application of the
legal rule relies on facts observed by the trial judge, such as a
witness’s appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application
                                                        (continued…)


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                           State v. Molina


                            ANALYSIS

¶13 “[A] defendant does not have a constitutional right to a
plea agreement,” but once an agreement has been reached, the
parties must adhere to certain conduct. State v. Francis, 

, ¶ 11, 

. As a general rule, “the State may withdraw
from a plea bargain agreement at any time prior to . . . the actual


of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record
available to appellate courts; and (3) other policy reasons that
weigh for or against granting discretion to trial courts.” Randolph,

 (quotation simplified); see also State v. Levin, 

, 

.
        Utilizing this test to evaluate the mixed question at issue
here, it is readily apparent that all three factors point in the same
direction: that whether a defendant detrimentally relied on a plea
agreement is a law-like question. Specifically, the first two factors
do not favor deferential review because the facts involved in
determining whether a defendant detrimentally relied on a plea
agreement (namely, the timing of the plea agreement and
withdrawal, the content of the agreement, and any actions the
defendant took in reliance on the agreement) are usually
relatively simple and can be easily identified; likewise, a
detrimental reliance determination does not typically rely heavily
on credibility determinations or other factual determinations that
cannot be adequately conveyed on the record. Lastly, even if these
first two factors provided a strong basis for adopting a deferential
standard of appellate review, they would nevertheless be
outweighed by the practical need for consistency in plea
enforcement decisions. Although there is no constitutional right
to a plea agreement, see Francis, 

, ¶ 11, the rights
implicated in a plea agreement are “generally fundamental and
constitutionally based,” United States v. Ringling, 

(4th Cir. 1993). And where the application of a legal rule
implicates “constitutional protections,” the supreme court has
held that “there is a strong interest in promoting clarity and
consistency in our state’s jurisprudence.” Levin, 

.


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                           State v. Molina


entry of the guilty plea by the defendant.” Id. ¶ 14 (quotation
simplified). However, this general rule is subject to a detrimental
reliance exception. Id. That is, the State may not withdraw from a
plea agreement “[w]hen a defendant has reasonably and
detrimentally relied” on the agreement because a defendant’s
detrimental reliance on a prosecutorial promise in plea bargaining
makes a plea agreement binding. Id. ¶¶ 12–14.

¶14 In this case, Molina agreed to plead guilty in exchange for
the reduction of the charge and sentencing recommendation but
did not enter the plea before the State rescinded its offer. Thus,
Molina’s motion to enforce the plea agreement—and the district
court’s order granting the motion—rested on his assertion that he
had detrimentally relied on the State’s promise before the
prosecutor withdrew the offer.

¶15 Before the district court and again on appeal, both parties
argue that State v. Francis, 

, 

, is controlling.
In Francis, the defendant argued the trial court should be required
to enforce a plea agreement the State had rescinded on the
morning of trial. 

 ¶¶ 4–6, 18. According to the defendant, his
reliance on the agreement had worked to his detriment in four
ways: (1) he had forgone his investigation and assertion of certain
discovery claims; (2) he had discontinued trial preparation;
(3) one of the witnesses who had been scheduled to appear at trial
was unlikely to appear at a future trial date; and (4) he would
incur additional expert witness fees. Id. ¶ 18.

¶16 The supreme court rejected all the defendant’s arguments.
First, the court found the defendant had already raised, and the
trial court had rejected, the allegedly forgone discovery claims. Id.
¶ 19. Second, the court determined the defendant was not forced
to go to trial unprepared because the trial court had granted a
continuance after the State withdrew the plea agreement. Id. ¶ 20.
Third, the court found unpersuasive the defendant’s assertion
that the witness was unlikely to appear at a future trial. Id. ¶ 21.
The court explained that it is commonplace for “reluctant and



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                          State v. Molina


unwilling witnesses” to be needed for trial, and that such
witnesses “can be subpoenaed and made to appear in court.” 

Further, to “meet his burden of persuasion” on this point, the
defendant would have needed “to explain who the witness [was],
what the testimony would have been, why the testimony [could
not] be obtained from another source, and how the lack of that
testimony [would] adversely affect[] his defense.” 

 Finally, as
to the additional expert witness cost, the court ruled that “a
potential and unquantified increase in the cost of defense” was
not “the sort of reliance that would compel the enforcement of a
plea agreement.” Id. ¶ 22.

¶17 In rejecting the defendant’s arguments, the supreme court
did not set forth a specific test for establishing detrimental
reliance on a plea agreement. The court instead recognized a
number of actions that have “been held to constitute acts made in
detrimental reliance upon a prosecutor’s breached promises.” Id.
¶ 13 (quotation simplified). Those actions include “providing
information to government authorities, testifying for the
government, confessing guilt, returning stolen property, making
monetary restitution, failing to file a motion to have charges
presented to a grand jury, submitting to a lie detector test[,] and
waiving certain procedural guarantees.” Id. ¶ 12 (quotation
simplified).

¶18 Here, the district court concluded that Molina had
detrimentally relied on the State’s offer because his decision to
accept the plea agreement caused him to (A) admit to a key fact
on the record and (B) call off his witnesses. The State argues the
court was incorrect on both fronts. We address each in turn.

A.    Admitting a Key Fact on the Record

¶19 The district court found that during the rule 11 conference
and also on the morning of the scheduled plea hearing, Molina
put a key fact “on the record in an effort to persuade the Court to
accept and enforce the agreement.” This fact was Molina’s



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                          State v. Molina


“willingness to plead guilty to manslaughter and serve an
additional year in jail.” The court found that this fact was
“detrimental” to Molina and that it “would never have been
placed on the record prior to a justification hearing had [Molina]
not anticipated a plea.” 6 But we fail to see how this admission
constitutes detrimental reliance.

¶20 First, construing the mere indication to the district court of
a willingness to plead guilty to a lesser charge in return for a
recommendation of a lower sentence as detrimental reliance
would undermine our rules related to guilty pleas. Under our
rules of criminal procedure, before accepting and entering a plea
of guilty, a court must ensure that the plea is knowing, is
voluntary, and has an adequate factual basis. See Utah R. Crim. P.
11(e). Were we to allow a plea agreement to become enforceable
based solely upon a defendant’s communication to the court of a
willingness to tender a plea, the requirements for accepting a plea
outlined in our rules of criminal procedure would effectively be
nullified. This would also create the bizarre situation where a plea
agreement that a court has rejected would nonetheless still be
enforceable simply because the defendant had indicated to the
court a willingness to plead guilty.

¶21 Second, Molina’s willingness to plead guilty to
manslaughter and serve an additional year in jail did not provide
the district court with any new material information about his
case. And the fact that Molina had requested a justification
hearing does not change the analysis. As an initial matter, Molina


6. Relatedly, the district court found that Molina “revealed trial
strategy . . . in his arguments to obtain the plea agreement and to
enforce the agreement.” But this finding lacks any record support.
The only thing Molina revealed during the rule 11 conference was
that the parties had reached a tentative plea agreement that he
was willing to accept. And Molina did not reveal any “strategy”
while attempting to enforce the agreement the following Monday
because the agreement had already been withdrawn.


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                           State v. Molina


was charged with murder for fatally shooting Dominic. By
requesting a justification hearing, Molina had necessarily already
admitted that he had used force against Dominic—the point of the
justification hearing was to determine whether Molina’s use of
force had been justified. Moreover, judges understand that
defendants frequently choose to waive their right to maintain
their innocence, for a variety of reasons; indeed, plea bargaining
is essential to our system of justice, Santobello v. New York, 

 (1971). Even in cases such as this, where a defendant
claims that his use of force was justified, he might nevertheless
prefer to accept a guilty plea to secure an agreed-upon sentence
in order to guard against potential deficiencies in the strength of
the evidence supporting a justification defense or in order to
avoid the expense and stress of trial.

¶22 Third, even if Molina’s willingness to plead guilty and
serve an additional year in jail had somehow conveyed
information to the district court that was “detrimental” to Molina,
courts are routinely required to set aside information that is
unfavorable to one party that is revealed during the proceedings.
There are many situations in our justice system where this occurs,
including when in the case of a bench trial a court sustains a
motion to strike an answer, grants a motion in limine to exclude
evidence, or considers evidence at a preliminary hearing that is
ultimately inadmissible at trial. In all these situations, the court
has an obligation during later stages of the proceeding to
disregard the information learned previously. See State v. Graham,

, 

 (“Utah appellate courts
presume that when conducting a bench trial, the trial court
considers only admissible evidence and disregards any
inadmissible evidence.” (quotation simplified)). Molina has not
persuaded us that a different result should follow here. Thus,
we agree with the State that even had the court learned
information potentially unfavorable to Molina prior to making an
adjudicative decision, that does not by itself constitute
detrimental reliance.




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                           State v. Molina


¶23 Lastly, by indicating a willingness to plead guilty to
manslaughter, Molina did not forfeit any potential arguments at
a future justification hearing or trial or otherwise narrow his range
of possible defenses. The State would not be allowed to use any
statements Molina made during the plea negotiations, or during
the rule 11 conference, against him at trial. See Utah R. Evid. 410(a)
(barring evidence of “a statement made during plea discussions
with an attorney for the prosecuting authority if the discussions
did not result in a guilty plea”). Nor would any such statements
be admissible at a justification hearing. See 

B.     Calling off Witnesses

¶24 During the brief interval between the Friday rule 11
conference with the district court and the State’s withdrawal of
the plea offer, Molina called off his justification witnesses. When
the parties appeared before the court on Monday morning,
Molina asserted that this decision was attributable to the fact that
he had “substantially relied” on the plea agreement. He then
informed the court that because he had called off his witnesses, he
was unprepared to move forward with the scheduled justification
hearing that week. Consequently, he argued, the court should
enforce the agreement.

¶25 The district court credited Molina’s argument on this point.
The court concluded that Molina had relied to his detriment on
the plea agreement when he “called off all witnesses.” The court
reasoned that this action constituted detrimental reliance because
by calling off his witnesses, Molina “forfeit[ed] his justification
hearing for another six months and risked his ability to secure
witness.” But the premise on which the court’s conclusion is based
is faulty, and therefore neither of the stated justifications
demonstrate that Molina detrimentally relied on the plea.

¶26 To begin, nothing in the plea agreement required, or even
suggested, that Molina call off his witnesses. Likewise, at no point
did the State instruct Molina to call off his witnesses or suggest he



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                            State v. Molina


should do so because of the agreement. His decision to do so was
entirely voluntary. That distinguishes this case from the range of
cases where courts have found detrimental reliance based on
actions the defendant took that were required under the plea
agreement. See State v. Francis, 

, ¶¶ 12–13, 

(collecting cases).

¶27 Next, it was not the plea offer itself that induced Molina to
call off his witnesses; rather, it was Molina’s belief that the district
court would accept the plea, thereby rendering the justification
hearing unnecessary. This assumption on Molina’s part does not
mean that the State induced him to call off his witnesses. See
generally State v. Stringham, 

, 

(“The decision whether to accept or reject a plea agreement lies
within the discretion of the trial court. Thus, even where the
government and the defendant reach a plea agreement, the court
is not required to accept it.” (quotation simplified)). Indeed, as just
noted, the State never so much as suggested to Molina that he do
so.

¶28 Moreover, Molina’s belief that the district court would
accept and enter the plea also rested on a further assumption. That
is, Molina assumed the court would find that his plea of guilty
was knowing, voluntary, and had an adequate factual basis. See
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) (stating that the court “may refuse to accept
a plea of guilty” and explaining that the court “may not accept [a]
plea until the court has” made findings in accordance with the
rule). Although the court indicated at the rule 11 conference that
it would follow the parties’ proposed disposition, at that point it
had not yet heard from Molina, had not yet heard the factual basis
for the plea, and had not yet made any of the required findings.
See 

 There are any number of things that could have happened
at the plea hearing that would have led—or even required—the
court to ultimately reject the agreed-upon plea despite the court’s
initial indication of a willingness to accept the parties’ agreement.
See, e.g., Kelty v. Warden Walden Corr. Inst., No. 15-cv-01130, 

, at *1 (D.S.C. Dec. 18, 2015) (rejecting plea where the



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                          State v. Molina


defendant testified during the plea hearing that he “did not
remember committing the charged crime”); People v. Ottomanelli,

 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (rejecting a
negotiated plea after the defendant failed to offer sufficient facts
during the plea colloquy to establish a factual basis for the plea);
State v. Wallace, 

 (N.C. 1997) (rejecting a
proposed plea after the prosecutor revealed new facts during the
plea hearing); cf. State v. Lopez, 

, 26–27, 

 (setting aside a guilty plea where the defendant had not
been offered a copy of the plea statement in his native language),
cert. denied, 

 (Utah 2006).

¶29 In light of the foregoing, neither of the reasons the district
court cited as factors in its detrimental reliance analysis are
availing. Aside from the fact that neither the plea agreement itself
nor the State required Molina to call off his witnesses, any delay
in rescheduling Molina’s justification hearing was completely
unrelated to the plea agreement—or anything the State had
done—and was instead due to scheduling conflicts on the part of
the court. This point was underscored by the court when it
explained that it would be unable to schedule “another five-day
setting for almost six additional months” due to its “insane”
calendar. Similarly, because Molina’s decision to call off his
witnesses was not the result of detrimental reliance on
representations by the State, any consequences flowing from that
decision are not attributable to the State. Therefore, even if
Molina’s decision to call off his witnesses does in fact result in
difficulties securing these witnesses in the future, any such
difficulties would not constitute grounds for enforcing the plea
agreement. 7



7. The district court also incorrectly concluded that a likely
difficulty of securing witnesses in the future is grounds for a
determination of detrimental reliance. In State v. Francis, 

, 

, our supreme court squarely rejected the notion
                                                     (continued…)


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                         State v. Molina


                         CONCLUSION

¶30 The State may not withdraw from a plea agreement if a
defendant has reasonably and detrimentally relied on the State’s
offer. Here, the district court incorrectly concluded that Molina
detrimentally relied on the State’s promise. We therefore reverse
the court’s order granting Molina’s motion to enforce his plea
agreement and remand the matter for further proceedings.




that a bald assertion that a witness may fail to appear at a
subsequent hearing or trial is sufficient to prove that the
defendant’s purported reliance was detrimental to the defense. Id.
¶ 21. Rather, to carry his burden of persuasion on such a claim,
Molina was required to “show that the witness was no longer
available,” as well as to explain “who the witness [was], what the
testimony would have been, why the testimony [could not] be
obtained from another source, and how the lack of that testimony
[would] adversely affect[] his defense.” Id. Although Molina
identified for the court who his witnesses were and provided a
general explanation as to what some of them might say, he did
not provide specifics about their potential testimony or
specifically explain why that testimony could not be obtained
from another source. And perhaps even more importantly,
Molina wholly failed to establish that any of the witnesses were
“no longer available.” Id. The crux of his argument was simply
that their cooperation would be difficult to obtain. This is not
enough to prove that the purported reliance was detrimental. See
id.


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