IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Supreme Court Docket No. 48486-2020; Consolidated Docket Nos. 48511-2020; 49440-
2022; 49441-2022; 49442-2022; 49443-2022; 49444-2022; 49445-2022; 49446-2022
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Boise, October 2024 Term
)
v. ) Opinion filed: December 19, 2024
)
LANCE A. ROBERTS, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Teton County. Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge.
The decision of the district court is affirmed.
Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant. Jason C.
Pintler argued.
Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Mark W. Olson
argued.
ZAHN, Justice.
Lance A. Roberts appeals from the district court’s decision on intermediate appeal
affirming the magistrate court’s decision denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion in a
misdemeanor DUI case, denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motions in his felony DUI cases, and
dismissing his petitions for post-conviction relief in his felony DUI cases. Roberts’ motions sought
to amend his multiple convictions from the past two decades for driving under the influence.
Roberts’ challenges all relate back to his April 1998 conviction for a second “adult” misdemeanor
DUI, which he claims should have been charged as a second “juvenile” misdemeanor DUI. Roberts
argues that the erroneous conviction had a domino-effect on his subsequent DUIs over the next
eighteen years, some of which were charged as felonies. He contends that the improper felonies
then resulted in a determination that he was a persistent violator of the law, which made him subject
to a sentencing enhancement in his most recent felony DUI case. Roberts filed Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 motions and post-conviction petitions in multiple criminal cases, seeking to amend his
1
prior DUI convictions and eliminate the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. The district
court denied his motions and dismissed the petitions because neither an Idaho Criminal Rule 35
motion nor a petition for post-conviction relief authorized the trial court to grant the requested
relief.
Roberts timely appealed. He concedes that the district court properly applied existing law
but asks this Court to carve out an exception to Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) and to interpret Idaho
Code section 19-4901(a), which governs post-conviction relief claims, to allow Roberts to amend
his prior DUI convictions. For the reasons discussed herein, we decline to do so and affirm the
district court.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This matter consists of nine consolidated appeals. Since 1997, Roberts has been convicted
of six DUIs and one count of felony burglary in the state of Idaho. One of those convictions is an
April 1998 conviction for “adult” DUI. Idaho law differentiates between “juvenile” and “adult”
DUI. A juvenile DUI occurs when someone under twenty-one years of age operates a vehicle with
a blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) of at least 0.02 but less than 0.08. I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a). An
adult DUI occurs when any person operates a vehicle with a BAC over 0.08. I.C. § 18-8004(1)(d).
Idaho law also provides that subsequent DUI convictions that occur within a specific
timeframe are subject to greater penalties. Idaho Code section 18-8005 mandates that, with some
exceptions, first and second offense adult DUIs are misdemeanors. I.C. § 18-8005(1), (4). Between
the date of Roberts’ April 1998 adult DUI and a statutory amendment in 2006, section 18-8005
mandated that DUIs were felonies if the defendant had two adult misdemeanor DUIs in the
previous five years, or one or more adult felony DUIs in the previous ten years. I.C. § 18-8005(4),
(5) (2005). In 2006, section 18-8005 was amended to increase the timeframes applicable to felony
enhancement, with the result that a defendant could be charged with felony DUI if he had two
adult misdemeanor DUIs in the previous ten years, or one or more adult felony DUI in the previous
fifteen years. See Act of Mar. 30, 2006, ch. 261, 2006 Idaho Sess. Laws 800, 809–11 (codified at
I.C. § 18-8005(4), (5)). Notably, section 18-8005(6) excludes prior juvenile DUIs as a basis for
enhancing a subsequent DUI to a felony. See I.C. § 18-8005(6).
Roberts was first convicted of juvenile DUI in March 1997, when he was sixteen years old.
In April 1998, at age seventeen, Roberts was charged with second offense adult DUI. The record
does not include evidence of a BAC attributed to Roberts for this DUI. Roberts waived his right
2
to an attorney and entered a guilty plea to second offense adult DUI. Roberts now argues that the
State erred by charging an unrepresented seventeen-year-old with a second offense adult DUI
because Roberts was under twenty-one years old and no BAC was recorded showing his BAC
above 0.08. Consequentially, Roberts argues that he should have been charged with a second
offense juvenile DUI instead of a second offense adult DUI.
What followed, as alleged by Roberts, is a domino effect that resulted in his subsequent
DUI’s being charged as felonies instead of misdemeanors. Roberts’ criminal history is outlined in
the table below:
Date Conviction Idaho Code Section
March 1997 • Juvenile misdemeanor DUI I.C. § 18-8004(1)(d) (1994);
I.C. § 18-8004A(1) (1994);
April 1998 • Second Adult Misdemeanor DUI I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a) (1997);
I.C. § 18-8005(1) (1997).
June 1998 • Second Adult Misdemeanor DUI I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a) (1997);
(Despite Roberts having already pleaded I.C. § 18-8005(4) (1997).
guilty to second adult misdemeanor, the
trial court only recognized one prior adult
DUI in Roberts’ history and determined
this DUI to be his second adult DUI
offense.)
February 1999 • Felony Burglary I.C. § 18-1401 (1997).
February 2001 • First Adult Felony DUI I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a) (2000);
(Charged as a felony because Roberts had I.C. § 18-8005(5) (2000).
two adult misdemeanor DUI convictions in
the previous five years.)
July 2006 • Second Adult Felony DUI I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a);
(Charged as a felony because Roberts had I.C. § 18-8005(7) (2005).
a felony DUI conviction in the previous ten
years.)
January 2016 • Third Adult Felony DUI I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a);
(Charged as a felony because Roberts had I.C. § 18-8005(9) (2015);
a felony DUI in the previous fifteen years.) I.C. § 19-2514.
• Persistent violator sentencing enhancement
In 2016, Roberts was charged with his third felony DUI. The State also charged a persistent
violator enhancement as a result of Roberts’ two previous felony DUIs and his burglary conviction.
Roberts pleaded guilty to the felony DUI and admitted that he met the conditions for the persistent
violator enhancement. Sometime after he was sentenced in that case, Roberts discovered the
alleged procedural error in his criminal history. To remedy this alleged harm, on April 7, 2017,
Roberts filed a Rule 35 motion in the April 1998 adult DUI case, seeking to correct what he alleged
3
was an illegal sentence because he was incorrectly charged with a second offense adult
misdemeanor DUI instead of a second offense juvenile DUI.
The magistrate court granted the motion and amended Roberts’ April 1998 judgment of
conviction. The amended judgment changed Roberts’ conviction from a second offense adult DUI
to a second offense juvenile DUI. The State moved to reconsider, arguing that the magistrate court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to change the conviction, that Rule 35(a) did not authorize
amendment of a conviction, and that any motion under Rule 35(b) was time barred. The magistrate
court denied the motion, and the State did not appeal.
Armed with his amended judgment of conviction, Roberts filed a flurry of motions and
petitions for post-conviction relief in his DUI cases that followed the April 1998 conviction, with
the ultimate goal of amending his subsequent felony DUI convictions to misdemeanor DUI
convictions and eliminating the persistent violator sentencing enhancement in his 2016 DUI case.
Roberts limits his arguments on appeal to the denial of his Rule 35 motions and the dismissal of
his petitions for post-conviction relief, so we will limit our discussion of the procedural history to
those filings.
The crux of Roberts’ Rule 35 motions was that (1) the amendment of his April 1998
conviction meant his June 1998 conviction for second offense adult DUI should have been a
conviction for first offense adult DUI; (2) his first adult felony DUI in 2001 should be a
misdemeanor because he only had one prior adult misdemeanor DUI in June 1998; (3) his second
felony DUI in 2006 should be a misdemeanor DUI because he did not have two adult misdemeanor
DUI convictions in the prior ten years; (4) his third adult felony DUI in 2016 should be a
misdemeanor because he did not have two adult misdemeanor DUI convictions in the prior ten
years; and (5) he should not have a persistent violator enhancement because he only had one prior
felony conviction in 1999 for felony burglary.
Roberts’ petitions for post-conviction relief alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
because his lawyers in the felony DUI cases failed to recognize the problem with his April 1998
conviction for second offense adult DUI.
The magistrate court denied Roberts’ Rule 35 motion to amend his June 1998 second
offense adult misdemeanor DUI conviction after concluding that the judgment entered in the June
1998 DUI case unambiguously described the conviction as being a second offense adult DUI
conviction, so the magistrate court did not have the authority to amend that judgment. Roberts
4
appealed the denial of his motion to the district court. The district court consolidated Roberts’
appeal with Roberts’ other pending motions and petitions for post-conviction relief in his felony
DUI cases.
Following briefing and oral argument, the district court issued a decision affirming the
magistrate court’s denial of Roberts’ motion related to his June 1998 second offense adult
misdemeanor DUI conviction and denied Roberts’ motions and petitions for post-conviction relief
filed in his felony DUI cases. The district court began by reviewing whether the magistrate court
had legal authority to amend Roberts’ April 1998 conviction for second offense adult DUI. The
district court concluded that Roberts failed to show from the face of the record that his April 1998
conviction was illegal and therefore a Rule 35(a) motion could not be used to attack the validity
of an underlying conviction. The district court concluded that the magistrate court erred by
granting Roberts’ Rule 35 motion concerning his April 1998 conviction and reversed the
magistrate court’s order amending the April 1998 judgment of conviction.
The district court next affirmed the magistrate court’s denial of Roberts’ Rule 35 motion
to amend his June 1998 second offense adult misdemeanor DUI conviction. The district court
concluded that Roberts failed to demonstrate that the conviction was illegal on its face and that
Rule 35 could not be used to collaterally attack a criminal conviction.
The district court then denied Roberts’ various motions in his felony DUI cases because
they were all dependent on Roberts’ April 1998 judgment of conviction being amended to a
juvenile DUI, which the district court reversed. Finally, the district court dismissed Roberts’
petitions for post-conviction relief, concluding that they were also premised on the April 1998
amended conviction that the district court vacated, and that Roberts did not provide any evidence
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Roberts timely appealed the decisions in each of his criminal cases. This Court thereafter
consolidated the appeals. On appeal, Roberts only argues error related to the district court’s
decision affirming the magistrate court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion, its decisions denying his
Rule 35 motions in his felony DUI cases, and its decisions dismissing his petitions for post-conviction relief in his felony DUI cases.
II. ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether Roberts is entitled to amend his prior judgments of conviction pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 35(a) or Idaho Code section 19-4901(a).
5
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
When reviewing the decision of a district court sitting in its intermediate appellate capacity,
we review the trial court record to “determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence
to support the magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow
from those findings.” State v. Dacey, 169 Idaho 102, 106–07,
491 P.3d 1205, 1209–10 (2021)
(quoting Bailey v. Bailey,
153 Idaho 526, 529,
284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012)). “If those findings are so
supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate’s
decision, we affirm the district court’s decision as a matter of procedure.”
Id. (quoting Bailey,
153
Idaho at 529,
284 P.3d at 973). Thus, this Court does not review the magistrate court’s decision.
Id. “Rather, we are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court.”
Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bailey,
153 Idaho at 529,
284 P.3d at 973).
The denial of a Rule 35 motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Arthur, 145
Idaho 219, 222,
177 P.3d 966, 969 (2008). When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion
by a trial court the Court considers whether the trial court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise of reason.” State v. Jones,
167 Idaho 353, 358,
470 P.3d 1162, 1167 (2020) (quoting
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163 Idaho 856, 863,
421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
“When reviewing the ‘dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally
construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.’” Hooley v. State,
172 Idaho 906, 912,
537 P.3d 1267, 1273 (2023) (quoting Charboneau v. State,
144 Idaho 900,
903,
174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007)). “When the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the
applicant to relief, the trial court may dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary
hearing.”
Id. (quoting Charboneau,
144 Idaho at 903,
174 P.3d at 873).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Neither Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) nor Idaho Code section 19-4901(a) allow Roberts to
amend his judgments of conviction.
Roberts acknowledges that the district court’s rulings were consistent with Idaho law.
However, he asks this Court to reconsider its interpretations of Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) and
6
Idaho Code section 19-4901(a) to allow Roberts to use those provisions to “correct” his criminal
history, amend his judgments of conviction, and eliminate his sentence enhancement for being a
persistent violator of the law. Roberts argues that if he cannot obtain the requested relief under
Rule 35 or section 19-4901(a), then he has no way to correct his criminal history following the
April 1998 conviction. For the reasons discussed herein, we decline to overrule our prior decisions
holding that neither Rule 35(a) nor Idaho Code section 19-4901(a) permit the relief that Roberts
seeks.
1. Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) does not authorize trial courts to amend a criminal conviction.
Roberts asks this Court to reconsider its interpretation of Rule 35(a) and allow courts to go
beyond the face of the record on the judgment of conviction when there is a colorable argument
that the sentence imposed is illegal based upon an erroneous understanding of the defendant’s
criminal history. Roberts argues that he should not have been permitted to plead guilty to a second
offense adult DUI in April 1998 because he was only seventeen years old and there is no evidence
in the record indicating that his BAC at the time was over 0.08. Roberts contends that his erroneous
conviction for a second offense adult DUI has resulted in his 2016 DUI conviction being a felony
and also in his being subject to a sentencing enhancement due to being a persistent violator.
Roberts asserts that, if his April 1998 DUI conviction was corrected to second offense juvenile
DUI, his subsequent DUI convictions would all be misdemeanors and he would not have been
subject to a persistent violator sentencing enhancement. The State responds that this Court should
not create a new equitable remedy contrary to the current language and interpretation of Rule 35(a).
The Idaho Supreme Court has inherent authority “to make rules governing procedure in the
lower courts of the state.” State v. Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 58,
539 P.2d 604, 610 (1975). Idaho
Criminal Rule 35(a) reads:
Illegal Sentences. The court may correct a sentence that is illegal from the face of
the record at any time.
I.C.R. 35(a) (emphasis added). “Idaho Criminal Rule 35 is a narrow rule that allows a trial court
to correct an illegal sentence at any time.” State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84,
218 P.3d 1143,
1145 (2009) (emphasis added). Both the plain language of Rule 35(a) and this Court’s caselaw
interpreting Rule 35(a) are clear that a Rule 35(a) motion cannot be used to amend an underlying
judgment of conviction.
Id. at 86,
218 P.3d at 1147 (“[T]he term ‘illegal sentence’ under Rule 35
is narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record, i.e., does not involve
significant questions of fact or require an evidentiary hearing.”); State v. Wolfe,
158 Idaho 55, 65,
7
343 P.3d 497, 507 (2015) (“Rule 35’s purpose is to allow courts to correct illegal sentences, not to
reexamine errors occurring at trial or before the imposition of the sentence.” (emphasis omitted)).
Roberts asserts that the equities in his case weigh in favor of allowing him to use Rule 35(a) to
look to the underlying facts of the case to attack an underlying conviction and that we should
therefore carve out an exception for his circumstance. We decline to do so for several reasons.
First, Roberts is incorrect that, absent carving out an exception for him, he had no other
avenues to correct his April 1998 conviction. Rather, the law provided him with several avenues
to correct or set aside his judgment of conviction, such as a direct appeal, a timely Rule 33 motion
to withdraw his guilty plea, or a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Roberts did not pursue
any of these procedural mechanisms. There is no need to create additional mechanisms when our
current law and rules provided him with several ways to raise the issue he raises now.
Second, to carve out an exception to Rule 35(a) as Roberts suggests would upend decades
of precedent from this Court and the Court of Appeals holding that a defendant cannot revisit an
underlying conviction via a Rule 35(a) motion. See Wolfe, 158 Idaho at 65,
343 P.3d at 507;
Clements,
148 Idaho at 84,
218 P.3d at 1145; State v. Burnight,
132 Idaho 654, 657 n.1,
978 P.2d
214, 217 n.1 (1999); State v. Gomez,
127 Idaho 327, 329,
900 P.2d 803, 805 (Ct. App. 1995); State
v. Sands,
121 Idaho 1023, 1025,
829 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Ct. App. 1992). Roberts fails to demonstrate
compelling reasons for why we should create exceptions to well-established caselaw. His argument
that he will not otherwise be able to obtain relief is unavailing in light of his failure to pursue the
other available procedural mechanisms to correct his conviction.
Finally, carving out an exception to our longstanding caselaw would disturb the finality
rationale that underlies Rule 35(a). Finality is a longstanding underpinning of Idaho’s legal system.
See State v. Davis, 8 Idaho 115, 118,
66 P. 932, 932–33 (1901) (per curiam). This Court has
repeatedly held that “the authority conferred by Rule 35 should be limited to uphold the finality of
judgments.” Clements,
148 Idaho at 86,
218 P.3d at 1147; see Wolfe,
158 Idaho at 65,
343 P.3d at
507. Roberts argues that “the goal of finality should never outweigh basic notions of justice and
due process . . . .” However, Roberts pleaded guilty to his April 1998 DUI charge over two decades
ago, and he has only now sought relief from a conviction that he argues was improper on its face
at the time it occurred.
This case presents a prime example for upholding the finality of judgments. Roberts makes
several factual assertions about what occurred in connection with his April 1998 guilty plea, which
8
are impossible to either confirm or deny due to the absence of any meaningful record. Likely due
to the passage of time, the record on appeal concerning Roberts’ April 1998 DUI conviction does
not include evidence of Roberts’ BAC when he was charged, why Roberts waived his right to
counsel, or why he decided to plead guilty to adult misdemeanor DUI. Without a complete record,
including Roberts’ BAC at the time he was arrested, this Court cannot determine if Roberts was
incorrectly charged with an adult misdemeanor DUI instead of a juvenile DUI. At the time of
Roberts’ arrest in April of 1998, Idaho law permitted a person under twenty-one years of age to be
charged with an adult DUI offense if that person’s BAC was over 0.08. I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a) (1997)
(“It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol . . . who has an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 . . . or more . . . to drive . . . within this state . . . .” (emphasis added)). If
Roberts’ BAC was 0.08 or more at the time of his arrest for his April 1998 DUI, then Roberts was
properly charged and his justification for carving out an exception to Rule 35 falls away. We
therefore uphold the finality of Roberts’ April 1998 judgment of conviction.
In conclusion, we decline Roberts’ invitation to carve out an exception to the plain
language of Rule 35 and our existing caselaw. We therefore affirm the district court’s intermediate
appellate decision affirming the magistrate court’s decision denying Roberts’ Rule 35 motion. We
also affirm the district court’s decisions denying Roberts’ Rule 35 motions in his felony DUI cases.
2. Idaho Code section 19-4901(a) does not authorize trial courts to amend a criminal
conviction.
Roberts also asks this Court to interpret section 19-4901(a) of Idaho’s Post-Conviction
Procedure Act to allow Roberts to amend his judgment of conviction when he is serving a sentence
arguably not authorized by Idaho law and when he raised that claim within a reasonable time of
discovering the error. The State responds that the Act bars Roberts from challenging the final
judgments entered in his case.
“Statutory interpretation is a question of law that receives de novo review from this Court.”
State v. Burke, 166 Idaho 621, 623,
462 P.3d 599, 601 (2020) (citing State v. Schulz,
151 Idaho
863, 865,
264 P.3d 970, 972 (2011)). Idaho Code section 19-4901(a)(1) provides that “[a]ny person
who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims . . . [t]hat the conviction or
the sentence was in violation of the constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of
this state . . . may institute, without paying a filing fee, a proceeding under this act to secure relief.”
I.C. § 19-4901(a)(1). However, as acknowledged by Roberts, he is not permitted to bring a claim
pursuant to section 19-4901(a)(1) because that claim must be filed within one year from the
9
expiration of the time for appeal, which has long since passed. I.C. § 19-4902(a). Additionally,
issues which could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are generally forfeited. I.C. §
19-4901(b). These procedural barriers bar Roberts from bringing a claim for post-conviction relief
to correct his allegedly erroneous DUI convictions.
We decline Roberts’ invitation to depart from the plain language of Idaho’s Post-Conviction Relief Act and our well-established caselaw. The plain language of Idaho Code section
19-4902 required Roberts to file his petition for post-conviction relief within a year of his
conviction. He did not. Moreover, the plain language of Idaho Code section 19-4901(b) prevents
Roberts from raising the claims he raises here because he failed to raise them on direct appeal.
“The right to post-conviction relief is proscribed by what the statute provides; we are not in the
business of rewriting statutes.” Hooley v. State, 172 Idaho 906, 915,
537 P.3d 1267, 1276 (2023).
Accordingly, Roberts is not entitled to post-conviction relief, and we therefore affirm the district
court’s decisions dismissing Roberts’ petitions for post-conviction relief.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the district court’s denial of Roberts’ requests
for relief from his final judgments of conviction.
Chief Justice BEVAN, Justices BRODY and MEYER, and Pro Tem Justice TROUT
CONCUR.
10
