United States v. Moss’s Empirical Analysis
562 F.2d 155 · 1977
Citation profile
29 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 42 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2013 · most notably United States v. Apfelbaum (1980), United States v. Nersesian (1987)
29 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 152 · 18 U.S.C. § 6002
Relies on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte · Johnson v. Zerbst · Fay v. Noia · Benton v. Maryland · Kastigar v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“in each such instance there is a separate act, taken at a discrete time, accompanied by the requisite intent.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““In such circumstances, the prohibition against use of the testimony was not a constitutional prohibition but rather a bargain made in exchange for testimony that could not have been compelled. * * * * * * “On the other hand, since under the present Bankruptcy Act section, 11 U.S.C. § 25 (a), the bankrupt is compelled to testify, the immunity granted must be coextensive with the privilege. * * * * * * “This seems to us to mean that the prohibition against the use and derivative use of the testimony is constitutionally required if the immunity granted is permitted to compel the testimony of the bankrupt. Now there is no longer a bargain but a naked compulsion sufficient in scope to preserve the privilege against misuse. “Since it is a constitutionally required quid pro quo to justify the compulsory process against the bankrupt, the prohibition rises to the dignity of a constitutional right rather than a mere bargain as it was under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. . “We think that a waiver in these circumstances requires an intentional relinquishment of a known right by the client rather than by the lawyer.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““The testimony given by the bankrupt was compelled by Section 25(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, as the Government concedes. See United States v. Dornau, 491 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1974). The compulsion was constitutionally justified only because the use immunity granted, including a prohibition against derivative use, was coextensive with the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 .. . (1972). The earlier Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not prohibit derivative use of the bankrupt’s testimony and hence was not coextensive with the privilege. . Under that statute the prohibition against use of the testimony came into play only if the bankrupt voluntarily surrendered his privilege.” (Italics in original)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.