01/14/2025
DA 22-0574
Case Number: DA 22-0574
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 7N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
CHARLOTTE ANN WOLFCHILD,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC-21-6
Honorable Ashley Harada, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Pete Wood, Attorney at Law, Boise, Idaho
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Tammy K Plubell, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Scott Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney, John M. Ryan, Deputy County
Attorney, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 11, 2024
Decided: January 14, 2025
Filed:
ir•--6.-
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Charlotte Ann Wolfchild (Wolfchild) appeals the August 17, 2022 Judgment
(Judgment) entered by the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, which
ordered Wolfchild, in relevant part, to pay $44,450.50 to Scott Lantz (Scott or Mr. Lantz)
or the Estate of his late wife, Faith Justice Lantz (Faith or Ms. Lantz), in restitution for
damages related to Wolfchild’s assault of Faith, which led to Wolfchild being charged
herein with felony assault with a weapon. Wolfchild contends the restitution was
erroneously imposed. We consider whether the restitution award was supported by
sufficient evidence, and whether the District Court properly made the award to “Scott Lantz
or the Estate of Faith Justice Lantz.” We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.
¶3 Faith began work as the property manager at Sage Towers in Billings in November
2020. On December 30, 2020, one of the tenants of the facility called Faith, informing
Faith that she was afraid to leave her apartment because of the presence in the building of
Wolfchild, who the tenant reported had assaulted her two days prior. Wolfchild did not
reside in the building. Faith located Wolfchild in another tenant’s apartment and asked her
to leave. Wolfchild, who had been drinking, began swearing and resisted Faith’s request.
Faith stated she would have to call police, and Wolfchild challenged her to do it, which
2
Faith did. Pursuant to a company policy, Faith accompanied Wolfchild to the elevator to
escort her out of the complex. While waiting for the elevator, Wolfchild decided to leave
by the stairs, and shoved Faith, which Faith reported on the call to police. The elevator
arrived at the floor, whereupon Wolfchild turned around and entered the elevator, followed
by Faith. Saying, “I’ll show you what an assault is,” Wolfchild repeatedly struck Faith in
the face with a bar glass. The tenant who Wolfchild was visiting told Wolfchild to stop
because “you’re going to kill her,” to which Wolfchild replied, “she deserves it.” Police
arrived and arrested Wolfchild. The District Court found:
Ms. Lantz was never the same after being brutally attacked. Ms. Lantz was
diagnosed with early onset cataracts in her right eye due to the assault. She
suffered near constant, debilitating headaches for months after the assault.
Mr. Lantz testified and described significant changes in the behavior of Ms.
Lantz and the need to provide constant care for her. Mr. Lantz was forced to
leave work to provide constant care for Ms. Lantz. Ms. Lantz had extreme
psychological trauma from the attack and struggled with feeling safe. Ms.
Lantz[’s] doctors also noted that her traumatic brain injury resulted in her
inability to work, her inability to feel safe, her inability to engage in normal
daily routines, and her post concussive behaviors.
¶4 While the case was pending, Faith was admitted to the hospital for COVID-19, and
her treatment was complicated by her traumatic brain injury. Scott could not be in the
hospital with Faith due to pandemic protocols, and she succumbed to the infectious disease
on January 12, 2022, at the age of 42. In July 2021, about six months prior to her death,
Faith submitted a restitution affidavit requesting payment of expenses she had incurred by
that time, including unreimbursed medical expenses and lost wages. Additionally, Faith
and Scott requested restitution in the amount of $35,000 for the wages Scott lost for the
3
months he had cared for Faith based upon Scott’s claim that he had given up employment
to provide for her care.
¶5 In March 2022, Wolfchild and the State entered a plea bargain agreement resolving
this charge by a plea of guilty and also resolving other pending charges against Wolfchild.
For this charge, the agreement provided that the State would recommend “payment of any
legally claimed restitution” as part of its sentencing recommendation. The District Court
conducted two hearings regarding sentencing and restitution, at which Scott testified about
he and Faith’s expenses and his employment status. Wolfchild objected that Scott could
not testify in support of the restitution request because he had not been named as executor
of Faith’s estate, which the District Court overruled. The District Court awarded a total of
$44,450.50 in restitution, including $9,450.50 for Faith’s claimed expenses, and $35,000
for Scott’s claimed lost wages, reasoning “[t]he Court heard testimony and determined by
a preponderance of the evidence Ms. Lantz and her husband sustained a pecuniary loss due
to Defendant’s criminal activity. Additionally, Ms. Lantz and her husband attempted to
mitigate damages and the damages requested are not excessive, unreasonable, or outside
statutory authority.” Wolfchild appeals.
¶6 “Restitution awards create mixed questions of law and fact that we review de novo.”
State v. Bertsch, 2024 MT 250, ¶ 4,
418 Mont. 425,
557 P.3d 1251 (citation omitted). “We
review the appropriateness of imposing restitution for correctness and the District Court’s
findings regarding the amount of restitution to determine whether they are clearly
erroneous.” State v. Cleveland,
2018 MT 199, ¶ 7,
392 Mont. 338,
423 P.3d 1074.
4
¶7 On appeal, Wolfchild initially challenged both the amount of restitution the District
Court ordered for Faith, $9,450.50, and the entirety of the restitution, $35,000, awarded to
Scott. However, Wolfchild has made concessions in her briefing that have narrowed the
issues. In her reply brief, Wolfchild re-explains her position and states, “In sum, Ms.
Wolfchild agrees that Ms. Lantz’s Estate is entitled to restitution in the amount of
$9,450.50 for her out-of-pocket expenses and lost wages,” which is the amount awarded
by the District Court for those claims. That leaves the $35,000 claimed by Scott for wages
he lost when caring for Faith instead of working.
¶8 Wolfchild initially objected to Scott’s testimony because he had not been appointed
a representative of Faith’s Estate. In her briefing, she now concedes that, “had Mr. Lantz
proffered sufficient evidence to substantiate his claim, he would be a victim under
[§ 46-18-243(2)(a)(i), MCA] as ‘a person who suffer[ed] [a] loss of property . . . as a result
of . . . the commission of an offense.’” Thus, the issue is narrowed to whether there was
sufficient evidence to support the District Court’s award of $35,000 for Scott’s claimed
lost wages.
¶9 A restitution award may be established, pursuant to § 46-18-242, MCA, by “an
affidavit of loss by or testimony of the victim describing the victim’s pecuniary losses.”
Cleveland, ¶ 12; see also State v. Pierre, 2020 MT 160, ¶ 13,
400 Mont. 283,
466 P.3d 494
(“The sentencing court may find the requisite causal nexus for restitution, between an
offender’s admitted or adjudicated criminal conduct and the asserted victim loss, upon an
admission, by implication from proof of the elements of the charged offense, upon victim
affidavits included with a PSI, or upon other evidence presented at or incident to
5
sentencing.”). Scott’s lost wages, covering the seven months he cared for Faith up to the
time she submitted her restitution claim in July 2021, were first requested within Faith’s
affidavit, which was prepared by her counsel, was detailed at length, and supported by
extensive documentation. In regard to Scott’s involvement, the affidavit, filed while Faith
was alive, stated:
Husband assists with all activities & daily living . . . Ms. Lantz’s neurologist,
Dr. Trenay Hart estimates that it will be 12 -- 18 months from the date of the
attack to determine the full extent of her injuries, and she will not be able to
work during that time. Mr. Lantz is unable to work because he assists Ms.
Lantz with all her daily living needs. Mr. Lantz has not worked since Ms.
Lantz’s attack. Please note that [Scott’s] wage loss calculations [of $35,000]
above do NOT include this future estimated loss of income.
¶10 Scott also testified in the two sentencing hearings, at which point Faith was
deceased, and provided information about his care of Faith and the calculation of the
claimed $35,000 in wages. About Faith’s care, he testified:
At home when I was taking care of her, she -- because of her vision problems
and other problems with the TBI, she couldn’t balance very well, I had to
help get her dressed, in and out of bed, I had to help her get up from the living
room chair, I had to help get her in and out of the bathtub, we had to get a
shower chair for her because she couldn’t stand in the shower. I had to help
take care of her. I had to do everything around the house and cook for her
and feed her. It was pretty much around the clock job, taking care of her.
Prior to Faith’s injury, Scott had worked as a delivery driver, earning $60,000 per year,
from which he calculated his usual wages to be $5,000 per month. Thus, the $35,000
claimed for lost wages was based upon Scott’s usual monthly wage for the seven months
he took care of Faith at home, from December 2020 to the time the claim was submitted in
July 2021. At the time of Faith’s injury, Scott was not then working, having sustained an
on-the-job shoulder injury. Then, his actual former position was cut because the company
6
reduced services during the COVID pandemic. However, after surgical repair of his
shoulder, he was in contact with employers and had received offers to return to work
whenever he was available to do so, some paying more than he had earned at his prior
position driving trucks. Scott explained these circumstances:
Q. So could you tell the Court a little bit about your working situation
leading up to Faith's injury?
A. My working situation, I had injured myself, and I was going through
therapy, and I ended up having to have a surgery on my shoulder, and Faith
was taking care of me during that time, plus working at the same time, and I
was recovering from the surgery to a point to where I could start to go out
and look for a job myself, and then the assault happened.
Q. [W]hat were you doing when you got hurt for work?
A. I was a deliveryman for Alsco American Linen.
Q. And I know in Montana it’s impolite to talk about money, but what
was your hourly wage or salary?
A. My yearly salary was 60,000 a year. I had the largest route in the
state . . . .
. . .
Q. So you find out that COVID cutbacks has cost you a position to go
back to; once you are feeling you are kind of capable and ready to go back
to work, what were your prospects looking like? Had you applied for jobs
or interviewed for jobs?
A. There were a couple different jobs that I could actually do. There was
some jobs that I could operate heavy equipment that I could do, I’ve done
that in the past, and that wasn’t going to be an issue, and it could have been
more profitable for me than the Alsco job, but because of Faith, I didn’t want
to leave her alone to her own devices while I was at work.
Q. Had you made contact with any of those construction companies or
any of those outfits to talk to them about work?
7
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And how close were you to actually landing a job with them? Was it
just a situation of showing up or describe that for the Court?
A. Well, the people I talked to were managers on the -- with the company,
and I could -- they said anytime I was ready to come on board with them, just
to let them know.
Q. Okay. You talked a little bit about your work experience prior to your
injury, but really just as far as one job goes; could you describe for the Court
what other kind of skills, what other kind of jobs you’ve done kind of
throughout the course of your adult life?
A. Through the course of my job career, I spent 17 years as an animal
control officer with the Billings Police Department, I was a swift water river
rescue tech, I’m a high and low angle rappelling rescue tech, I was a swift
water river rescue and ice water rescue tech, I was a occult investigator for
the Billings Police Department, I was a euthanasia tech for the State, I ran
the crematorium for the animal shelter, I cremated drugs for the city, county
and state.
When I left that job, I took a supervisor’s job up at the airport. I was
a manager of an air cargo operation up there for UPS, I worked for Edwards
Jet Center -- I trained everybody on every piece of equipment up there, I
managed the crew, I did scheduling -- we went through a lot of people every
year, a couple hundred people every year, worked two different shifts up
there, and I did that for 12 years, then I went to work at Alsco.
¶11 Wolfchild argues that “Mr. Lantz’s restitution request is premised on the assumption
that but for his staying home to take care of his wife, he could have earned $35,000 in the
7-month period from January 1–July 31, 2021. This assumption is unsupported by
evidence in the record.” She further contends that “the only evidence concerning Mr.
Lantz’s purported lost wages was his statement that he turned down a job operating heavy
equipment. This single statement is insufficient to prove Mr. Lantz actually turned down
a bona fide job offer.” However, from our review of the record we conclude there was
sufficient evidence presented, if believed, for the District Court to conclude that the claim
8
for $35,000 in lost wages had been established by a preponderance of the evidence,
including the “requisite causal nexus for the restitution, between an offender’s admitted or
adjudicated criminal conduct and the asserted victim loss.” Pierre, ¶ 13.
¶12 The Judgment lumped the restitution amounts together and awarded them to “Scott
Lantz or the Estate of Faith Justice Lantz.” In accordance with the claims as made and the
findings entered by the District Court, the Judgment should state that $9,450.50 is awarded
to the Estate of Faith Justice Lantz, and $35,000 is awarded to Scott Lantz, and we remand
for entry of an Amended Judgment to this effect. Although we do not reach the issue here,
in the event restitution is paid to the Estate of Faith Justice Lantz, and dependent upon other
properties and circumstances, it may be necessary to initiate an informal probate
proceeding or a summary administration procedure for small estates pursuant to
§§ 72-3-1101 through -1104, MCA, for distribution of such proceeds.
¶13 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
applicable standards of review. The District Court’s interpretation and application of the
law were correct, and its findings of fact were not clearly erroneous.
¶14 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of an Amended Judgment.
/S/ JIM RICE
9
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
10
