FILE
THIS OPINION WAS FILED
FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
JANUARY 23, 2025
IN CLERK’S OFFICE
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
JANUARY 23, 2025
SARAH R. PENDLETON
ACTING SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 102643-9
Respondent, EN BANC
v.
MONTREAL LEANTHONY MORGAN Filed: January 23, 2025
SR.,
Petitioner.
STEPHENS, C.J.— Washington’s crime victims compensation act (CVCA),
chapter 7.68 RCW, provides benefits to crime victims and their families for expenses
resulting from criminal acts. Payments are administered by the Department of Labor
and Industries (L&I), which is authorized to seek a court order of restitution for
benefits paid. The restitution statute, RCW 9.94A.753, governs court orders of
restitution in criminal cases as part of a responsible defendant’s judgment and
sentence. Under RCW 9.94A.753(7), a court must hold a hearing and enter a
restitution order whenever a victim is entitled to CVCA benefits. The issue in this
case is whether the restitution statute affords the court any discretion to modify the
amount owed to L&I as reimbursement for CVCA benefits paid.
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
Montreal Morgan pleaded guilty to crimes that resulted in Fabian Alvarez’s
death. At his restitution hearing, the State requested $10,480 in restitution for CVCA
benefits paid by L&I toward Alvarez’s medical and funeral expenses. Morgan asked
the trial court to reduce the amount of restitution due to mitigating factors, including
his youth and role in the crime, but the court believed RCW 9.94A.753(7) limited
its discretion. The trial court ordered the full amount of restitution requested for
CVCA benefits, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted review.
Applying settled principles of statutory construction, we hold that RCW
9.94A.753 does not allow a trial court discretion to modify the amount of restitution
owed to L&I for CVCA benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals and
uphold Morgan’s order of restitution.
BACKGROUND
In June 2020, Montreal Morgan participated in a home invasion robbery that
resulted in the death of Fabian Alvarez, a resident of the home. Alvarez’s funeral
was held two weeks later, paid for by family members. The next month, L&I paid
$6,170 toward the cost of Alvarez’s funeral expenses under the CVCA. 1 L&I also
paid $4,310 directly to Harborview Medical Center for Alvarez’s medical expenses.
1
L&I reimbursed Alvarez’s family members $3,584 and paid the funeral home $2,586.
Although the total funeral cost exceeded this amount, $6,170 was the maximum allowable for
funeral expenses under the CVCA at the time. See RCW 7.68.070(10) (providing a method to
adjust the maximum amount allowed under the program to account for inflation).
2
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
On January 20, 2022, Morgan pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit murder in the
second degree and unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree. As part
of the plea agreement, Morgan agreed to the imposition of restitution, with the
amount to be determined at a later date.
At the restitution hearing on September 7, 2022, the State requested $10,480
to reimburse L&I for the total amount of financial benefits paid under the CVCA as
a result of Alvarez’s death. The State submitted L&I’s proof of payments with its
request. Alvarez’s family did not seek separate restitution.
Morgan did not dispute that his actions caused the losses paid for from the
CVCA program. Rather, Morgan asked the trial court to exercise its discretion and
order a lower amount of restitution, citing his youthfulness at the time of the crime,
his limited earning potential, his mental health conditions, and his role in the crime
relative to other participants. The trial court responded that it believed RCW
9.94A.753(7) constrained its discretion to impose less than the amount requested as
reimbursement for the benefits L&I paid under the CVCA. The court accordingly
refused Morgan’s request and ordered him to pay, jointly and severally with his
codefendants, $10,480 in restitution to the CVCA program.
Morgan appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing with the lower
court that RCW 9.94A.753(7) does not afford trial courts discretion to impose less
3
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
restitution than the amount of CVCA benefits paid. State v. Morgan, 28 Wn. App.
2d 701, 707,
538 P.3d 648 (2023), review granted,
2 Wn.3d 1036 (2024). Morgan
filed a petition for review, which we granted. We accepted an amicus brief from
L&I, which administers the CVCA program.
ANALYSIS
This case concerns the proper interpretation of the restitution statute, RCW
9.94A.753. Generally, the statute affords a trial court broad discretion to craft a
restitution order, and the court’s decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an
abuse of discretion. State v. Tobin, 161 Wn.2d 517, 523, 527,
166 P.3d 1167 (2007)
(noting abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court applies “incorrect legal analysis
or other error of law”). However, statutory interpretation poses a pure question of
law and our review is de novo. State v. Gray,
174 Wn.2d 920, 926,
280 P.3d 1110
(2012).
RCW 9.94A.753(7) states:
Regardless of the provisions of subsections (1) through (6) of this
section, the court shall order restitution in all cases where the victim is
entitled to benefits under the [CVCA], chapter 7.68 RCW. If the court
does not order restitution and the victim of the crime has been
determined to be entitled to benefits under the [CVCA], [L&I], as
administrator of the crime victims’ compensation program, may
petition the court within one year of entry of the judgment and sentence
for entry of a restitution order. Upon receipt of a petition from [L&I]
the court shall hold a restitution hearing and shall enter a restitution
order.
4
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
RCW 9.94A.753(3)(b) addresses restitution owed specifically to insurers and
states agencies. It states:
[T]he court may determine that the offender is not required to pay, or
may relieve the offender of the requirement to pay, full or partial
restitution . . . where the entity to whom restitution is owed is an insurer
or state agency, except for restitution owed to [L&I] under chapter 7.68
RCW, if the court finds that the offender does not have the current or
likely future ability to pay.
RCW 9.94A.753(3)(b).
The parties agree that the statutory scheme requires restitution where a victim
is entitled to CVCA benefits. And they agree that upon a request for restitution from
L&I, the court must hold a hearing and enter a restitution order. But the parties do
not agree about whether the court has discretion to determine the amount of
restitution to order. Morgan argues that the statute is silent with respect to the
amount of restitution a court may impose and that to hold otherwise impermissibly
adds words to the statute. The State counters that the statutory framework as a whole
requires an award of restitution in the amount of benefits paid by L&I under the
CVCA, and that if the legislature intended to make the amount discretionary, then it
would have explicitly said so, as it did in other provisions of the statute.
To address the parties’ arguments and properly construe RCW 9.94A.753, we
begin with foundational principles of statutory interpretation. Our fundamental
5
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
objective “is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent.” Dep’t of Ecology
v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9,
43 P.3d 4 (2002) (citing State v. J.M.,
144 Wn.2d 472, 480,
28 P.3d 720 (2001))). The first step in interpreting a statute is
to examine its plain language. State v. Armendariz,
160 Wn.2d 106, 110,
156 P.3d
201 (2007). When a statute’s meaning is plain on its face, we “must give effect to
that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Campbell,
146 Wn.2d at
9-10. We look to “the ordinary meaning of the language in the context of related
statutory provisions, the entire statute, and related statutes.” AURC III, LLC v. Point
Ruston Phase II, LLC,
3 Wn.3d 80, 87,
546 P.3d 385 (2024). We need not rely on
other interpretive tools, such as legislative history, when a statute is unambiguous.
Spokane County v. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife,
192 Wn.2d 453, 458,
430 P.3d 655
(2018) (citing State v. Velasquez,
176 Wn.2d 333, 336,
292 P.3d 92 (2013)).
Here, we hold that RCW 9.94A.753(7) is unambiguous. The plain language
of the statute, when read in context with related provisions of the restitution statute
and the CVCA, requires the court to order restitution in the amount of benefits paid
by L&I through the CVCA program.
1. In the context of RCW 9.94A.753, the absence of discretionary
language in RCW 9.94A.753(7) plainly indicates that a court’s order of
restitution must reflect the amount of CVCA benefits paid
To properly interpret the restitution statute, it is important to first consider its
relationship to other statutes governing legal financial obligations (LFOs). Under
6
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), LFOs are part of an offender’s sentence.
RCW 9.94A.760(1). When imposing LFOs, a trial court must designate the amounts
owed for restitution, costs, fines, and other assessments required by law. Id.
Restitution is prioritized and treated differently from other LFOs. For example, an
offender is not required to pay costs if indigent but must still pay restitution.
Id.
When a court clerk receives an offender’s LFO payment, victim restitution is always
paid first, followed by other forms of restitution, and lastly costs. RCW
9.94A.760(2). Unlike other LFOs, which may be enforced only within 10 years of
the offender’s release or entry of the judgment and sentence, the court retains
jurisdiction over restitution until the obligation is fully satisfied. RCW
9.94A.760(5)(c), (d). These statutory distinctions clearly indicate that restitution is
intended to be treated independently from other LFOs.
The purpose of restitution is “both to rehabilitate the defendant and to
compensate the victim.” State v. Barbee, 193 Wn.2d 581, 588,
444 P.3d 10 (2019)
(citing Gray,
174 Wn.2d at 929-30). We interpret the restitution statute consistent
with the SRA’s purpose to “‘[p]romote respect for the law by providing punishment
which is just.’” State v. Davison,
116 Wn.2d 917, 922,
809 P.2d 1374 (1991)
(alteration in original) (quoting RCW 9.94.010(2)). In Davison, we rejected the view
that the statute must be strictly construed in favor of defendants, insisting on an
7
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
interpretation that furthers the legislature’s broad intent to allow restitution. Id. at
920.
We recognize that RCW 9.94A.753 generally grants a trial judge
“considerable discretion” in determining restitution, which may range from as little
as nothing in extraordinary circumstances to as much as double the offender's gain
or the victim's loss. State v. Kinneman, 155 Wn.2d 272, 282,
119 P.3d 350 (2005);
see also State v. Enstone,
137 Wn.2d 675, 680,
974 P.2d 828 (1999) (“[The
restitution] statute unambiguously provides a trial court with the discretion to order
a defendant to pay restitution for the expenses that are caused by his or her criminal
acts.”); Gray,
174 Wn.2d at 925 (“RCW 9.94A.753 grants trial courts ‘broad power’
to order and modify restitution.” (quoting Enstone,
137 Wn.2d at 679)).
The statute’s grant of discretion is evident in several provisions. RCW
9.94A.753(5) states that when a person is convicted of an offense that “results in
injury to any person or damage to or loss of property,” the court shall order
restitution “unless extraordinary circumstances exist which make restitution
inappropriate in the court's judgment.” The statute does not specify what constitutes
extraordinary circumstances, leaving it to the court to ultimately decide when to
impose or withhold restitution.
RCW 9.94A.753(1) permits a court to extend the application period beyond
180 days if, in the court’s judgment, good cause exists for the extension. In addition,
8
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
subsection (1) does not require the court to follow a strict formula when setting a
defendant’s monthly restitution payment amount; rather, it directs the court to “take
into consideration the total amount of the restitution owed[;] the offender's present,
past, and future ability to pay[;] as well as any assets that the offender may have.”
RCW 9.94A.753(1).
RCW 9.94A.753(3) allows for a broad range in the amount of restitution a
court may impose, including up to “double the amount of the offender's gain or the
victim's loss from the commission of the crime.”
When considered together, subsections (1), (3), and (5) plainly grant the
sentencing court wide latitude in determining when restitution is appropriate and the
amount it may order.
Morgan argues that sentencing courts have “inherent” discretion under the
restitution statute and this should extend to subsection (7). The plain language
suggests otherwise. Subsection (7) lacks the discretionary language present in
subsections (1), (3), and (5), and more importantly, it does not apply to general
orders of restitution. Rather, subsection (7) concerns a distinct type of restitution:
restitution ordered as reimbursement to L&I for CVCA benefits provided to crime
victims. The legislature has consistently treated this category of restitution as
unique, and the specific language in subsections (7) and (3)(b) indicates the
9
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
legislature intended to prevent courts from modifying the amount of restitution
reflecting CVCA benefits paid.
RCW 9.94A.753(7) states, “Regardless of the provisions of subsections (1)
through (6) of this section, the court shall order restitution in all cases where the
victim is entitled to benefits under the [CVCA]. . . . Upon receipt of a petition from
[L&I], the court shall hold a restitution hearing and shall enter a restitution order.”
There is no language in subsection (7) granting the court discretion to modify
the amount of benefits to which a victim is entitled. There is also no language that
requires or permits a court to consider “exceptional circumstances” or other
mitigating factors such as the defendant’s ability to pay. Morgan argues that because
subsection (7) does not specify the term “full amount,” we should read the statute as
allowing courts to retain their general discretion to determine restitution amounts.
However, it is the absence of express discretionary language, which is present in
other provisions of the statute, that is most significant. See United Parcel Serv., Inc.
v. Dep't of Revenue, 102 Wn.2d 355, 362,
687 P.2d 186 (1984) (“[W]here the
Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language
in another, there is a difference in legislative intent.”).
Beyond the presumption that different language conveys different intent,
recent amendments strongly support reading the legislature’s omission of
discretionary language with respect to CVCA benefits as a deliberate choice to
10
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
prohibit modification of this type of restitution. In 2022, the legislature amended
RCW 9.94A.753 to add subsection (3)(b), which affords courts the discretion to
reduce restitution owed to insurers and state agencies based on an offender’s
inability to pay. See LAWS OF 2022, ch. 260, § 3. Subsection (7) was not amended.
The new, remedial language provides that “if the court finds that the offender does
not have the current or likely future ability to pay,” then the court “may determine
that the offender is not required to pay, or may relieve the offender of the
requirement to pay, full or partial restitution . . . except for restitution owed to [L&I]
under chapter 7.68 RCW.” RCW 9.94A.753(3)(b) (emphasis added).2
This subsection, enacted just two years ago, plainly carves out restitution for
CVCA benefits administered by L&I, from other categories of restitution. And this
carve out in subsection (3)(b) reinforces the conclusion that restitution ordered under
the CVCA cannot be modified by the sentencing court. See Gray, 174 Wn.2d at 928
(“[T]he legislature knows how to limit a court’s discretion to modify restitution.”).
In the same bill, the legislature amended another statute, RCW 10.82.090, to
give courts the flexibility to waive or reduce the interest on restitution. See LAWS
OF 2022, ch. 260, § 12. Unlike RCW 9.94A.753(3)(b), this amendment does not
2
The legislature added identical provisions, including the exception for restitution owed to L&I,
to the sentencing guidelines for district courts under RCW 3.66.120(2), suspended sentences
under RCW 9.92.060(3), and conditions of probation under RCW 9.95.210(4).
11
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
include an exception for interest on restitution owed to L&I. RCW 10.82.090(2)
states, “The court may elect not to impose interest on any restitution the court
orders.” (Emphasis added.)3 The contrast between the two added provisions—one
prohibiting courts from reducing restitution owed for CVCA benefits, while the
other allowing for discretion to modify an amount—supports the conclusion that
when the legislature intends to provide discretion in the restitution statute, it does so
expressly.
After oral argument, Morgan submitted a statement of additional authorities,
citing Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 670,
140 S. Ct. 1731,
207 L. Ed. 2d
218 (2020), to argue that we should not consider subsequent legislative changes to
other statutory provisions when determining the plain language of subsection (7). In
Bostock, the United States Supreme Court considered the meaning of the word “sex”
in Title VII. As part of its analysis, the Court declined to consider the reasons why
Congress adopted certain laws referencing sexual orientation while not also
amending Title VII to include sexual orientation as a protected characteristic. The
Court explained that “speculation about why a later Congress declined to adopt new
3
The amended statute requires that before waiving the interest on restitution, the court must
consider the offender’s indigency, available funds, homelessness, mental health, other financial
obligations, and whether the victim will suffer hardship if restitution interest is not imposed.
RCW 10.82.090. The court “may also consider any other information that the court believes, in
the interest of justice, relates to not imposing interest on restitution.”
Id.
12
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
legislation offers a ‘particularly dangerous’ basis on which to rest an interpretation
of an existing law a different and earlier Congress did adopt.” Id.
The situation in this case is quite different. Here, we are not considering the
legislative history behind the subsequent enactment of unrelated laws or speculating
as to why the legislature did not amend subsection (7). Rather, our interpretation
rests on the plain language of related provisions in the restitution statute that are
consistent with the overall statutory scheme. To fully interpret subsection (7), we
must read it in the context of the entire restitution statute, including subsection
(3)(b), as well as the related provision concerning the payment of restitution interest
in RCW 10.82.090. See AURC III, LLC, 3 Wn.3d at 87 (“We discern plain language
from the ordinary meaning of the language in the context of related statutory
provisions, the entire statute, and related statutes.”).
Read as a whole, the restitution statute does not afford courts discretion to
modify amounts owed for CVCA benefits. Key discretionary language found in
other provisions of the restitution statute and related statutes indicates that the
absence of discretionary language in RCW 9.94A.753(7) is intentional. When
ordering restitution to reimburse benefits paid to crime victims, the restitution statute
plainly provides that the court must impose restitution reflecting the CVCA benefits
to which the victim is entitled.
13
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
2. The CVCA statutory scheme further indicates that the legislature
intended the amount of restitution to match CVCA benefits paid by L&I
Because the restitution statute RCW 9.94A.753(7) requires courts to order
restitution in “all cases where the victim is entitled to benefits under the [CVCA],
chapter 7.68 RCW,” we also consider its language in the context of the CVCA to
which it refers.
The purpose of the CVCA is to provide “benefits to innocent victims of
criminal acts.” RCW 7.68.030(1). The act defines a “victim” to mean “a person
who suffers bodily injury or death as a proximate result of a criminal act of another
person.” RCW 7.68.020(16). “Each victim . . . or the victim’s family or beneficiary
in case of death of the victim, are eligible for benefits.” RCW 7.68.070(1). The
amount of benefits L&I pays on behalf of a victim is directed by statute. Benefits
include payment of medical expenses, lost wages, funeral expenses, and mental
health services. See RCW 7.68.070. Each category of benefit is subject to individual
statutory caps, with a maximum of $40,000 per injury, excluding medical expenses,
which are capped at $150,000. RCW 7.68.085.
The CVCA program is primarily funded by a federal grant from the U.S.
Department of Justice, with additional support from the state general fund and
inmate phone fees.4 Restitution payments from criminal defendants may also play
4
How We’re Funded¸ DEP’T OF LAB. & INDUS., https://lni.wa.gov/claims/crime-victimclaims/lawsuits-settlements-and-insurance/how-we-re-funded.
14
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
a role in financing the CVCA program, though research generally shows that only a
small fraction of court-imposed restitution is ever collected.5 L&I must operate the
CVCA program within legislative appropriations, so funding, and subsequently
benefits, may be reduced if there is a deficit. RCW 7.68.015, .030(2)(g), (i).
Not every victim of a criminal act is eligible to receive CVCA benefits. To
qualify, a victim, or someone on their behalf, must file a police report within one
year of the criminal act and submit an application to L&I within three years, though
extensions may be granted for good cause. RCW 7.68.060(1). However, even with
a timely filing, a victim may be disqualified for other reasons, such as if the injury
occurred while they were committing or attempting to commit a felony or if they
have outstanding LFOs. RCW 7.68.061, .060(4)(b). As the program's administrator,
L&I reviews applications and distributes benefits according to the terms and limits
of the CVCA.
RCW 7.68.120 governs L&I’s process for seeking reimbursement for CVCA
benefits paid to victims. Under this provision, any payment of benefits to or on
behalf of a qualifying victim “creates a debt due and owing to [L&I] by any person
5
See Bryan L. Adamson, Debt Bondage: How Private Collection Agencies Keep the Formerly
Incarcerated Tethered to the Criminal Justice System, 15 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y. 305, 330-31
(2020) (“According to data compiled by the Washington Administrative Offices of the Courts
for the years 2014-2016, the LFOs which were actually paid into the courts woefully trail
behind the LFOs imposed. Of the over $130 million of LFOs imposed in courts of general
jurisdiction, only $7.8 million or 6% has been paid.”).
15
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
found to have committed the criminal act in either a civil or criminal court
proceeding in which he or she is a party.” RCW 7.68.120(1). If no restitution order
has been entered and a person is found responsible for the criminal act that results
in the payment of benefits to a victim, L&I must petition the court for entry of a
restitution order within one year of the sentence. Id.
While chapter 7.68 RCW governs L&I’s administration of the CVCA
program, RCW 9.94A.753(7) governs the actions of sentencing courts in criminal
cases, which follow a separate process. RCW 9.94A.753(7) states, “Upon receipt of
a petition from [L&I], the court shall hold a restitution hearing and shall enter a
restitution order.” A court “shall order restitution in all cases where the victim is
entitled to benefits under the [CVCA].” Id.
The amount of benefits to which a victim may be entitled under the CVCA is
statutorily determined. Benefits reflect the actual cost of the victim’s qualifying
expenses incurred as a result of a crime, subject to statutory caps. See RCW
7.68.070. As the State confirmed at oral argument, the trial court orders restitution
owed to L&I based on supporting documentation that verifies the payment of these
benefits. 6 In other words, “benefits” constitute a specific amount. Therefore, when
6
Wash. Sup. Ct. oral arg., State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9 (Sept. 12, 2024), at 30 min., 16 sec.,
video recording by TVW, Washington State's Public Affairs Network (“There has to be
substantial credible evidence presented that the amount being requested by CVC [(crime victims
compensation)] was the amount that it paid to an entitled person.”),
https://tvw.org/video/washington-state-supreme-court-2024091109/.
16
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
RCW 9.94A.753(7) requires a court to order restitution in “all cases where the victim
is entitled to benefits under the [CVCA], chapter 7.68 RCW,” the statute is referring
to a specific debt owed, not a general obligation that the court later determines in its
discretion.
Reading restitution for CVCA benefits as encompassing not a general
obligation but a debt in a specific dollar amount is consistent with the history and
purposes of the CVCA. The legislature enacted the CVCA in 1973 “to provide a
method of compensating and assisting those residents of the state who are innocent
victims of criminal acts and who suffer bodily injury or death as a consequence
thereof.” LAWS OF 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 122, § 1; see Haddenham v. State, 87
Wn.2d 145, 152,
550 P.2d 9 (1976) (“The legislature has determined that the number
of innocent victims injured is substantial, that their ability to be compensated under
existing law is somewhat sporadic, and that there ought to be a uniform procedure
for compensating these innocent victims on a fair basis.”) In structuring the CVCA,
the legislature directly incorporated entire sections of chapter 51 RCW, which
governs the workers’ compensation program. See, e.g., LAWS OF 1973, 1st Ex. Sess.,
ch. 122, § 2(3) (“ ‘[V]ictim’ shall be interchangeable with ‘employee’ or ‘workman’
as defined in chapter 51.08 RCW.”), § 6 (“For the purposes of applying for benefits
under this chapter, the rights, privileges, responsibilities, duties, limitations and
procedures contained in RCW 51 . . . shall apply.”), § 7(4) (“The benefits established
17
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
upon the death of a workman and contained in RCW 51 . . . shall be the benefits
obtainable under this chapter . . . .”). The legislature intended to “make certain” that
like workers’ compensation for injured workers, the CVCA provides innocent crime
victims with benefits for expenses incurred as a result of a crime. See id. § 1, § 7(2).
Over the years, the legislature has steadily expanded the scope of the CVCA
program to increase both the number of eligible recipients and the monetary amount
of benefits provided. Amendments to chapter 7.68 RCW have extended the
application period for victims, broadened eligibility criteria, raised statutory caps,
and introduced a method to adjust these caps for inflation.7 The legislature’s
ongoing efforts to strengthen and protect the CVCA program demonstrate its
commitment to ensuring that “victims of crimes are made whole after suffering
losses” and defendants “fulfill their responsibility to compensate victims for losses
resulting from their crimes.” State v. Gonzalez, 168 Wn.2d 256, 265,
226 P.3d 131
7
For example, in 1990, the legislature added a provision to the CVCA, extending the time limit
to file a police report from 72 hours to 12 months. LAWS OF 1990, ch. 3, § 501(1)(b). In 1992,
the legislature extended benefits to immediate family members or dependents of homicide
victims. LAWS OF 1992, ch. 203, § 1(17). In 1996, the legislature increased the application
period for benefits from one year to two years as well as added an exception to the time limit for
good cause. LAWS OF 1996, ch. 122, § 4(1)(a). In 2011, the legislature removed the references
to the workers compensation program, chapter 51 RCW, and directly incorporated the program’s
procedures and benefits into the CVCA. See LAWS OF 2011, ch. 346. The legislature intended
the change to “streamline and provide flexibility” to the administration of benefits as well as
“help the largest number of crime victims as possible.” Id. § 1. In 2017, the legislature extended
the time period for which an individual could receive reimbursement for funeral expense from 12
months to 24 months and included a method to account for inflation to increase the statutory
maximum. LAWS OF 2017, ch. 235, § 5(9). In 2020, the legislature increased the application
period from two years to three years. LAWS OF 2020, ch. 308, § 1(a).
18
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
(2010). This brief overview of the CVCA provides context to better understand the
related provisions of the restitution statute. The legislature’s consistent bolstering
of CVCA benefits supports our reading of RCW 9.94A.753(7) as not affording
discretion to sentencing courts to modify the amount of restitution owed to L&I.
3. We are unpersuaded by Morgan’s statutory interpretation arguments
based on constitutional avoidance and the rule of lenity
In his supplemental brief, Morgan argues that principles of constitutional
avoidance and the rule of lenity compel a statutory interpretation that grants courts
discretion over the amount of restitution. Specifically, he contends that interpreting
RCW 9.94A.753(7) to deny discretion would violate due process and the separation
of powers, and that the rule of lenity supports a strict construction of the statute in
his favor.8 We have an obligation to properly construe statutes in a way that aligns
with sound principles of interpretation and avoids constitutional infirmity. See Utter
ex rel. State v. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Wash., 182 Wn.2d 398, 434,
341 P.3d 953 (2015)
(“We construe statutes to avoid constitutional doubt.” (citing State v. Robinson,
153
Wn.2d 689, 693-94,
107 P.3d 90 (2005))). However, on their merits, Morgan’s
arguments fail. Constitutional avoidance does not compel reading RCW
8
We now deny the State’s motion to strike these arguments as new. While Morgan’s reliance on
constitutional avoidance principles and the rule of lenity expand on his earlier statutory
interpretation arguments, he is not belatedly introducing new constitutional claims or improperly
expanding the issues on review.
19
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
9.94A.753(7) to give courts discretion over the amount of restitution. Nor does the
rule of lenity support Morgan’s interpretation.
First, our reading of the statute does not implicate the due process concerns
Morgan identifies. Legislation may appropriately set criminal punishments,
including legal financial obligations, without granting courts discretion. Cf. State v.
Curry, 118 Wn.2d 911, 918,
829 P.2d 166 (1992) (noting mandatory LFOs are
constitutional so long as “there are sufficient safeguards in the current sentencing
scheme to prevent imprisonment of indigent defendants”). Moreover, the restitution
statute does not allow the court to impose a financial obligation without procedural
safeguards, as it must hold a hearing at which the defendant can challenge the
propriety of any restitution order consistent with the statutory scheme. See RCW
9.94A.753(7).
Morgan contends that without the ability to challenge the amount of
restitution, these court hearings are meaningless. We disagree. Restitution for
CVCA benefits may be contested on several grounds, such as whether a victim
qualifies to receive benefits or whether the ordered amount accurately reflects the
benefits L&I paid. Moreover, restitution may be ordered only for damages causally
connected to the defendant’s crime, and a defendant may dispute causation.
Kinneman, 155 Wn.2d at 286. Here, Morgan did not dispute causation and L&I
presented a claim for restitution in the amount of CVCA benefits paid, accompanied
20
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
by receipts for the victim’s allowable expenses. The court entered an order in that
exact amount, consistent with RCW 9.94A.753(7).
Additionally, the mandatory provisions of the statute applicable to court-
ordered restitution do not leave defendants without other recourse to seek relief from
payment. A defendant may petition L&I to reduce the amount owed, using the
CVCA process that allows L&I to “waive[], modif[y] downward or otherwise
adjust[]” the amount owed to L&I in the “interest of justice, the well-being of the
victim, and the rehabilitation of the individual.” RCW 7.68.120(5). When making
this determination, L&I considers factors such as a defendant’s ability to pay,
employment status, and the circumstances surrounding the criminal act. WAC 296-
30-120. The adjusted amount becomes the defendant’s obligation, and once it is
fully paid, L&I files a satisfaction of judgment with the court.9
We also reject Morgan’s argument that interpreting the restitution statute to
allow courts no discretion over the amount owed to L&I for CVCA benefits
implicates the separation of powers doctrine. Morgan argues that requiring a court
to “rubber-stamp” any request by L&I would give L&I unchecked power over a
defendant’s sentence and that the authority to amend a court’s restitution order lies
with the court, not an administrative agency. However, L&I is not exercising any
9
Wash. Sup. Ct. oral arg., Morgan, supra, at 27 min., 57 sec., video recording by TVW,
Washington State's Public Affairs Network, https://tvw.org/video/washington-state-supreme-court-2024091109/.
21
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
judicial sentencing power in carrying out its role under the CVCA and the restitution
statute. The statute itself prescribes the relationship between L&I and the sentencing
court, consistent with the legislature’s power to set criminal punishment in a way
that limits judicial sentencing discretion.
Restitution orders are entirely derived from statute. Davison, 116 Wn.2d at
919. The CVCA, chapter 7.68 RCW, provides the framework to determine the
amount of benefits a victim is entitled to, and the restitution statute, RCW
9.94A.753, mandates that a court order restitution in that amount. Incorporating the
CVCA into the restitution statute to prescribe how restitution should be imposed and
calculated is well within the legislature’s authority. See In re Pers. Restraint of
Forcha-Williams,
200 Wn.2d 581, 591-92,
520 P.3d 939 (2022) (“[S]etting and
altering criminal penalties is the sole prerogative of the legislature, and the judicial
branch may intervene only when the legislature's chosen punishment violates the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I, section 14 of the
Washington Constitution.”); State v. Mulcare,
189 Wash. 625, 628,
66 P.2d 360
(1937) (“Fixing of penalties or punishments for criminal offenses is a legislative
function.”). The legislature’s decision to require courts to order restitution reflecting
CVCA benefits reflects a policy choice that the legislature is entitled to make.
Finally, Morgan argues that if we find the restitution statute ambiguous, we
should apply the rule of lenity generally applicable to criminal sentences. There is
22
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
no need to reach this argument because the statute is not ambiguous. RCW
9.94A.753(7), read in context with subsection (3)(b) and the CVCA, plainly requires
courts to impose restitution in the amount requested by L&I for allowable CVCA
program benefits caused by the defendant’s criminal acts. Because the statutory
scheme is clear and falls within the legislature’s authority to shape criminal
punishments, Morgan’s arguments based on the rule of lenity and constitutional
avoidance are unavailing.
CONCLUSION
RCW 9.94A.753(7) requires a sentencing court to order restitution in the
amount of CVCA benefits paid by L&I to a qualifying victim, and the court lacks
discretion to modify this amount based on individual circumstances of the
defendant. We affirm the Court of Appeals and uphold Morgan’s restitution order.
23
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
____________________________
WE CONCUR:
___________________________ ____________________________
____________________________ ____________________________
____________________________ ____________________________
RESULT ONLY
____________________________ ____________________________
24
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
(Knodell, J.P.T., concurring)
No. 102643-9
KNODELL, J. * (concurring)—I write separately on an issue that is not addressed
in the majority opinion, but one that I cannot ignore. I believe Montreal Morgan was
improperly ordered to pay restitution in this case because the victim’s medical and
funeral expenses were not incurred as a result of the crime of conviction, which was
conspiracy to commit murder. I further believe this case illustrates a larger problem in
our legal system: unbridled prosecutorial discretion. However, because these issues were
not preserved below, this court cannot address them in this case. Therefore, I concur in
the result.
Morgan seems to have pleaded guilty to a crime he did not commit. When
prosecutors initially filed charges in this case, they charged Morgan with felony murder.
The State then dropped the charge down to conspiracy to commit murder. My review of
the record in this case convinces me that Morgan committed the crime with which he was
originally charged, felony murder. He seems to have helped his codefendants plan and
*Judge John Knodell is serving as a justice pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to
Washington Constitution article IV, section 2(a).
1
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
(Knodell, J.P.T., concurring)
attempt to rob a home. During the course of that attempt, one of Morgan’s codefendants
caused the death of an occupant of the home. But Morgan does not seem to have
committed the crime to which he pleaded guilty, conspiracy to commit murder. One
conspires to commit a crime by agreeing with one or more persons to engage in or cause
that crime. RCW 9A.28.040(1). Morgan made no such agreement to kill another person.
Because Morgan pleaded guilty only to conspiracy to commit murder, restitution
was improper. “[R]estitution must be based on a causal relationship between the offense
charged and proved and the victim’s losses.” State v. Johnson, 69 Wn. App. 189, 191,
847 P.2d 960 (1993). “Restitution may not be based on acts connected with the crime
charged when those acts are not part of the charge.” State v. Tindal,
50 Wn. App. 401,
403,
748 P.2d 695 (1988). Here, Morgan pleaded guilty only to conspiracy to commit
murder, which is an inchoate, uncompleted crime. See State v. Williams,
131 Wn. App.
488, 497,
128 P.3d 98 (2006). He did not admit that either he or an accomplice caused
death or injury when he pleaded guilty to conspiracy. While restitution would have been
proper if Morgan was convicted of felony murder, it was not proper for his conspiracy
conviction. The State should not have requested this restitution, and defendant’s counsel
should have objected to the State’s request. For that matter, the sentencing judge should
have known the requested restitution was improper. But because Morgan failed to raise
an objection at sentencing, this issue is not preserved for appeal. If our adversarial
system of justice had worked properly, this would not have been the outcome.
2
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
(Knodell, J.P.T., concurring)
I take this opportunity to speak to another issue that this case raises, the unfettered
discretion afforded the State when making charging decisions. I believe the State may
have strategically overcharged Morgan to induce him to plead guilty to a crime he did not
commit. Although Morgan’s conduct supported a wide range of possible charges, the
State chose to charge Morgan with felony murder, which has a high standard sentencing
range. RCW 9.94A.510, .517. Morgan likely agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to
commit murder, a crime unsupported by probable cause, to avoid that high sentence.
The strategic overcharging of criminal defendants to induce a plea deal runs
contrary to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981’s (SRA) directive to charge offenses that
adequately describe the nature of defendants’ conduct and to not overcharge. The SRA
delegates responsibility to the State to ensure a defendant is sentenced appropriately.
State v. Lewis, 115 Wn.2d 294, 306,
797 P.2d 1141 (1990). The SRA directs prosecutors
to charge those crimes that adequately describe the nature and seriousness of a
defendant’s criminal conduct. RCW 9.94A.411(2)(a). The legislature further intended
that a person’s punishment be commensurate with the punishment imposed on others
committing similar offenses. RCW 9.94A.010(3). To avoid the possibility that
prosecutorial discretion could frustrate the SRA’s purpose of uniform punishment, the
legislature enacted charging and plea standards to guide prosecutors when exercising
their discretion. RCW 9.94A.411. The statute specifically directs prosecutors not to
3
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
(Knodell, J.P.T., concurring)
overcharge to obtain a plea. RCW 9.94A.411(2)(a). The State here seems not to have
abided by these mandates. 1
Judges have few tools to check a prosecutor’s decision to overcharge and little
discretion to consider a defendant’s culpability in light of the circumstances of the crime.
Morgan was raised in poverty and has experienced significant life challenges, including
significant childhood abuse and neglect, lead exposure, multiple head traumas, substance
use problems, and a major mood disorder. Clerk’s Papers at 185. Prior to the enactment
of the SRA, the judge who sentenced Morgan would have taken the unique circumstances
of both Morgan and his crime into account when imposing a sentence. But because this
case was resolved through a plea, the trial court was prevented from taking the degree of
Morgan’s moral culpability into account when he was sentenced. Under the SRA, absent
a plea for a mitigated sentence, a trial court must sentence within a narrow sentencing
1
The charging decisions in this case are particularly suspect because Morgan was initially
charged with felony murder. A felony murder charge relieves the prosecution of the necessity of
proving the mens rea of common law murder, the intent to cause another’s death. But
eliminating the intent requirement runs contrary to basic principles of criminal law because
intent reflects a criminal defendant’s moral blameworthiness. Scholars, courts, and advocates
have criticized the felony murder doctrine as morally indefensible, constitutionally suspect,
penologically unsound, and discriminatory. Perry Morierarty, Kat Albrecht & Caitlin Glass,
Race, Racial Bias and Imputed Liability Murder, 51 Fordham Urb. L.J. 675, 687 (2024). Some
studies conclude that prosecutors charge felony murder disproportionately as a tool against
defendants of color like Morgan, who is Black. See NAZGOL GHANDOOSH, EMMA STAMMEN &
CONNIE BUDACI, SENT’G PROJECT, FELONY MURDER: AN ON-RAMP FOR EXTREME SENTENCING 6
(2022) (detailing deeply concerning racial disparities in prosecutors’ use of discretion when
deciding which homicides to prosecute as felony murder and how many people to charge as
codefendants), https://www.sentencingproject.org/app/uploads/2024/05/Felony-Murder-An-On-Ramp-for-Extreme-Sentencing.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BT6-4M7K].
4
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
(Knodell, J.P.T., concurring)
range established by a defendant’s criminal history and the seriousness the legislature
assigns to the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced.
On the record before the court, Morgan had many reasons to argue that another
crime, one with a shorter sentencing range, adequately described his criminal conduct.
There is no indication the State considered whether the circumstances of Morgan’s
upbringing reduced his moral culpability, as a judge would have done prior to the SRA’s
enactment. But just as Morgan did not question whether the court had authority to assess
medical and funeral expenses as restitution against him, he did not challenge the
propriety of either of the State’s charging decisions. Absent such a challenge, we cannot
analyze whether the charges leveled against Morgan were disproportionate or if his race
played a part in the prosecutor’s charging decisions.
This case illustrates that courts do not adequately account for the danger that
prosecutors will use their unbridled charging discretion to induce a plea that is made to
avoid a lengthy sentence. Under current law, the only limit on a prosecutor’s charging
discretion is the court’s inherent authority to dismiss unsubstantiated charges and the
requirement that the prosecutor establish probable cause for the charged offense. Lewis,
115 Wn.2d at 306. Morgan’s circumstances demonstrate that the Lewis court was wrong
when it concluded the SRA’s charging and plea standards adequately guard against
prosecutorial overcharging. The courts should require prosecutors, at a minimum, to
adopt clear standards by which defendants may challenge and courts may judge a
5
State v. Morgan, No. 102643-9
(Knodell, J.P.T., concurring)
prosecutor’s discretion. See State ex rel. Schillberg v. Cascade Dist. Ct., 94 Wn.2d 772,
779,
621 P.2d 115 (1980).
This court disavows institutional bias and sometimes takes action when racial bias
is evident. See State v. Zamora, 199 Wn.2d 698,
512 P.3d 512 (2022). However, the
court seems unwilling to tackle one of the root causes of systemic bias: the lack of any
judicial oversight when overzealous prosecutors seek convictions rather than justice.
Until the court demonstrates a willingness to revisit Lewis and its progeny, the court is
simply glossing over the fundamental problem—unfettered prosecutorial discretion in
charging and plea negotiation. Laws and institutions, no matter how efficient and well-
arranged, must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 3 (rev. ed. 1999).
Although I have reservations regarding the outcome of this case, the issues I have
discussed here were not preserved below. Therefore, I can only shrug, concur, and hope
that in the future this court will revisit its conclusion in Lewis that the SRA’s charging
standards adequately protect defendants from overzealous prosecution.
__________________________________________
Knodell, J.P.T.
6
