562 So. 2d 575 - Lambeth v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1990
Citation profile
14 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory · United States v. Russell · Sorrells v. United States · Sherman v. United States · Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"When a defendant raises an entrapment defense, he must initially come forward with evidence that the governmental conduct created a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person other than one ready to commit it. Pierce v. United States , 414 F.2d 163 , 168 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 , 90 S.Ct. 435 , 24 L.Ed.2d 425 (1969). Once the defendant has carried this burden, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime charged. United States v. Gomez-Rojas , 507 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 , 96 S.Ct. 41 , 46 L.Ed.2d 42 (1975). "Consequently, the focal point of inquiry in entrapment cases is the predisposition of the defendant. United States v. Webster , 649 F.2d 346 , 348 (5th Cir. 1981). Being 'predisposed' means being 'presently ready and willing to commit the crime,' and it has been further held: " '[T]he predisposition which must be shown by the prosecution is a "state of mind which readily responds to the opportunity furnished by the officer or his agent to commit the forbidden act for which the accused is charged." . . . [P]redisposition is, by definition, "the defendant's state of mind and inclinations before his initial exposure to government agents. " ' " Chillous [v. State] , 441 So.2d [1055] at 1057 [(Ala.Cr.App. 1983)] (quoting United States v. Burkley , 591 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966 , 99 S.Ct. 1516 , 59 L.Ed.2d 782 (1979), and Uni”
4 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Clay v. State · Germany v. State“". . . Some jurisdictions allow hearsay and reputation evidence to be admitted to establish predisposition. See United States v. Hawke , 505 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied , 420 U.S. 978 , 95 S.Ct. 1404 , 43 L.Ed.2d 658 (1975); State v. Talbot , 135 N.J. Super. 500 , 343 A.2d 777 (1975), aff'd on other grounds , 71 N.J. 160 , *Page 548 364 A.2d 9 (1976). However, a substantial number of jurisdictions refuse to permit reputation or hearsay evidence to establish predisposition. See United States v. Richardson , 764 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir.), cert. denied , 474 U.S. 952 , 106 S.Ct. 320 , 88 L.Ed.2d 303 (1985); United States v. Hunt , 749 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied , 472 U.S. 1018 , 105 S.Ct. 3479 , 87 L.Ed.2d 614 (1985); United States v. Webster , 649 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); United States v. McClain , 531 F.2d 431 (9th Cir.), cert. denied , 429 U.S. 835 , 97 S.Ct. 102 , 50 L.Ed.2d 101 (1976); United States v. Ambrose , 483 F.2d 742 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Johnston , 426 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Catanzaro , 407 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1969); Whiting v. United States , 296 F.2d 512 (1st Cir. 1961); Bauer v. State , 528 So.2d 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Bowser v. State , 50 Md. App. 363 , 439 A.2d 1 (1981); State v. Jones , 416 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1980); Price v. State , 397 N.E.2d 1043 ( Ind. App. 1979); State v. Cox , 110 Ariz. Sup.Ct. 603, 522 P.2d 29 (1974). "The State argues that once the entrapment defense is raised, the usual ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“" 'Our creation of a rule that allows gross hearsay evidence to be used to prove predisposition has resulted in the very evils that the rule against hearsay was designed to prevent. The jury is free to believe unsworn, unverified statements of government informants, sometimes unidentified, whose credibility is not subject to effective testing before the jury and whose motivations may be less than honorable. We are hard pressed to envision a situation where the disparity between the probative value and prejudicial affect of evidence is greater. . . . [W]e hold that hearsay evidence is never admissible for the purpose of proving the defendant's predisposition. All prior decisions of this Court to the contrary are hereby overruled.' " 649 F.2d at 350 (footnotes omitted in Lambeth ). "We agree with the rationale of the Webster court. We can find no justification for the proposition that where the predisposition of the defendant is in issue, traditional hearsay rules are thrown out the window. There is no legitimate basis why the rules of evidence should be bent or broken simply because the defendant raises the defense of entrapment. "We recognize that the Webster case dealt with reputation and hearsay evidence about the defendant. The hearsay evidence admitted in the instant case related *Page 549 to the reputation of the club where the defendant was arrested. We see no difference in the prejudicial effect of the two patterns of hearsay. "Our holding will not, as the State argues”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.