¶1dissenting.
¶2I respectfully dissent.
¶3It is elementary that a general residuary clause embraces only those assets of the estate that remain undisposed of by the remainder of the will. See Travis v. Randolph, supra.
¶4Conceding that the residuary clause in Section IV of the will is not restricted to real property sheds no light on the issue presented here, to it, the testatrix’s intent to include cash in bequeathing to the Brook-shire and Parkinson families “any other of my personal possessions which may be left.”
¶5It may also be observed that the residuary clause uses only the words “the residue and remainder of my estate,” and does not expressly designate real and personal property as included therein. If testatrix intended the last section in Section II of her will to be a residuary clause, as I believe she did, disposing all her personal assets remaining after satisfying the specific bequests of cash and furniture in paragraph eight of that section, the language of the residuary clause in Section IV would not preclude such an interpretation.
¶6I agree with the learned Chancellor’s conclusion that Mrs. Parkinson intended to dispose of all of her personal estate, including money “which may be left,” after satisfying the seven specific bequests of cash and the five bequests of specific items of household furnishings.
¶7The entire last paragraph of Section II of the will and each word thereof must be given its usual and natural meaning, rather than focusing only on the words “personal possessions,” as appellant’s advocacy does.
¶8The testatrix said, after payment of the above specific bequests and devises, the Brookshire and Parkinson families may have “any other of my personal possessions which may be left.” The fact that the specific bequests were of both cash and selected items of household furniture places added significance on the words “any other . . which may be left,” to wit: any other money and furniture and similar property left after payment and delivery of specific bequests.
¶9I would affirm the decree of the trial court.
¶10HENRY, C. J., concurs in the dissent.
¶11OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR
¶12Insofar as the merits of this case are concerned, the majority of the Court adhere *194to the views expressed in the original opinion, and the petition for rehearing is denied.
¶13The Court is of the opinion, however, that the petition for rehearing does have merit insofar as the taxation of costs is concerned, and upon reconsideration, the petition to rehear will be granted as to that aspect of the case, and all costs will be taxed to the estate of Helen D. Parkinson.
¶14The issue of an award of fees to counsel for appellees has not previously been raised on appeal in this case, but upon remand, the Chancellor may hear such evidence and make such determination with respect thereto as, in his discretion, he deems appropriate.
¶15COOPER and BROCK, JJ., concur.
¶16HENRY, C. J., and FONES, J., dissent.