Marshall v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(a) Within three hundred sixty-five (365) days after: (1) the defendant begins serving his sentence; (2) a hearing at which the defendant is present and of which the prosecuting attorney has been notified; and (3) obtaining a report from the department of correction concerning the defendant’s conduct which imprisoned; the court may reduce or suspend the sentence. The court must incorporate its reasons in the record. (b) If more than three hundred sixty-five days (365) days have elapsed since the defendant began serving the sentence and after a hearing at which the convicted person is present, the court may reduce or suspend the sentence, subject to the approval of the prosecuting attorney.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Fulkrod · Catt v. State

2. “"In crimes such as murder, manslaughter, battery and reckless homicide, the gravamen of the offense is causing the death or injury of another person, ie., the result is part of the definition of the crime. Thus, in these offenses where several deaths or injuries occur in the course of a single incident, the offense prohibited by statute has been violated several times over. The separate victims represent different offenses because conduct has been directed at each particular victim."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lockhart v. State · 823 F. Supp. 615 - Marshall v. Farley

3. “[The petitioner] claims the trial court erred in failing to vacate his multiple convictions and sentences for reckless homicide. He argues double jeopardy principles prohibit punishment for more than a single death arising out of a single incident of reckless conduct. [The petitioner’s] multiple convictions for reckless homicide can stand. The issue in considering the double jeopardy clause’s protection against multiple punishments for the same offense is one of ascertaining the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the particular criminal statute. “The whole point of whether multiple offenses for the same statute are committed during a single transaction focuses on the definition of the crime in volved.” Hurst v. State (1984), Ind. App., 464 N.E.2d 19, 21 . Thus, the touchstone of whether the double jeopardy clause is violated is the legislature’s articulated intent. See Albernaz v. United States (1981), 450 U.S. 333 , 101 S.Ct. 1137 , 67 L.Ed.2d 275 . Kelly v. State (1988), Ind.App., 527 N.E.2d 1148, 1154 . Following this logic, this court in Kelly concluded the essence of the crime of operating a vehicle while intoxicated resulting in death is the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated; the result of death is a factor enhancing the crime rather than part of the definition of the crime. Thus, this court concluded only one offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated resulting is death can be punished although multiple deaths occur. This same logic applies to t”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 823 F. Supp. 615 - Marshall v. Farley