State v. Schaefer

               THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

                       STATE OF UTAH,
                         Appellee,
                             v.
                  ROYCE BRANDON SCHAEFER,
                         Appellant.

                            Opinion
                       No. 20210247-CA
                     Filed January 9, 2025

           Fourth District Court, Provo Department
                The Honorable Thomas Low
                        No. 161403069

          Douglas J. Thompson, Attorney for Appellant
             Derek E. Brown and Jonathan S. Bauer,
                    Attorneys for Appellee

   JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and RYAN M. HARRIS
                        concurred.

ORME, Judge:

¶1     Royce Brandon Schaefer appeals his convictions of sodomy
upon a child and aggravated sexual abuse of a child. He argues
that the trial court erroneously concluded he was not in custody
for Miranda purposes during a police interrogation and that the
court accordingly erred in denying his motion to suppress an
incriminating statement he made during the interrogation.
Because we conclude Schaefer was in custody at the point in the
interrogation when he requested an attorney, we reverse.
                          State v. Schaefer


                         BACKGROUND

¶2     Four-year-old B.D. 1 was eating lunch outside the
apartment she shared with her mother (Mother) when an
unknown man sat next to her and put his mouth on her vagina,
biting it “hard.” B.D., crying, told Mother that “someone’s dad”
“bit [her] peepee.” Mother called the police. After giving the
responding officer (Officer) a “very vague description” of the man
as “someone’s dad who wore glasses,” Mother took B.D. to the
hospital, where cheek and genital swabs, as well as B.D.’s clothes,
were collected for testing. B.D. was later interviewed at the
Children’s Justice Center. She described the man who touched her
as wearing glasses, a blue shirt, and blue pants. She disclosed that
the man had flipped her onto her stomach and “bit [her]
peepee”—indicating her vagina. She also stated that he had
inserted his finger into her vagina.

¶3      Meanwhile, Officer canvassed the apartment complex
looking for someone fitting the description Mother gave him. He
spoke to a neighbor (Neighbor) who had twice seen a man drive
slowly through the complex in an older two-door maroon car.
Neighbor described the man as a “White male, late twenties, early
thirties” with “short, blonde hair” and wearing denim jeans and
a plaid shirt with a white base and blue or green striping.
Neighbor had also seen the driver walk past her on the sidewalk
and later saw him run through the complex and jump over a
nearby fence.

¶4      Two days after the incident, Neighbor and her friend met
at a nearby park, and Neighbor informed police that there was a
car parked there matching the description of the one she had seen
at the apartment complex on the day of the incident. Hearing this


1. To protect her identity, we refer to B.D. by her initials. See Utah
R. App. P. 24(d) (“The identity of minors should be protected by
use of descriptive terms, initials, or pseudonyms.”).


 20210247-CA                      2                 

                          State v. Schaefer


call over the radio, Officer arrived at the park to see an “older
model, really deep maroon/brown-colored vehicle” and the
driver—a white male with “[b]londish hair.” Neighbor told
Officer that the vehicle was the same one she had seen at the
apartment complex and that the driver was the man she had seen
jump the fence. Police identified the driver as Schaefer.

¶5     Because there was not enough evidence to arrest him at the
park, Schaefer was allowed to leave. But the detective assigned to
the case (Detective) later obtained a warrant for Schaefer’s DNA.
Detective served the warrant at Schaefer’s home, giving Schaefer
a copy to read and informing him that the DNA collection would
occur at the police station. Detective accompanied Schaefer to his
bedroom while Schaefer got dressed. Inside the room, Detective
observed eyeglasses and a blue and white plaid shirt. Although
Schaefer consented to go to the police station pursuant to the
warrant, because Detective’s vehicle did not “have any safety
cage” or other means to separate Schaefer from Detective,
Detective placed him in handcuffs and a “waist belt that straps
around the waist” and “allows the hands to be secured in front.”

¶6      At the station, Schaefer—still wearing the waist belt and
handcuffs—was escorted into a small interview room. Two armed
officers entered the room to take Schaefer’s blood and saliva
samples, as well as photos of him. The handcuffs were removed
from Schaefer’s wrists to facilitate the blood draw, but they were
left attached to the waist belt and rested in his lap. When the
officers finished, they exited the room, closing the door behind
them.

¶7     After Schaefer’s DNA was collected, Detective, also armed,
entered the room and asked Schaefer, “Did you want me to
answer any questions or anything for you?” When Schaefer
indicated he did have questions, Detective said, “Clearly you’re
the subject of an investigation, so I’d like to give you the Miranda
warning, and then after that you can ask me whatever you want,



 20210247-CA                     3                 

                           State v. Schaefer


okay?” After reading Schaefer his rights, Detective asked whether
he understood them, to which Schaefer answered, “Yeah. I think
I will—I will need a lawyer,” clarifying, “Because apparently you
guys got me on a search warrant and stuff, and it seems really
serious, and from what I’ve read, I’m going to be needing—”.
Instead of ending it there, Detective continued the interview,
again asking Schaefer if he had any questions. Schaefer asked,
“Am I free to go back home, then; is that what you’re saying?”
Detective said, “I’ll take you home if you don’t want to ask me
any questions or anything about the investigation.” But Detective
then continued speaking, describing the investigation and
eventually obtaining Schaefer’s admission that he had been
“looking around that area for . . . apartments” and had driven by
the apartment complex on the day in question. At the end of the
interview, Detective put the handcuffs back on Schaefer and took
him home.

¶8     After forensic results showed the presence of a small
amount of DNA from male saliva on the underwear B.D. had been
wearing on the day of the incident, Schaefer was charged with one
count of sodomy upon a child and one count of aggravated sexual
abuse of a child, both first-degree felonies. 2

¶9     Before trial, Schaefer filed a motion to suppress the
recording of his interview with Detective, arguing that “[a]ll
objective indicia of arrest were present at the time of questioning”
and that Schaefer had made an “unequivocal assertion of his right
to counsel.” After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued an
order in which it found that the interview occurred immediately
after executing the DNA warrant; Detective “made no coercive or
manipulative statements”; the entire encounter—including DNA
sample collection—lasted one hour; and although Schaefer


2. The amount of male DNA extracted from the underwear was
insufficient to allow for further testing to identify the source of the
DNA.


 20210247-CA                      4                  

                         State v. Schaefer


remained in the waist belt, he was not handcuffed. The court also
noted that Schaefer “was explicitly told he was not under arrest
and could go home, or be taken home, at any time after the DNA
samples were taken” and that after the 10-minute interview with
Detective, he was immediately given a ride home. From this, the
court concluded that “the fact he was not under arrest could not
have been made more explicit than it was” and that Schaefer “was
not in custody.” Accordingly, the court determined that “Miranda
warnings were not necessary” and that there was therefore “no
need to examine whether [Schaefer’s] request for counsel was
equivocal or unequivocal.” The court thus denied Schaefer’s
motion to suppress.

¶10 At a subsequent pretrial hearing, an unidentified woman
chimed in during the proceeding, asking counsel and the court “to
slow down” and explaining she was “the CART provider,” which
was “like an interpreter” for Schaefer.3 Schaefer’s counsel
informed the court that Schaefer has “a hearing issue” but that he
has a hearing aid and “can hear” and “read lips.” Schaefer then
addressed the court, saying he had “been asking for a transcriber
from the beginning” because he was “definitely hard of hearing”
and had found it difficult to follow the proceedings. But he said
he was satisfied with the CART services and was “thankful to
have this.” The court—which had been unaware of Schaefer’s
hearing difficulties and the CART services—then learned that a
family member of Schaefer’s had contacted someone at the court
“sometime before [the] hearing” to alert it to Schaefer’s need for




3. Communication Access Realtime Translation (CART)
provides “instant speech-to-text translation on a computer
monitor or other display for the benefit of” those that are deaf or
hard of hearing. Captioning Matters, Nat’l Court Reps. Ass’n,
https://www.ncra.org/captioningmatters [https://perma.cc/P5QPKCUE].


 20210247-CA                    5                 

                          State v. Schaefer


an accommodation, which the court assured Schaefer would be
provided going forward.

¶11 At trial, various witnesses recounted the events outlined
above. And the recording of Detective’s interview with Schaefer
was played for the jury—including the portion where he admitted
to being in the area on the day of the incident. Schaefer was found
guilty on both charges.


             ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶12 On appeal, Schaefer argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress based on its conclusion that he
was not in custody for Miranda purposes. “When reviewing the
denial of a motion to suppress, we review the trial court’s factual
findings for clear error and its legal conclusions for correctness.”
State v. Reigelsperger, 

, 

(quotation simplified), cert. denied, 

 (Utah 2017). “A
trial court’s ultimate determination that a defendant was not
subject to custodial interrogation and thus was not entitled to a
Miranda warning is a mixed question of law and fact that we also
review for correctness.” Id. 4



4. Schaefer also argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to investigate and counter the State’s DNA
evidence, arguing we should grant a remand to develop the
record in support of this claim under rule 23B of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. He further argues the trial court plainly
erred in not providing, and his counsel was ineffective in not
requesting, proper accommodations for him as a deaf individual
under section 78B-1-202(1) of the Utah Code. Because we reverse
Schaefer’s convictions on another ground, we need not
definitively decide these issues. But we take the opportunity to
emphasize, by way of guidance that might be helpful on remand,
                                                     (continued…)


 20210247-CA                     6                 

                          State v. Schaefer


                            ANALYSIS

¶13 “The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.” State v. Fredrick, 

, 

 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 

(Utah 2020). “To protect this right against self-incrimination, the
United States Supreme Court held, in Miranda v. Arizona, 

 (1966), that individuals who are in police custody must be
apprised of their rights prior to any questioning”—including the
“right to remain silent” and “the right to the presence of an
attorney.” Fredrick, 

 (quotation simplified).
These “Miranda warnings are not required every time police ask
someone questions. But due to their critical importance, Miranda
warnings must be given to a defendant subject to custodial
interrogation.” State v. Jessop, 

, 

(quotation simplified), cert. denied, 

 (Utah 2024).


that under Utah law, “If a deaf or hard of hearing person is a party
or witness at any stage of any judicial . . . proceeding,” then “the
appointing authority shall appoint and pay for a qualified
interpreter to interpret the proceedings to the deaf or hard of
hearing person.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-202(1) (LexisNexis
2022). A “qualified interpreter” is defined, in this context, as “a
sign language or oral interpreter” who “is able to accurately
communicate with and translate information to and from the
hearing-impaired person involved.” Id. §§ 78B-1-201(4), -203(1).
The record submitted to us is not entirely clear regarding what
CART services entail and whether those services, as rendered in
this case, included the involvement of a “qualified interpreter.”
Accordingly, we make no pronouncement on whether the CART
services provided to Schaefer were adequate under the statute,
but we advise the trial court, on remand, that if Schaefer is found
to be “a deaf or hard of hearing person,” then he is entitled to the
assistance of a “qualified interpreter” who can “provide effective
communication” for him. See id. § 78B-1-203(2).


 20210247-CA                      7                 

                          State v. Schaefer


“Generally, custodial interrogation occurs where there is both
(1) custody or other significant deprivation of a suspect’s freedom
and (2) interrogation.” Id. ¶ 39 (quotation simplified).

¶14 There was no dispute before the trial court about whether
Schaefer’s interview with Detective satisfied this latter
requirement. The court’s order denying Schaefer’s motion to
suppress concluded he was not in custody without addressing
whether the interview was an interrogation. This point was
essentially conceded, as Schaefer argued briefly in his motion to
suppress that the interview was an interrogation, but the State did
not contest that point in its opposition or during argument on the
motion. Nor is there argument about this point on appeal. Thus,
it remains undisputed that the interview was an interrogation,
which resulted in disclosure of incriminating evidence by
Schaefer. 5

¶15 The State argues that we may avoid deciding whether this
interrogation was custodial because, even if it was, Schaefer
waived his Miranda rights. Specifically, the State contends that
Schaefer’s statement, “I think I will—I will need a lawyer,” was
not an unequivocal assertion of his right to counsel. But we
disagree, particularly with the State’s argument that Schaefer’s
mention of counsel conveyed only his future desire for counsel,
and we decline to affirm on this alternative basis. Schaefer made
this statement immediately after being read his rights and
indicating he understood them. He clarified his request, saying,
“Because apparently you guys got me on a search warrant and
stuff, and it seems really serious, and from what I’ve read, I’m
going to be needing—”. This was an unequivocal assertion of that
right. See Smith v. Illinois, 

 (1984) (holding that a


5. Schaefer’s admission that he was in the area of the apartment
complex on the day in question was critical to the State’s case
given that the DNA test of B.D.’s underwear revealed only male
DNA and not Schaefer’s DNA specifically.


 20210247-CA                     8                 

                          State v. Schaefer


defendant’s confession was inadmissible because the defendant’s
statement, “Uh, yeah, I’d like to do that,” when asked whether he
understood his right to have counsel present—“with the possible
exception of the word ‘uh’”—was “neither indecisive nor
ambiguous”) (quotation simplified); Wood v. Ercole, 

(2d Cir. 2011) (holding that “[t]he statement ‘I think I should get a
lawyer’ evidences no internal debate whatsoever”); Cannady v.
Dugger, 

 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
defendant’s “statement, ‘I think I should call my lawyer,’ was an
unequivocal request for counsel”); Smith v. Endell, 

 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a defendant’s statement,
“Can I talk to a lawyer? At this point, I think maybe you’re
looking at me as a suspect, and I should talk to a lawyer. Are you
looking at me as a suspect?” was “conditional” but not “equivocal
or ambiguous”). 6 If Schaefer was in custody at the time, the
interrogation should have ended upon this unequivocal assertion.
See Edwards v. Arizona, 

, 484–85 (1981) (“[A]n accused,
. . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only
through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless
the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges,
or conversations with the police.”); State v. Medina, 

, 

 (“Interrogation must cease if the accused
invokes his or her right to consult with an attorney, and, with
limited exceptions, the prosecution may not use any statements
made by the accused taken in violation of Miranda’s protections.”)


6. Although we acknowledge cases to the contrary, see United
States v. Mohr, 

 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that a
defendant’s statement, “I think I should get a lawyer,” was
equivocal) (quotation simplified); Burket v. Angelone, 

 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a defendant’s statement, “I think
I need a lawyer,” did “not constitute an unequivocal request for
counsel”) (quotation simplified), we follow the cases cited in the
text above, as they most clearly advance the policy served by
Miranda v. Arizona, 

 (1966).


 20210247-CA                     9                  

                           State v. Schaefer


(quotation simplified), cert. denied, 

 (Utah 2019). We
thus turn to the question of whether—at the pivotal moment
when he invoked his right to counsel—Schaefer was in custody.

¶16 “For Miranda purposes, ‘custody’ is a term of art that
specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a
serious danger of coercion.” Jessop, 

(quotation simplified). To determine whether a suspect is in
custody, we utilize a two-part test. “The initial step is to ascertain
whether, in light of the objective circumstances of the
interrogation, a reasonable person would have felt he or she was
not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” 

(quotation simplified). “The safeguards prescribed by Miranda
become applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is
curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” State v.
Goddard, 

, 

 (quotation
simplified), cert. denied, 

 (Utah 2022). “If the court finds
that an individual’s freedom of movement was not curtailed, then
the person was not in custody for Miranda purposes and the
court’s analysis ends there.” Jessop, 

(quotation simplified). But “if the court does find that an
individual’s freedom of movement was curtailed, the focus turns
to whether the relevant environment presented the same
inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house
questioning at issue in Miranda.” 

 (quotation simplified).

¶17 “The first part of this inquiry—whether a reasonable
person would have felt free to leave—is an objective one.” Id. ¶ 41
(quotation simplified). “In order to determine how a suspect
would have gauged his freedom of movement, courts must
examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.”
Id. (quotation simplified). Accord Goddard, 

.
“Relevant factors include, but are not limited to, the location of
the questioning, its duration, statements made during the
interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during
the questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of



 20210247-CA                      10                 

                          State v. Schaefer


the questioning.” Jessop, 

 (quotation
simplified).

¶18 Here, it is undisputed that Schaefer was in custody while
his DNA was collected. But custody did not terminate there. Cf.
Goddard, 

 (discussing how, during a traffic
stop, “if an individual is temporarily detained but thereafter is
subjected to treatment that renders him in custody for practical
purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections
prescribed by Miranda”) (quotation simplified). And again, in
determining whether Schaefer was in custody at the moment he
stated he wanted a lawyer, we must “examine all of the
circumstances surrounding” the interrogation. Jessop, 

 (emphasis added, quotation simplified).

¶19 Schaefer was brought to the police station by Detective,
pursuant to a warrant. Cf. State v. Fullerton, 

, 

 (recognizing that a defendant was not in custody, in
part, because he “voluntarily had his father drive him to the police
station” and “his father waited at the station for him the entire
time”) (emphasis added); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 

(2004) (pointing to the fact that “police did not transport [the
defendant] to the station or require him to appear at a particular
time” as weighing against a finding of custody); Oregon v.
Mathiason, 

 (1977) (per curiam) (concluding that
the defendant was not in custody in large part because he “came
voluntarily to the police station”). At the station, Schaefer was
isolated in an interview room. Two armed officers—one of whom
entered and exited the room several times—took pictures of
Schaefer and collected his blood and saliva samples, each time
closing the door behind them. During transportation to the
station, Schaefer was placed in a waist belt and handcuffs. During
the DNA collection, he remained in the waist belt. And while the
handcuffs were removed from his wrists, they were attached to
the belt and rested in his lap.




 20210247-CA                     11                

                          State v. Schaefer


¶20 After his DNA was collected, Schaefer sat in the interview
room with the door closed and still in the waist belt until
Detective, also armed, entered, closing the door behind him.
Detective immediately told Schaefer, “Clearly you’re the subject
of an investigation,” before reading Schaefer his rights. While
“[s]tatus as a suspect does not necessarily impose a warning
requirement,” “a detective’s beliefs concerning an individual’s
potential culpability are relevant . . . to the extent they would
affect how a reasonable person in that position would perceive his
or her freedom to leave.” State v. Reigelsperger, 

, 

 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 

 (Utah 2017). See State v. MacDonald, 

,

 (“[E]ven when police disclose that they suspect the
interviewee of a crime, that disclosure may not bear great weight
in the custody analysis where other objective indicia of arrest are
absent.”). Given the totality of the other circumstances here, this
would have contributed to a reasonable person’s perception of the
environment as custodial.

¶21 Thus, we conclude a reasonable person would not have felt
free to leave before the interrogation began or at the point in time
when Schaefer asked for an attorney. In that moment, he had not
been advised during the custodial interrogation that he could go
home, and he was still wearing the waist belt to which handcuffs
were attached. But this “is only the first step in the custody
analysis.” MacDonald, 

. Under the second
step, we must also determine “whether the relevant environment
presented the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of
station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Jessop, 

 (quotation simplified).

¶22 “Of course, any interview of one suspected of a crime by a
police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of
the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system
which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a
crime.” MacDonald, 

 (quotation simplified).



 20210247-CA                     12                

                         State v. Schaefer


But “[i]n the paradigmatic Miranda situation—[in which] a person
is arrested in his home or on the street and whisked to a police
station for questioning—detention represents a sharp and
ominous change, and the shock may give rise to coercive
pressures.” Howes v. Fields, 

 (2012).

¶23 In Miranda v. Arizona, 

 (1966), the United States
Supreme Court discussed such coercive pressures in considering
four defendants’ challenges to their respective custodial
interrogations. The Court noted that each defendant had been
questioned “in a room in which he was cut off from the outside
world,” “thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere,” and “run
through menacing police interrogation procedures.” 

. In such settings, the defendants were subjected to
“incommunicado interrogation . . . in a police-dominated
atmosphere” that emphasized the “invincibility of the forces of
the law,” resulting in “self-incriminating statements without full
warnings of constitutional rights.” 

 (quotation
simplified). The Court stressed that “the very fact of custodial
interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades
on the weakness of individuals.” 

.

¶24 We conclude that when he invoked his right to an attorney,
Schaefer’s interrogation carried the same “badge of intimidation”
that animated the Court’s concern in Miranda. 

. Again,
Schaefer was taken from home pursuant to a warrant and isolated
in a small interview room at the police station—a setting that is
“inherently coercive.” State v. Goddard, 

, 

, cert. denied, 

 (Utah 2022). The door to the
interview room remained shut, except as armed officers entered
and exited. Schaefer still wore the waist belt to which his
handcuffs were attached, and he would not have been free to
leave until they were removed, which he could not have done
himself. This environment signaled to Schaefer that he was
“completely at the mercy of the police officers.” MacDonald, 2017




 20210247-CA                    13                

                          State v. Schaefer


UT App 124, ¶ 36. Thus, the interrogation imposed many of the
same coercive pressures as were at issue in Miranda.

¶25 In sum, because a reasonable person in Schaefer’s shoes
would not have felt free to leave before the interrogation started
or at the time he asked for an attorney, and because, at this point
in time, the interrogation presented the same inherently coercive
pressures at issue in Miranda, we conclude that Schaefer was in
custody when he invoked his right to counsel and that the trial
court erred in concluding otherwise. To be sure, later in the
interrogation, Detective told Schaefer he was free to go home, and
Detective eventually did take him home. But this is irrelevant. The
interrogation should not have persisted beyond Schaefer’s
invocation of his right to counsel.

¶26 Our analysis does not end here, however. “Even if there is
error on the part of the trial court, an error is harmless and does
not require reversal if it is sufficiently inconsequential that we
conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected
the outcome of the proceedings.” State v. Hernandez, 

, 

 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 

 (Utah 2024). “However, when addressing claims involving the
violation of a federally protected constitutional right, federal law
sets a higher standard and instructs that we cannot declare federal
constitutional error harmless unless we sincerely believe that it
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

 (quotation
simplified). In Hernandez, we applied the heightened “harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to a violation of Miranda. Id.
¶ 28. But in its decision in Vega v. Tekoh, 

 (2022), the
United States Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings are “a
set of prophylactic rules” that “are not themselves rights protected
by the Constitution” and thus, “a violation of Miranda does not
necessarily constitute a violation of the Constitution,” 

 (emphasis added, quotation simplified), suggesting the
heightened standard would not apply to Miranda violations. But
we need not decide which is the proper standard.



 20210247-CA                     14                 

                         State v. Schaefer


¶27 A crucial piece of the State’s case was Schaefer’s
admission—elicited during the interrogation after he invoked his
right to counsel—that he was in the area of the apartment complex
on the day of B.D.’s abuse. See supra note 5. The other evidence,
including DNA and witness descriptions of Schaefer, what he
wore on the day of the incident, whether he had glasses, and what
kind of car he drove, was entirely circumstantial. Thus, there is a
reasonable likelihood that, on this evidence alone, the jury would
not have convicted him. And absent Schaefer’s admission, the
prosecution’s case was comparatively weak. See generally
Hernandez, 

 (noting factors relevant to the
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard, including “the
importance of the evidence to the prosecution’s case, whether the
evidence was cumulative, and, of course, the overall strength of
the prosecution’s case”) (quotation simplified). We conclude that
under either standard for assessing harmless error, the trial
court’s denial of Schaefer’s motion to suppress was harmful,
entitling him to reversal.


                         CONCLUSION

¶28 Because the trial court denied Schaefer’s motion to
suppress based on its incorrect conclusion that he was not in
custody when he invoked his right to an attorney, we reverse his
convictions. We remand for a new trial in which the incriminating
statements made during his custodial interrogation must be
suppressed.




 20210247-CA                    15