563 So. 2d 449 - State v. King’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

94 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 95 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed[.]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 637 So. 2d 758 - State v. Riley · 693 So. 2d 1300 - State v. Crochet

2. “Manslaughter generally carries a sentence of zero to 40 years. In this case, however, the State on January 1 st of 2016, filed a firearm enhancement pursuant to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure 893.1. Under 893, 893.2 E, the State legislature has mandated as if a defendant commits a violent felony, i.e., in this case a manslaughter, with a firearm where in a firearm is discharged during the commission of such felony, the Court is required by the legislature to impose a minimum of at least 20 years imprisonment. That 20 years is without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. Accordingly, considering the mandatory minimum sentence required by the firearm enhancement and considering the jury's finding of manslaughter, this Court must consider a sentencing range of 20 years to 40 years. * * * The court sentences Mr. Parvez to 25 years to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 20 of those years are to be served without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 249 So. 3d 102 - State v. Parvez

3. “Concerning the initial inculpatory statement made to Deputy Lea, there is no doubt that the defendant had not been advised of his Miranda rights before making this statement. However, a single, general inquiry made to the defendant at his home during an investigation, and prior to his arrest, does not constitute custodial interrogation. State v. Anderson, 332 So.2d 452 (La.1976). Miranda warnings are not essential prerequisites to non-custodial, general, on-the-scene interrogation to determine facts relating to whether or not a crime has been committed, or by whom, at least absent a showing that the questioning is past such investigatory stage. State v. Brown, 340 So.2d 1306 (La.1976). See also State v. Hodges, 349 So.2d 250 (La.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074 , 98 S.Ct. 1262 , 55 L.Ed.2d 779 (1978).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 651 So. 2d 463 - State v. Stracener