Key v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1978
Citation profile
30 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 31 later decisions — most recently June 2013 · most notably State v. Odom (1996), Anderson v. State (1979)
30 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Pearson v. State · State Ex Rel. Terry v. Yarrell · State Ex Rel. Anderson v. Winsett · Ellenburg v. State · Jenkins v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““We do not, however, hold that the possession contemplated by Sec. 39-901, T.C.A. [T.C.A. § 39-3-401], must be personal and exclusive to trigger the enhancement provision. The reasoning of Judge Dwyer in Peters v. State, 521 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tenn.Cr.App.1974), is appropriate: The law, as we understand it, does not require actual or physical possession of the drug. If that were the case it would be a simple matter for participants in crimes of this type [drugs] to designate who was to have actual possession. The other parties would then be secure from culpability because of the fact that another was in actual possession. We think that possession means control. The possession necessary to invoke the statutory enhancement may be actual or constructive; it may be exclusive or joint. Constructive or joint possession may occur only where the personally unarmed participant has the power and ability to exercise control over the firearm. Such possession may never exist absent knowledge that the other participant is in the possession of a firearm.””
3 later decisions quote this exact passage““... The common purpose need not be to commit the particular crime which is committed; if two persons join in a purpose to commit a crime, each of them, if actually or constructively present, is not only guilty as a principal, if the other commits that particular crime, but he is also guilty of any other crime committed by the other in pursuance of the common purpose, or as a natural or probable consequence thereof.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Carson · State v. Grooms“its language its usual and ordinary meaning, thus avoiding any forced construction.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Horton
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.