United States v. McGee’s Empirical Analysis
564 F.3d 136 · 2009
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 2 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (§ 101 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974) · 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act)
Relies on United States v. Matlock · Illinois v. Rodriguez · Georgia v. Randolph · United States v. Nersesian · United States v. Rojas-Contreras
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“McGee’s argument is by no means unreasonable. It is true that Ellison had no formal property interest that afforded her a right to enter. Any access she enjoyed came to her solely as McGee’s invitee, and, for the moment at least, McGee had locked her out of the house and taken away her key.... While McGee’s argument is respectable, we believe it is mistaken and mis-perceives the meaning of “access” as used in Davis. Whether a so-called “third party,” i.e., one whose access depends on the approval of the person who owns the formal right of possession, has access to a premises depends on the understandings communicated by the titular owner to that person. The presence or absence of locks on doors can be helpful to the court’s discernment of that understanding, but does not directly answer it.... On the unusual facts of our case, McGee’s argument fails. McGee did not lock Ellison out of the house and take away her key with the intention of excluding her from continuing to live in his house with him. By locking the door, he was not saying, “Get out of my house and stay out.” To the contrary, McGee locked her bags in the house and locked her out temporarily in an effort to prevent her from leaving the house. Far from seeking to expel her from the house, his conduct was designed to insure that she would continue to reside in it. He was simply trying to put her baggage out of her reach so that she would not depart. While it is true that in doing so he temporarily prevented her from ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Ferguson v. State“another person who has authority to consent by reason of that person's 'common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises,'”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.