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← 564 F.3d 587 - Molinari v. Bloomberg

Molinari v. Bloomberg’s Empirical Analysis

564 F.3d 587 · 2009

Citation profile

37
cited by 37 later decisions
2
states following
October 2024
most recently cited

5 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 37 later decisions — most recently October 2024 · most notably Ellis v. Solomon (2010), Vega v. Lantz (2010)

5 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

320200920102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1973C (§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965)

Relies on Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Roth v. United States · Thornhill v. Alabama · Heller v. Doe Ex Rel. Doe · Williams v. Rhodes

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[T]he right to pass legislation through a referendum is a state-created right not guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[W]e conclude that ... the Constitution does not require a state to create an initiative procedure”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Under the Plaintiffs' theory, every structural feature of government that makes some political outcomes less likely than others-and thereby discourages some speakers from engaging in protected speech-violates the First Amendment. Constitutions and rules of procedure routinely make legislation, and thus advocacy, on certain subjects more difficult by requiring a supermajority vote to enact bills on certain subjects. Those who propose, for example, to impeach an official, override a veto, expel a member of the legislature, or ratify a treaty might have to convince two-thirds of the members of one or both houses to vote accordingly. State constitutions attach supermajority requirements to a bewildering array of specific categories of legislation, [collecting specific examples]. These provisions presumably have the "inevitable effect" of reducing the total "quantum of speech" by discouraging advocates of nuclear power plants, general banking laws, or unauthorized state flags from bothering to seek legislation or initiatives embodying their views. Yet if it violates the First Amendment to remove certain issues from the vicissitudes of ordinary democratic politics, constitutions themselves are unconstitutional. Indeed, the Plaintiffs' theory would have the ironic effect of rendering the relief they seek in this litigation unconstitutional under the First Amendment: if it is unconstitutional to amend the Utah constitution to require a supermajority to approve a wildlife initiative, ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.