¶2 California state prisoner Edwin Valencia appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1988 action arising from the loss of his property following his transfer to another prison. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir.2007) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We affirm.
¶3 The district court properly dismissed Valencia’s action because Valencia had an adequate post-deprivation remedy under California law. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (“[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.”); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (“California [l]aw provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property deprivations.”). Contrary to Valencia’s contentions otherwise, his complaint alleged that defendants disregarded prison regulations, which resulted in the loss of his property.
¶4 Valencia’s contentions that he was not allowed adequate time to file an amended complaint, and that the district court should have inquired into his disability, are unpersuasive.
¶5 AFFIRMED.