United States v. Matassini’s Empirical Analysis
565 F.2d 1297 · 1978
Citation profile
21 federal appellate · 4 district · 6 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 38 later decisions — most recently June 2014 · most notably United States v. Gillies (1988), United States v. Brady (1994)
21 federal appellate · 4 district · 6 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board · United States v. American Trucking Associations · United States v. Bass · Rector Etc of Holy Trinity Church v. United States · Rewis v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“We believe it is clear that Congress, in enacting [the statute forbidding convicted felons from possessing firearms], intended the proscriptions ... to reach persons convicted of felonies prior to 1968, [the effective date of the act.] We also believe that Congress intended that with respect to convicted felons pardoned after the enactment of the Omnibus Act, only those felons whose pardons contained a clear indication of express authorization would be permitted to receive, possess, or transport in commerce any firearm. Finally, we are prepared to believe that with respect to convicted felons pardoned prior to 1968, Congress intended to permit receipt or possession of firearms only following a determination that the individual involved did not present a threat to public safety.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. State v. Hall““We have no doubt that Congress is free within constitutional limits, to choose its own indicia of dangerousness in constructing a regulatory scheme. It is not slavishly bound to follow the characterizations adopted by the states. But in Title IV, by identifying those subject to the proscription of § 922(h)(1) as ‘any person . . . who has been convicted in any court . . . ’ Congress chose to rely, at least in part, on state criminal law. We see no reason, in either the language or legislative history of Title IV, to doubt that Congress adopted the states’ own definitions of conviction, including the effects of an [expunction] thereon.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“(2) any person who has been pardoned by . . . the chief executive of the State and has expressly been authorized by the . . . chief executive ... to receive, possess, or transport in commerce a firearm.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.