Stephens v. Astrue’s Empirical Analysis
565 F.3d 131 · 2009
Citation profile
9 federal appellate · 1 district ·
Relationships
Applies 12 U.S.C. § 3417 · 28 U.S.C. § 2412 · 28 U.S.C. § 636 · 31 U.S.C. § 3716 · 42 U.S.C. § 1988 · 42 U.S.C. § 406 (§ 206 of the Social Security Act of 1935)
Relies on Connecticut National Bank v. Germain · Farrar v. Hobby · Buckhannon Board and Care Home Incs v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources · Lamie v. United States Trustee · Rubin v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Reeves’ second textual argument is based on an uncodified clause of the EAJA, which harmonized fees payable by the Government under EAJA with fees payable under § 406(b) of the Social Security Act. The EAJA and the Social Security Act both contain provisions commonly relied upon by successful social security claimants and their attorneys to secure the payment of attorney’s fees. The uncodified clause of the EAJA requires an attorney that receives fees for the same work under both the EAJA and the Social Security Act to refund the smaller amount to the claimant. Reeves argues this clause can only logically be read to contemplate that the EAJA award will be paid to the attorney. Otherwise, he asserts, it makes no sense to direct the attorney to refund an amount he has not received. We find this argument unpersuasive because the clause, by its own terms, only comes into play after the attorney actually receives double fees for the same work. Our reading of the plain text of § 2412 is not altered by the uncontroversial proposition that Congress anticipated attorneys will often be the ultimate beneficiaries of the attorney’s fees awarded under the EAJA. When an attorney actually receives the proceeds of an EAJA award from his client, the clause is implicated. The clause is not implicated, in a case like this, where the attorney never receives the proceeds of an EAJA award. The unambiguous text of the EAJA resolves the issue before us; therefore, we refrain from embarking on a supe”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Murkeldove v. Astrue““(b) Section 206(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 406(b)(1)) [section 406(b) of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare] shall not prevent an award of fees and other expenses under section 2412(d) of title 28, United States Code [subsec. (d) of this section]. Section 206(b)(2) of the Social Security Act [section 406(b)(2) of Title 42] shall not apply with respect to any such award but only if, where the claimant’s attorney receives fees for the same work under both section 206(b) of that Act [section 406(b) of Title 42] and section 2412(d) of title 28, United States Code [subsec. (d) of this section], the claimant’s attorney refunds to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.””
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Murkeldove v. Astrue“[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses ... incurred by that party in any civil action ..., including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Rice v. Astrue
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.