Irick v. Bell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “applies] a “two-part test to determine whether the state court reasonably applied the federal standard in holding that prosecutorial misconduct did not render [the petitioner’s] trial fundamentally unfair.” Irick v. Bell, 565 F.3d 315, 324 (6th Cir.2009). [The Court] first determine[s] whether the prosecution’s conduct was improper. Id. Second, [the Court] determine^] whether that improper conduct was flagrant by considering four factors: “(1) whether the evidence against the defendant was strong; (2) whether the conduct of the prosecution tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; (3) whether the conduct or remarks were isolated or extensive; and (4) whether the remarks were made deliberately or accidentally.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 907 F. Supp. 2d 878 - Blackston v. Rapelje · 902 F. Supp. 2d 1006 - Drain v. Woods

2. “In Brady [v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) ], the Supreme Court held “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87 , 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 . “ ‘There are three components of a true Brady violation: the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’ ” Owens [v. Guida], 549 F.3d [399] at 415 [ (6th Cir.2008) ] (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)). A defendant is prejudiced when there is “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 , 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Akrawi v. Booker