This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter
2025 UT 1
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
v.
DEON ANDRE JENNINGS,
Petitioner.
No. 20230720
Heard September 9, 2024
Filed February 20, 2025
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
Third District Court, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Su Chon
No. 221904766
Attorneys:
Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., Emily Sopp, Asst. Solic. Gen.,
Salt Lake City, for respondent
Erick Grange, Amy Powers, Salt Lake City, for petitioner
JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE,
JUSTICE HAGEN, and JUSTICE POHLMAN joined.
JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 Defendant Deon Jennings was arrested and charged with
first-degree murder after he stabbed Willie Houston twice in the
back and Houston died from his injuries. At a bail hearing in the
district court, Jennings argued that he should be released on bail
pending trial because the State had not presented “substantial
evidence to support the charge” of first-degree murder, as required
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Opinion of the Court
by the Utah Constitution and the Utah Code. He asserted that he
had not intended to injure Houston and that he had acted in self-defense. The district court rejected Jennings’ arguments and
ordered that he be held in custody without bail. Jennings appealed
that decision, and the court of appeals affirmed.
¶2 Jennings argues on certiorari that we should reverse the
court of appeals’ decision because the State failed to present
substantial evidence to support the first-degree murder charge at
the bail hearing. Specifically, he argues that the State did not
present substantial evidence to 1) prove the applicable mens rea,
and 2) disprove that he acted in self-defense.
¶3 We affirm the court of appeals’ decision. We conclude that
the State presented substantial evidence of the requisite mens rea.
With respect to whether the State disproved self-defense by
substantial evidence, the parties disagree as to whether the State
carries such a burden at a bail hearing. However, we do not resolve
this legal question here because even assuming the State carries this
burden, we agree with the court of appeals that the State disproved
that Jennings acted in self-defense by substantial evidence.
BACKGROUND1
¶4 After receiving a 911 report of a stabbing, police arrived to
find Willie Houston lying on the kitchen floor of a neighbor’s
apartment, unconscious and covered in blood. The blood came
from two sharp-force injuries on his back—one three inches deep
and the other five. In other words, Houston had been stabbed twice
in the back. Houston was taken to the hospital for treatment, but he
died from his injuries. Before losing consciousness, Houston’s
neighbor asked him, “Who did this? What happened?” Houston
replied, “My nephew.” His “nephew” was defendant Deon
Jennings.
¶5 Houston had been in a relationship with Jennings’ aunt for
about fifteen years. Although Houston and Jennings were not
blood relatives, Jennings had been known to call Houston his
“uncle,” and Houston had been known to call Jennings his
“nephew.”
¶6 Police followed a trail of blood from the apartment where
they found Houston, down the sidewalk, in and around Houston’s
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1 These background facts are taken from the preliminary
hearing record, which the State relied on at the bail hearing.
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car, and back to the scene of the crime: the apartment that Houston
shared with Jennings’ aunt. She later testified that she and Houston
lived together in the apartment. She also explained that Jennings
did not have a key to the apartment and did not have her
permission to be there that night, or any night for that matter.
Nonetheless, both Houston and Jennings had been in the
apartment together on the day in question.
¶7 The only direct account of what happened inside the
apartment comes from statements that Jennings made to an
investigating detective, Detective Johanson. According to Jennings,
he and his uncle had been hanging out, drinking beers together,
when they got into an argument. Houston asked Jennings to leave
the apartment multiple times. Jennings refused and demanded that
Houston go instead. At one point, Houston did briefly leave out the
front door, and Jennings quickly tried to lock him out. But Jennings
was too slow, and Houston forced his way back in.
¶8 As Houston pushed open the door, the two men fell
together onto the floor “in a heap,” with Houston on top of
Jennings. They then got into “some sort of tussle.” While still
underneath Houston, Jennings reached for an object to use against
Houston and “struck” Houston in the back with it. But he was not
entirely sure what the object was. Jennings “suspected, maybe, it
was a screwdriver at one point . . . but he was never specific or
clear.” Jennings thought “he struck [Houston] at least twice”
“somewhere in his back ribs torso area.”
¶9 Jennings, however, sustained no injuries. At one point,
Jennings told Detective Johanson that he “thought he might’ve
been hit over the head” during the altercation. But he later changed
this aspect of his story, stating that “he wasn’t ever hit over the
head” and that, in fact, he “wasn’t hit” at all that night. Jennings
also stated that Houston never attempted to strike him. Moreover,
Detective Johanson specifically asked Jennings whether he felt
“threatened” or “like something was going to happen to [him],”
and “[Jennings] never said that is how he felt.”
¶10 After Jennings stabbed Houston twice in the back with the
object, Houston left the apartment and eventually made it to a
neighbor’s apartment—leaving a trail of blood behind him. He
asked the neighbors to call the police.
¶11 Meanwhile, Jennings did not call 911. Nor did he follow
Houston to check on him. Instead, he locked the front door of the
apartment, gathered his things, and left out the back “to go find
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Opinion of the Court
another beer.” When Detective Johanson asked Jennings why he
didn’t check on Houston, Jennings’ “response was that he honestly
didn’t care.”
¶12 Jennings laid low for three days until a relative convinced
him to call the police. Through a series of phone calls, police located
Jennings at his apartment and arrested him. The State charged
Jennings with first-degree murder and requested that he be held
without bail.
Preliminary Hearing
¶13 At the preliminary hearing, the State presented evidence
from Detective Johanson about her crime scene investigation and
her interviews with Jennings. In one of the interviews, Jennings
reenacted how he had pushed Houston away with his left hand and
struck him in the back with his right, which was clenching the
object. And during the preliminary hearing, Detective Johanson
demonstrated Jennings’ reenactment on the stand. The prosecutor
described the Detective’s movements for the record: “And you
were using your left hand in a pushing motion, as if pushing away
from your body?” Johanson replied, “Yes.” “And then you—you
had clenched your fist as if you were moving that up—in an up- and-down motion with your right hand.” Again, Johanson replied
affirmatively, “Uh-huh.”
¶14 The State also presented testimony from Jennings’ aunt.
Although she was not at the apartment on the day of the altercation,
she spoke about her relationship with both Houston and Jennings.
¶15 Jennings cross-examined the State’s witnesses but did not
call any witnesses of his own. The district court ultimately bound
him over on the first-degree murder charge.
Bail Hearing
¶16 Two months later, Jennings requested pretrial release, and
the court held a bail hearing. Neither party offered new evidence.
Both relied primarily on the evidence already offered at the
preliminary hearing.2
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2 The parties also made various evidentiary proffers at the bail
hearing. Jennings alleges that many of the State’s proffers were
unsupported, or even contradicted, by the evidence from the
preliminary hearing. We need not resolve these evidentiary
(continued . . .)
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¶17 Jennings argued that the State had not met its burden to
present “substantial evidence to support the charge,” as required
by article I, section 8 of the Utah Constitution and the Bail Statute,
Utah Code section 77-20-201. And he argued that he had been
acting in self-defense because there was a “fight that ensued in
which both parties fell to the ground.” And Jennings argued that
Houston’s wounds were consistent with his account of the fight:
“that he struck the deceased in the back several times while the
deceased was on top of him . . . attacking [him].” Jennings also
argued that the district court should consider Houston’s toxicology
results—which showed both methamphetamine and cocaine postmortem—in considering “who was the primary aggressor.”
¶18 The prosecution cast the case in a distinctly different light,
arguing to the court, “There’s clear intent here, Judge, and
statements from the defendant’s own mouth that he was
intend[ing] to attack [Houston,] and . . . there’s no self-defense
claim here.” On that point, the State argued that “using a weapon
while somebody’s on top of you without a weapon is not a claim
for any kind of self-defense or any kind of reasonable way to
increase the level of violence used.”
¶19 After hearing both sides, the district court ordered
Jennings to be held without bail and concluded that “there was no
self-defense . . . in what happened there.” The court first observed
that Jennings “had no right to be in the home,” whereas Houston
did and was trying to regain entry to his own home. The court then
reasoned that “the nature of the injuries in the back [do] not suggest
self-defense.” And the court decided that it would not consider
“the argument about meth and cocaine” in reaching its conclusion,
“because those drugs cause [different] people to react differently.”
Further, the district court observed that “nothing” from the
preliminary hearing suggested that Houston was “aggressive or
hostile” that night.3
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disputes, however, because the record indicates that the district
court did not rely on any of the contested proffers in reaching its
final ruling. Rather, it relied on the evidence and testimony
presented at the preliminary hearing. We do the same.
3 The district court also concluded that the State had shown “by
clear and convincing evidence” that Jennings posed “a substantial
danger to any other individual or the community” and that he was
(continued . . .)
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¶20 Jennings appealed.
Court of Appeals’ Decision
¶21 In the court of appeals, Jennings argued that the State did
not present substantial evidence of the crime charged, and that it
had failed to disprove his self-defense claim by substantial
evidence. The court of appeals disagreed on both issues and
affirmed the district court’s bail determination.
¶22 The court of appeals concluded that “Jennings’s
statements to the detective provided substantial evidence to
support the charge.”4 It applied the substantial evidence standard
enunciated in Randolph v. State, which “is met when the facts
adduced by the State, notwithstanding contradiction of them by
defense proof, warrant the conclusion that if believed by a jury they
furnish a reasonable basis for a verdict of guilty.” 2022 UT 34, ¶ 64,
515 P.3d 444 (cleaned up). Referencing the elements of first-degree
murder, the court of appeals concluded that the evidence presented
at the preliminary hearing “provide[d] a reasonable basis for a jury
to conclude that Jennings intended to cause serious injury to the
deceased, and that he committed an act dangerous to human life.”
¶23 The court of appeals next considered Jennings’ argument
that the State had failed to disprove his self-defense claim by
substantial evidence. Noting that the parties disagreed as to
whether the State had the burden of disproving self-defense at the
bail-hearing stage, the court of appeals deemed it unnecessary to
decide the issue. It explained, “even if we assume for the sake of
argument that the State was required to present substantial
evidence that a defendant did not act in self-defense at a detention
hearing, the State met its burden in this case.”
¶24 In making this determination, the court noted that
Jennings had no authority to be in the apartment and had been
asked to leave. It further reasoned that Jennings’ own statements
demonstrated that: “(1) the deceased never made any threats of
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“likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court if released”—at least one
of which must be found to deny bail under Utah Code section 77-
20-201(1)(c). Neither of these findings have been challenged on
appeal.
4 The court of appeals ruled on Jennings’ appeal by way of an
unpublished order of affirmance. As a result, there is no citation for
the court of appeals’ ruling.
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death or serious bodily injury towards him; (2) Jennings never felt
threatened by the deceased; and (3) Jennings was never hurt by the
deceased.” Thus, the court of appeals concluded that “there was
substantial evidence that Jennings did not act in self-defense.”
¶25 Jennings petitioned for certiorari, which we granted. We
have jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶26 “On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals and not that of the district court.” State v. Brake, 2004 UT
95, ¶ 11,
103 P.3d 699. “In doing so, we review for correctness,
giving the court of appeals’ conclusions of law no deference.” State
ex rel. A.T. v. A.T.,
2001 UT 82, ¶ 5,
34 P.3d 228.
¶27 Whether the State presented “substantial evidence” of the
charge at the bail hearing is a “law-like mixed question” that is
reviewed de novo. Randolph v. State, 2022 UT 34, ¶ 44,
515 P.3d 444.
Any factual findings underlying the district court’s decision are
reviewed with deference and overturned “only when they are
clearly erroneous.”
Id.
ANALYSIS
¶28 On appeal, Jennings argues that he was entitled to bail for
two reasons. First, he argues that the State failed to present
substantial evidence of the requisite mens rea for first-degree
murder. Second, Jennings argues that the State failed to prove by
substantial evidence that he did not act in self-defense.
¶29 We first discuss the substantial evidence standard, which
applies to both issues before us. We next analyze Jennings’ mens
rea argument and then turn to his self-defense argument.
Ultimately, we agree with the court of appeals that the State
presented substantial evidence of both, and we affirm.
I. AT A BAIL HEARING, THE PROSECUTION MUST PRESENT
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE CHARGE
¶30 In Utah, criminal defendants have a constitutional right to
bail. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8; see also State v. Barnett, 2023 UT 20, ¶ 2,
537 P.3d 212. The Utah Constitution establishes this right, and it
specifies some exceptions to it. Article I, section 8 states:
All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable
except:
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Opinion of the Court
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there
is substantial evidence to support the charge; or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation
or parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a
previous felony charge, when there is substantial
evidence to support the new felony charge; or
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if
there is substantial evidence to support the charge
and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that the person would constitute a substantial danger
to any other person or to the community or is likely
to flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on bail.
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8(1).
¶31 The Bail Statute mirrors the language of article I, section 8
and designates the “other crime[s]” for which bail may be denied.
Id. art. I, § 8(1)(c); see UTAH CODE § 77-20-201(1). Relevant here, it
states:
An individual charged with, or arrested for, a
criminal offense shall be admitted to bail as a matter
of right, except if the individual is charged with . . . a
felony when there is substantial evidence to support
the charge and the court finds, by clear and
convincing evidence, that . . . the individual would
constitute a substantial danger to any other
individual or to the community . . . [or] is likely to flee
. . . if the individual is released on bail.
UTAH CODE § 77-20-201(1)(c).
¶32 Jennings was charged with first-degree murder. And he
does not dispute that first-degree murder is one of the crimes
“designated by statute as one for which bail may be denied.” UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 8(1)(c); UTAH CODE § 77-20-201(1)(c). Accordingly,
the only question is whether “there is substantial evidence to
support the charge.” UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8(1)(c).5
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5 The district court also had to determine whether Jennings was
a danger to the community or a flight risk. See UTAH CONST. art I,
§ 8(c); UTAH CODE § 77-20-201(1)(c). It determined by clear and
(continued . . .)
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¶33 In Randolph v. State, we analyzed the original public
meaning of the term “substantial evidence” in article I, section 8.
2022 UT 34, ¶¶ 56–65,
515 P.3d 444. We explained that in 1895,
when the Utah Constitution was ratified, article I section 8 read:
“All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for
capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption strong.”
Id. ¶ 58 (emphasis added) (quoting UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8
(amended 1973)); see also State v. Kastanis,
848 P.2d 673, 674 (Utah
1993) (per curiam).
¶34 In 1988, Utahns amended article I, section 8 to its current
form. See Randolph, 2022 UT 34, ¶ 58. Relevant here, the language
“proof is evident or the presumption strong” was changed to
“substantial evidence to support the charge.” See Proposition No. 1
Bail Amendment, UTAH
VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET, 10 (1988), https://vote.utah.gov/
wp-content/uploads/sites/42/2023/09/1988-VIP.pdf; see also
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8. We observed in Randolph, however, that
this modification was implemented “for the sole purpose of
modernizing the language.”
2022 UT 34, ¶ 60 (quoting Kastanis,
848
P.2d at 675). It was not intended to alter the quantity of evidence
necessary to support a denial of bail under the “proof is evident or
the presumption strong” standard.
Id. at ¶¶ 60–61 (cleaned up).
And this court stated in Chynoweth v. Larson, that the proofevident/presumption-strong standard is met when “the facts
adduced by the State, notwithstanding contradiction of them by
defense proof, warrant the conclusion that if believed by a jury they
furnish a reasonable basis for a verdict of [guilty].”
572 P.2d 1081,
1082 (Utah 1977) (cleaned up).
¶35 Because the 1988 amendment was not intended to
substantively change the quantum of evidence required by article
I, section 8, the substantial evidence standard does not materially
differ from the standard we described in Chynoweth. In Randolph,
we held that the “substantial evidence standard is met when the
prosecution presents evidence capable of supporting a jury finding
that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 2022 UT
34, ¶ 73; see also Kastanis,
848 P.2d at 676 (“At [a bail] hearing, the
trial court may not revoke bail unless the facts adduced by the State
__________________________________________________________
convincing evidence that he was both, and Jennings does not
dispute those findings on appeal. See supra ¶ 19 n.3.
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furnish a reasonable basis for a jury finding of a verdict of guilty of
[the crime charged].”).
¶36 “[T]he purpose of the substantial evidence standard is to
ensure that the quantum of evidence presented by the State
sufficiently justifies the denial of the defendant’s right to freedom
from pretrial incarceration.” Randolph, 2022 UT 34, ¶ 74. The district
court must reach this decision without viewing the evidence in a
light favorable to any party—instead, it must evaluate the strength
of the evidence presented by both sides and make credibility
judgments where necessary. See
id. ¶¶ 74–75.
¶37 We now assess whether the State presented substantial
evidence of the requisite mental state for first-degree murder.
II. THE STATE PRESENTED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE APPLICABLE
MENS REA
¶38 Jennings argues that, at the bail hearing, the State failed to
present substantial evidence of the mens rea required to support
the first-degree murder charge against him. A person commits first-degree murder when “(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly
causes the death of another individual; [or] (b) intending to cause
serious bodily injury to another individual, the actor commits an
act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of the
other individual.” UTAH CODE § 76-5-203(2)(a)–(b), (3)(a)(i). The
court of appeals concluded that the State had presented substantial
evidence of the mens rea required in subsection 203(2)(b)—namely,
that Jennings intended to cause serious bodily injury to Houston
when he stabbed Houston twice in the back with a sharp object, an
act clearly dangerous to human life that caused Houston’s death.
Id. § 76-5-203(2)(b). We agree.
¶39 A person acts intentionally “when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” Id.
§ 76-2-103(1). We often look to circumstantial evidence to infer
intent “[b]ecause intent is a state of mind, which is rarely
susceptible of direct proof.” State v. Logue, 2018 UT App 156, ¶ 17,
436 P.3d 136 (cleaned up). Of course, intent may be proven by direct
evidence as well, if available. See State v. Minousis,
228 P. 574, 576
(Utah 1924) (“It is . . . well settled that . . . specific intent may be
proved by circumstantial, as well as direct, evidence . . . .”). Here,
we have both.
¶40 Jennings told Detective Johanson that when Houston
pushed his way back into the apartment the two of them
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“collapse[d] into some sort of tussle” on “the ground.” With
Houston on top of him, Jennings stated that he grabbed an object
off the floor and began striking Houston with it. He claimed that he
did not know what the object was. Although at one point, Jennings
told Detective Johanson that he “suspected, maybe, it was a
screwdriver.”
¶41 Further, in one of his interviews with Detective Johanson,
Jennings reenacted the physical motions of pushing Houston away
with his left hand while stabbing him in the back with his right.
And during the preliminary hearing, Detective Johanson
demonstrated Jennings’ reenactment on the stand. The prosecutor
described Detective Johanson’s movements for the record: “And
you were using your left hand in a pushing motion, as if pushing
away from your body?” Johanson replied, “Yes.” “And then you—
you had clenched your fist as if you were moving that up—in an
up-and-down motion with your right hand.” Again, Johanson
replied affirmatively, “Uh-huh.”
¶42 In addition to Jennings’ direct statements about and
demonstration of his actions, Houston’s injuries provide
circumstantial evidence of Jennings’ intent. Houston had two deep
stab wounds in his back, made by a sharp object.
¶43 Jennings argues that this does not constitute substantial
evidence that he intended to cause serious bodily injury to Houston
for a couple of reasons. First, he argues that the evidence is
insufficient because he did not know what he was holding or if it
could cause serious bodily injury. In other words, he argues that if
he did not know what he was holding, how could he have known
that using it to strike Houston was likely to cause serious bodily
injury? Second, he notes that he admitted only to “striking”
Houston, and that he never said he “stabbed” him.
¶44 Had Jennings stabbed Houston once, these arguments
might be more persuasive. But Jennings stabbed Houston twice, at
depths of three and five inches. When Jennings first grabbed the
object in the heat of the moment, perhaps he truly did not know its
lethality. But with the object clenched in his right hand, he plunged
it several inches into Houston’s back. And Houston’s injuries, and
Jennings’ statements and reenactment, show that Jennings then
pulled the object out of Houston’s body and plunged it inches deep
into his back again. After stabbing Houston once, it is difficult to
believe that when Jennings pulled the object out of Houston’s body
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and did it again, he still had no idea that the object he was holding
could cause “serious bodily injury.”
¶45 For these reasons, we conclude that the State presented
substantial evidence of Jennings’ criminal intent, because the
evidence provides a reasonable basis for a jury to conclude that
Jennings intended to cause serious bodily injury to Houston.
Therefore, we agree with the court of appeals that the State
presented substantial evidence that Jennings had the requisite
mental state.
III. THE STATE PRESENTED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DISPROVING THAT
JENNINGS ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE
¶46 Finally, Jennings argues that the State failed to present
substantial evidence that he did not act in self-defense and,
therefore, that the State did not produce “evidence capable of
supporting a jury finding that the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Randolph v. State, 2022 UT 34, ¶ 73,
515 P.3d 444.
The court of appeals correctly concluded otherwise.
¶47 Before proceeding to the merits of Jennings’ argument, we
first note the parties’ disagreement as to whether the State even has
a burden to disprove self-defense—assuming it is at issue—at the
bail hearing stage of a criminal proceeding.
¶48 Jennings argues that once self-defense is at issue in a bail
hearing, the burden then shifts to the State to disprove self-defense
by substantial evidence. He premises his argument on the meaning
of the phrase “substantial evidence” in article I, section 8 of the
Utah Constitution. He first observes our holding in Randolph that
the substantial evidence standard is met when the State produces
evidence “capable of supporting a jury finding that the defendant
is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” at trial. Id. And he notes that
in the trial context, “the State carries the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt each element of an offense, including the
absence of an affirmative defense once the defense is put into
issue.” State v. Low,
2008 UT 58, ¶ 45,
192 P.3d 867 (cleaned up).
Jennings argues that, taken together, these holdings require the
conclusion that if self-defense is put at issue in a bail hearing, the
burden shifts to the State to disprove it by substantial evidence. He
reasons that even if the State proved every element of first-degree
murder at trial beyond a reasonable doubt, a jury could not convict
him if self-defense was at issue and the State failed to disprove it.
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¶49 The State argues that it has no burden to disprove
self-defense, or any other affirmative defense, at a bail hearing. It
focuses on other language in article I, section 8 and the Bail Statute,
specifying that the State need only present “substantial evidence to
support the charge.” UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8(1)(c) (emphasis added);
UTAH CODE § 77-20-201 (1)(c). And since an affirmative defense is
not an element of the “charge,” the State contends that it had no
constitutional or statutory duty to prove the absence of self-defense
at Jennings’ bail hearing. See State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah
1985) (“Absence of self-defense is not an element of a homicide
offense.”). The State further argues that the narrow purpose of a
bail hearing is to determine whether there is enough evidence of
the crime charged to hold the defendant in custody. And requiring
the State to disprove affirmative defenses falls outside that
purpose.
¶50 We agree with the court of appeals that this question is not
determinative in this case. The court of appeals correctly concluded
that, even assuming the State bears the burden of disproving self-defense at a bail hearing, it did so here. And, “[i]n light of the great
gravity and delicacy of constitutional questions,” our court
generally “will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of.” State v. Argueta,
2020 UT 41, ¶ 55,
469 P.3d 938 (cleaned up), abrogated on other
grounds by State v. Green,
2023 UT 10,
532 P.3d 930. That is the case
here.
¶51 Under Utah law, an individual “is justified in threatening
or using force against another individual when and to the extent
that the individual reasonably believes that force or threat of force
is necessary to defend the individual or another individual against
the imminent use of unlawful force.” UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(2)(a).6
In assessing the reasonableness of this belief,
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6 The Utah Code contains two subtypes of self-defense: lethal
and non-lethal. See UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(2)(a)–(b). The parties
have not explicitly argued which self-defense standard should
apply in this case, but both applied section 76-2-402(2)(a)—the non-lethal standard—in their briefs. This standard, quoted in full above,
requires that the defendant reasonably believed use of force was
necessary to defend himself or another “against the imminent use
(continued . . .)
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the trier of fact may consider: (a) the nature of the
danger; (b) the immediacy of the danger; (c) the
probability that the unlawful force would result in
death or serious bodily injury; (d) the other
individual’s prior violent acts or violent propensities;
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties’
relationship; and (f) any other relevant factors.
Id. § 76-2-402(5).
¶52 As we explained in State v. Sorbonne, this standard “is not
a purely objective one.” 2022 UT 5, ¶ 27,
506 P.3d 545 (cleaned up).
The requirement of individual belief necessarily “introduces a
component of subjectivity.”
Id. And requiring that this belief be
reasonable “introduces a component of objectivity.” Id. ¶ 28.
¶53 There was substantial evidence before the district court
that Jennings did not reasonably believe that the force he used
against Houston was necessary to defend himself against an
imminent use of unlawful force by Houston. As a threshold matter,
Jennings’ statements indicate that he did not subjectively feel
threatened by Houston during the incident. The only evidence
cutting in Jennings’ favor on this point is the fact that he told
Detective Johanson that during the initial argument over who
should leave the apartment Houston said something along the lines
of, “Well, if you don’t want to leave, I have something for you.”
Whether this vaguely foreboding language rises to the level of a
threat of physical violence is unclear. But what we do know is that
Jennings did not interpret it that way. Detective Johanson
specifically asked Jennings, “did you feel threatened? Were you –
did you feel like something was going to happen to you?” And she
testified that Jennings “never said that is how he felt.” When the
prosecutor asked Detective Johanson whether Jennings indicated
that Houston “had ever made any threats of death or serious bodily
injury toward him,” she replied, “He did not.”
__________________________________________________________
of unlawful force.” Id. By contrast, the lethal subsection sets a more
exacting standard, requiring that the defendant reasonably
believed force was necessary “to prevent death or serious bodily
injury” to himself or another. Id. § 76-2-402(2)(b). Because both
sides have applied the non-lethal standard found in subsection (a),
we do the same without opining on whether that is the correct
standard here.
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Opinion of the Court
¶54 Further, the facts here suggest that even if Jennings had
subjectively believed Houston posed an imminent threat of danger,
that belief would not have been reasonable. Viewing Jennings’
actions in context, Houston was rightfully present in his own home,
he asked Jennings to leave, and Jennings refused to do so. Jennings
then attempted to lock Houston out of his own apartment. Houston
was able to push his way back in, and this led to the two men falling
together onto the floor.
¶55 Jennings’ account of how Houston ended up on top of him
suggests it was accidental, not an aggressive attack by Houston.
Houston was on one side of the door attempting to regain entry.
Jennings was on the other side trying to keep him out. The two
pushed against each other until the equilibrium broke, and they
“collapse[d] into some sort of tussle.” Jennings similarly said that
the pair “fell on the floor together in a heap.” (emphasis added).
¶56 Further, Jennings’ account does not indicate that Houston
ever attempted to strike him that night. Jennings did, at one point,
tell Detective Johanson that he thought he might have been “hit
over the head” by Houston leading up to the altercation, but he
later retracted that version of events, clarifying “that he wasn’t ever
hit over the head and that he really doesn’t think he ever got hit.”
The fact that Jennings left the altercation unscathed corroborates
this.
¶57 Thus, Houston, unarmed, landed on top of Jennings, and
Jennings responded by grabbing what might have been a
screwdriver and stabbing Houston in the back with it twice. In that
moment, the facts suggest that any belief Jennings might have had
that Houston posed an imminent threat of danger would not have
been objectively reasonable. And in any event, the extent of the
force that Jennings used against Houston was out of proportion to
any threat Houston might have posed. See State v. Wall, 2020 UT
App 168, ¶ 20,
479 P.3d 355 (“It is assault and not self-defense when
a defendant fights back with a level of violence that is out of
proportion to the provocation. Defensive force thus must be
proportionate to the requirements of the situation.” (cleaned up)).
¶58 Jennings contends that even if self-defense does not
appear objectively reasonable on the face of things, it becomes
“objectively reasonable to believe there was immediate danger to
his person” if you take into consideration other factors. For
example, he references a history of violence between him and
Houston. Detective Johanson testified that the police had been
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Opinion of the Court
called to the apartment previously due to disputes between
Jennings and Houston. Specifically, about a year before this
altercation, local police responded after Jennings reported that
Houston had attacked him. We agree that the history of violence is
an important factor to consider in assessing the reasonableness of
Jennings’ belief, see UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(5)(d)–(e). But there was
scant information about the nature of the past disputes before the
district court—and it was not enough to counter the facts described
above.
¶59 Jennings also points to an Instagram message he sent to a
relative after the incident, which stated that Houston attacked him
first. But this statement to a relative does not outweigh Jennings’
own description of the altercation to Detective Johanson, which
suggests that Houston “fell” on top of Jennings, not that Houston
attacked him.
¶60 Finally, Jennings argues that it was error for the district
court and the court of appeals not to consider the toxicology results
that showed illegal drugs in Houston’s system. But as the district
court explained, there was no testimony regarding Houston’s drug
use or the effect the drugs may have had on him at the time in
question. Nor was there evidence of the effects of
methamphetamine or cocaine more generally. Without such
evidence, the district court would have been merely speculating as
to whether the drugs made Houston behave in an aggressive way
that Jennings reasonably perceived as threatening.
¶61 Thus, the countervailing evidence Jennings highlights
does not persuade us that the court of appeals erred. The
substantial evidence standard is met when “the facts adduced by
the State, notwithstanding contradiction of them by defense proof,
warrant the conclusion that if believed by a jury they furnish a
reasonable basis for a verdict of guilty.” Randolph, 2022 UT 34, ¶ 62
(cleaned up). Jennings’ own statements demonstrate that Houston
never injured Jennings, that Houston never seriously threatened
Jennings, and that Jennings never felt threatened by Houston
during their altercation. The court of appeals concluded that this
was substantial evidence that Jennings was not acting in self-defense when he stabbed Houston. We agree.
CONCLUSION
¶62 We conclude that the court of appeals correctly
determined that the State presented substantial evidence of first-degree murder, including that Jennings had the requisite mens rea,
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Opinion of the Court
at Jennings’ bail hearing. And even assuming that the State must
also disprove self-defense at a bail hearing when it has been put at
issue, we agree that the State submitted substantial evidence
showing that Jennings did not act in self-defense.
¶63 We affirm.
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