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← 566 P2D 640 - Davis v. State

Davis v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1977

Citation profile

15
cited by 15 later decisions
1
states following
April 1992
most recently cited

15 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently April 1992

15 state decisions

100197719801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Davis v. Alaska · Mutschler v. State · Davenport v. State · Cleary v. State · State v. Carlson

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Consecutive sentences are rarely appropriate. Authority to impose a consecutive sentence should be circumscribed by the following statutory limitations: (i) The aggregate maximum of consecutive terms should not be permitted to exceed the term authorized for an habitual offender (section 3.3) for the most serious of the offenses involved. If there is no provision for an habitual offender for the offenses involved, there should be a ceiling on the aggregate of consecutive terms which is related to the severity of the offenses involved; and (ii) The aggregate minimum of consecutive terms should be governed by the limitations stated in section 3.2; and (iii) The court should not be authorized to impose a consecutive sentence until a presen-tence report (sections 4.1-4.5), supplemented by a report of the examination of the defendant’s mental, emotional and physical condition (section 4.6), has been obtained and considered; and (iv) Imposition of a consecutive sentence should require the affirmative action of the sentencing court. The court should be authorized to impose a consecutive sentence only after a finding that confinement for such a term is necessary in order to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant. These limitations should also apply to any sentence for an offense committed prior to the imposition of sentence for another offense, whether the previous sentence for the other offense has been served or remains to be served.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. ““(a) Correction or Reduction of Sentence. The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after sentence is imposed, or within 120 days after receipt by the court of either a mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or an order of dismissal of the appeal, or within 120 days after receipt of an order of the supreme court of the state or of the United States denying an application for relief. The court shall retain jurisdiction under this paragraph notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal. If such a motion is filed during the pendency of a sentence appeal, the proceedings on that sentence appeal shall be automatically stayed upon the filing of a copy of the motion with the court in which the sentence appeal is pending. The stay shall remain in effect until the motion is decided.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “Finally, Judge Burke specified that Davis must serve five years in prison before becoming eligible for parole. At the time of sentencing, AS 33.15.230(a)(1) provided that such a minimum imposed by the judge shall not exceed one-third of the maximum sentence he imposes. Davis asserts that this statute limits the minimum term to one-third of ten years, or 3 years and 4 months, since each of the individual terms to which Davis was sentenced was ten years. The state claims that this means one-third of the total of 20 years, in which case Judge Burke’s 5-year minimum was permissible. Once again, our recent opinion in Thomas v. State [ 566 P.2d 630 (Alaska 1977)] is dis-positive of this contention. In that case, we adopted the construction of AS 33.15.230(a) which the state offers here.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.