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567 So. 2d 49

Docket No. 89-02873.

State v. Walters

STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Landon Todd WALTERS, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided September 26, 1990.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1990-09-26

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently December 2008

6 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“to require a remedy. Case law in existence long before the circuit court addressed the issue presented in this case established that revocation of a driver's license is not a punishment of the offender, but rather, under chapter 322, Florida Statutes,”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 999 So. 2d 660 - State v. Bolware, 999 So. 2d 1065 - State v. Caswell

“[R]evocation is an administrative remedy for the purpose of protecting the public and. . . the judge has no judicial discretion. Therefore, the uncounseled nature of the prior conviction can have no bearing on the court's duty to permanently revoke [the repeat DUI offender's] driving privileges.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including State v. Kelly

Relies on 93 So. 2d 105 - Smith v. City of Gainesville · 489 So. 2d 1168 - STATE, DEPT. OF HIGHWAY SAFETY v. Vogt

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1990-09-26

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and Stephen A. Baker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.

¶2Peter D. Ringsmuth, Fort Myers, for appellee.

¶3RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.

¶4The state challenges the trial court's order reducing sentence, whereby the court rescinded its previous order which revoked Landon Todd Walters' driver's license for life, pursuant to section 322.28(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1987), and ordered that the revocation be decreased to three years, pursuant to section 322.28(5)(a), Florida Statutes, (1987). The basis for the modification was that Walters had pled to a prior DUI without benefit of counsel, therefore, the prior DUI could not be used to enhance the penalty. We disagree and reverse because revocation of a driver's license is not a criminal punishment.

¶5The state correctly argues that the trial court mistakenly applied the law that uncounseled guilty pleas to prior crimes cannot be used to enhance a subsequent criminal charge or sentence. The suspension of a defendant's driving privilege, pursuant to section 322.28(2)(e) is not a criminal punishment, but is strictly administrative. See Smith v. City of Gainesville, 93 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1957).

¶6This court, on the authority of Smith, reversed the decision of the trial court for refusing to apply the statute on the basis that the first DUI conviction was uncounseled. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Vogt, 489 So.2d 1168 (Fla.2d DCA 1986). In Vogt, this *50 court held that revocation is an administrative remedy for the purpose of protecting the public and that the judge has no judicial discretion. Id. at 1170. Therefore, the uncounseled nature of the prior conviction can have no bearing on the court's duty to permanently revoke Walters' driving privileges. This conclusion is further supported by the language in section 322.28(2)(e) that places upon the Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles the duty to suspend DUI offender's driving privileges for life if the court fails to perform its duty, within thirty days after sentencing.

¶7We reverse and set aside the order to reduce sentence. Although we recognize that the Department has the authority to revoke Walters' driver's license pursuant to section 322.28(2)(e), inasmuch as we are reversing the trial court, we remand with instructions to the trial court to reinstate the previous order revoking Walters' driver's license for life, and for any further proceedings needed to accomplish the permanent revocation.

¶8Reversed and remanded with instructions.

¶9LEHAN, J. and LUTEN, CLAIRE K., Associate Judge, Concur.

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