¶1dissenting on appellant’s motion for leave to file motion for rehearing.
¶2The majority denies appellant’s motion for leave to file motion for rehearing. On original submission, this Court held that the appellant was not entitled to cross-examine a police officer concerning his suspension without pay from the Police Department for falsifying a report. On appellant’s motion for leave to file motion for rehearing, he urges reconsideration of the original opinion. After studied consideration, I agree with appellant’s contention and would grant his motion.
¶3The State’s evidence at trial concerning the offense was provided by Officer T. Q. Akins, a Dallas police officer. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to prevent the appellant from referring to any acts of discipline, including interdepartmental transfers, concerning Officer Akins and several other officers, which motion was granted. At trial, the appellant developed on a bill of exceptions that Officer Akins, three and a half months before trial, had filed a false report concerning another officer in the vice squad. Officer Akins was subsequently suspended without pay for 15 days and transferred to the Traffic Division as a disciplinary matter.
¶4The appellant sought to show by this proffered evidence that Akins was in a position after this disciplinary action where he sought to redeem himself in the eyes of his superiors and may have colored his testimony in order to establish a good record. Appellant argued he was entitled to show the disciplined officer’s testimony may have been motivated by his desire to “work himself back into the good graces” of his superiors.
¶5This Court has most recently and most thoroughly discussed this issue raised by appellant in Castro v. State, 562 S.W.2d 252, a case we failed to cite in our original opinion. In Castro, we stated:
“As this Court has stated many times, great latitude should be allowed a defendant in showing any fact which would tend to establish ill feelings, bias, motive *804and animus upon the part of any witness testifying against him. Jackson v. State, 552 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Robinson v. State, 550 S.W.2d 54 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Simmons v. State, 548 S.W.2d 386 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Evans v. State, 519 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Smith v. State, 516 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974); Blair v. State, 511 S.W.2d 277 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
In Blair v. State, supra, we stated that any possible malice, bias or prejudice towards the defendant on the part of the witness is admissible to attack his credibility and to lay the groundwork for possible impeachment. The motives which operate on the mind of a witness when he testifies are never regarded as immaterial or collateral matters [footnote omitted]. The defendant may prove facts ‘which tend to show bias, interest, prejudice or any other mental state or status which fairly construed might tend to affect his credibility.’ See 1 Branch’s Ann.P.C. 2d Ed. Sec. 185.
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. By presenting evidence to the jury that, while Rhoades [key prosecution witness] had participated in some criminal offense and had been arrested for robbery and murder and indicted for theft, but that those charges were no longer pending against him, appellant sought to show that Rhoades had some interest and motive in testifying for the State. The inference that the jury could have drawn was that Rhoades had a personal interest in helping the prosecution prove its cases against appellant and, therefore, may have been an unreliable witness. While the jury may have chosen to reject such an inference, especially since Rhoades denied that he was testifying for the State because of his vulnerable status, this evidence was nevertheless admissible and appellant should have been permitted to prove these facts, [citations omitted]”
¶6In the instant case, the inference the jury could have drawn was that Akins’ testimony was prompted by his desire to promote his own career and his testimony was slanted in an attempt to obtain a conviction and get his floundering career back on course. As we stated in Castro, the jury may well have chosen to reject any such inference, and yet, this evidence should have been admitted.
¶7It is fundamental that a primary interest of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is the right of cross-examination. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974):
“Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness’ story to test the witness’ perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i. e., discredit, the witness. ... A more particular attack on the witness’ credibility is effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is ‘always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.’ 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 940, p. 775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). We have recognized that the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1413, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959). (emphasis added)
We cannot speculate as to whether the jury, as sole judge of the credibility of a witness, would have accepted this line of reasoning had counsel been permitted to fully present it. But we do conclude that the jurors were entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before them so that they could make an informed judg*805ment as to the weight to place on Green’s testimony .
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On these facts it seems clear to us that to make any such inquiry effective, defense counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. . . . ”
¶8I reiterate the holding in the original opinion that cross-examination is subject to the discretion of the trial court. As noted in Davis, that discretion is to “preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation.” As earlier stated by the United States Supreme Court in Alford v. U. S., 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1930):
“The extent of cross-examination with respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion of the trial court. It may exercise a reasonable judgment in determining when the subject is exhausted, [citations omitted] But no obligation is imposed on the court, such as that suggested below, to protect a witness from being discredited on cross-examination, short of an attempted invasion of his constitutional protection from self incrimination, properly invoked. There is a duty to protect him from questions which go beyond the bounds of proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy or humiliate him. [citations omitted] But no such case is presented here. The trial court cut off in limine all inquiry on a subject with respect to which the defense was entitled to a reasonable cross-examination. This was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial error.”
¶9In the instant case, we should hold that the appellant was entitled to explore Officer Akins’ possible bias or motive for testifying against the appellant. Having failed to allow the appellant to delve into this matter deprived him of his right to reasonable cross-examination.
¶10Appellant’s motion for rehearing should be granted and the judgment reversed.