Charles H. Young v. Robert E. Hampton’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

41 federal appellate · 2 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 70 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Since an agency must make at least two separate determinations in its decision to discipline an individual employee, we are compelled, even under our narrow scope of review, to ascertain if either of those two determinations was arbitrary or capricious. The first judgment which an agency must make is that the individual to be disciplined actually committed the complained of acts (Point I). This is usually a question of facts adduced by the agency at the employee’s hearing which tend to show the employee’s involvement or participation in the alleged activities. It is these facts which we must review to determine whether the agency had a rational basis for its determination that the employee’s misconduct actually occurred .... Once the agency has made a determination that the employee misconduct has, in fact, occurred, it must make a second determination. This second determination, required by 5 U.S.C. §7501 (a), must be to the effect that the disciplinary action taken against the employee 'will promote the efficiency of the service,’ (Point II). The agency may base this determination also on evidence adduced at the employee’s hearing which tends to connect the employee’s misconduct with the efficiency of the service; or, in certain egregious circumstances, where the adverse effect of retention on the efficiency of the service could, in light of the nature of the misconduct, reasonably be deemed substantial, and where the employee can introduce no evidence showing an absence of”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Gloster v. General Services Administration · Masino v. United States

2. “b. A cause "as will promote efficiency.” Simply having an indentifiable cause is not sufficient to warrant adverse action. In addition, the action must be "for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service . ...” A just and substantial cause is necessary for an adverse action and the action must be determined on the merits of each individual case. Differences in agency missions, in codes of penalties, or in other internal regulations may result in a cause and an action which combine to be perfectly proper in one agency being improper in another. For example, an offense involving a violation of law, which would warrant removal of a law-enforcement employee in an agency with a mission of law enforcement, might not warrant comparable action against a warehouse forklift operator in another agency. In every case the agency’s action should be based on the conclusion that the adverse action is warranted and reasonable (i.e., the agency has a just cause for the action taken) and that the agency can establish, or "prove” the facts which support its reason for action, (emphasis added)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Masino v. United States

3. “There is, of course, some conduct with respect to which the "nexus between the dismissed employee’s activities and the efficiency of the service” is "obvious on the face of the facts.” Typical of conduct, which carries on its face prejudice to the service as contemplated in § 7501(a), are falsification of work records or expense accounts, theft of government property, assault on one’s supervisor at work, and insubordination. All of these are without question related to the faithful and loyal performance of his duties by an employee and are work-related. * * * [Footnotes omitted.]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Staton v. United States