Moynes v. State

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¶2Richard Earl Moynes and Barbara Sullivan Pike pleaded guilty and were convicted of trafficking in cocaine in violation of Ala. Code 1975, § 20-2-80. Each defendant was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. *393 In pleading guilty, both defendants preserved the right to appeal the question of the legality of the search of the automobile and the seizure of the cocaine. That is the only issue the defendants raise on this appeal from their convictions.

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¶4Deputy Harris had had "several conversations" with his informant over a three-year period. On two or three occasions in the past, the informant had supplied him with information of the "same type as on this occasion." He had given Harris information resulting in search warrants. The informant had also given Deputy Harris information on two prior occasions that did not result in an arrest, although the information had been verified. Harris testified that "[o]ver the three year period that I've known this person I've probably made two arrests [and convictions] based on his or her information." Harris also stated that the informant had never given him incorrect information.

¶5Deputy Harris testified that "Soso's is known as a gathering place for drug dealers," and that his informant had previously expressed to him the informant's knowledge of, experience with, and ability to recognize cocaine.

¶6After receiving the telephone call, Deputy Harris drove to Soso's Lounge, arriving about 9:55 p.m. He was met there by two other patrol units. Harris then verified the informant's information that the Corvette with the described license tag was parked in front of the lounge where the informant had indicated. The deputies waited until the defendants had left the lounge, entered the Corvette and driven away before stopping the Corvette at 10:45 p.m., a short distance from the lounge. Defendant Moynes was driving. Defendant Pike was in the passenger seat.

¶7A small clear plastic bag containing 3.503 grams of cocaine was discovered on the passenger's seat. Two small bags containing a total of 4.138 grams of cocaine were located in Pike's purse, along with $396 in United States currency and a small bottle containing .018 gram of cocaine residue. A total of 33.650 grams of cocaine was discovered in three plastic bags located under the driver's seat, along with $6,600 in U.S. currency. Cocaine paraphernalia was located in various interior portions of the Corvette.

¶8On this appeal, the defendants argue that there was no probable cause for the search of the Corvette, emphasizing the fact that Deputy Harris observed no suspicious or unlawful conduct on the part of the defendants before the Corvette was stopped and searched.

¶9Applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test for determining the existence of probable cause set out inIllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), we find that Deputy Harris had ample probable cause to stop and search the Corvette. Indeed, the facts of this case are sufficient to satisfy the more stringent "two-prong" test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509,12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

¶10Here, the informant's credibility was established because he had previously given accurate information and also because he had never given any erroneous information. See McClellan v.State, 415 So.2d 1238, 1239-40 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982). The basis *394 of the informant's knowledge was established because the informant's information was partially verified and because there was sufficient information to reasonably infer that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way. SeeHatton v. State, 359 So.2d 822, 826-27 (Ala.Cr.App. 1977), writ quashed, 359 So.2d 832 (Ala. 1978).

¶11In White v. State, 550 So.2d 1074 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 550 So.2d 1081 (Ala. 1989), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 834, 107 L.Ed.2d 830 (1990), this Court found that an anonymous telephone tip was insufficient, under the particular facts of that case, to supply probable cause for an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle. Although we distinguish an anonymoustelephone tip from information supplied by a previously tested confidential informant, we noted in White that even an anonymous telephone tip may supply the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the stop of a motor vehicle:

¶12 "We begin our analysis of the instant tip with an expression of agreement with the commentator that the factors of Aguilar and its progeny are still 'highly relevant.' We also note that the weight of each factor cannot be set by a strict across-the-board rule, but rather depends on the totality of the circumstances of each case. However, we do declare the following two principles in determining the presence of the factors. First,corroboration of the details of the anonymousinformer's tip — even innocent details — mayestablish the informant's veracity. See Note, Stopand Frisk Based Upon Anonymous Telephone Tips, [39 Wn. Lee L.Rev. 1437, 1450-51 (1982)]. Westrongly caution, however, that the detailscorroborated should be impressive, as to number andspecificity, under the particular circumstances, ifcorroboration is to be utilized to establish thetipster's credibility. This brings us to our second principle: detail in the anonymous tip can support the inference that the informant has an adequate basis of knowledge. Id. at 1449-50. However, the detail must demonstrate that the anonymous informant had special familiarity with the affairs of the suspect. 3 W. LaFave, [Search andSeizure] at § 9.3(e), p. 484 [2d ed. (1987)]. For an example of cases wherein a detailed tip, which proved through corroboration to be accurate in all innocent details, can furnish the reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry stop, see White v.United States, [454 U.S. 924, 102 S.Ct. 424, 70 L.Ed.2d 233 (1981) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)]."

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¶14REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

¶15All Judges concur. *395