William E. Wright v. Harold J. Smith, Superintendent, Etc.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 federal appellate · 4 district · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he People have the burden of proving to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt not only all the essential elements of the crime, but also that the Defendant Stuart Huber is the person who committed it. Even if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a serious crime has been committed, this does not end your deliberations. You must also be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is the person who committed it. You, the jury, are the sole judges of the rightness, indeed the certainty of the identification. You must, therefore, examine with great care all the evidence on the issue of identity, and as you have been instructed, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the right man, the man who, in fact, committed the crime. Otherwise you must acquit him. In this case, ... the only evidence which establishes or tends to establish that the Defendant, Stuart Huber, is the actual perpetrator, that is the right man, is the testimony of the eye witnesses, Jeffery Fischler, Kenan Karatas, and Alice Quinn. Apart from their testimony that the Defendant is the right man, there is no other evidence which identifies the Defendant as the perpetrator. In such ease, the law requires that the jury be satisfied that identification testimony of eye witnesses is as certain as human recollection admits under the most favorable circumstances. It becomes your duty to examine with great care all the circumstances surrounding the case. For exa”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Huber v. Schriver

2. “The introduction of an alibi defense frequently poses the risk that if the alibi evidence is disbelieved,the defense will backfire, leading the jury to convict because of the failure of the defense rather than because the evidence introduced by the government has satisfied the jury of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Because of this possibility of confusion on the jury’s part, we have, on appeal from federal convictions, held that it is reversible error to refuse a defendant’s request to the effect that, even if the alibi witnesses are disbelieved, the burden of proof remains with the government. . * * * * * * Other circuits have likewise reversed federal convictions on the ground that the alibi instruction given by the district court inadequately explained the government’s burden of proof. See, e. g., United States v. Booz, 451 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1971). The safeguard against jury confusion is a careful jury instruction designed to emphasize the fact that the assertion of an alibi does not affect the government’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 457 F. Supp. 929 - Rogers v. Redman

3. ““[T]he issue upon this review of a decision on a federal habeas petition is not whether the state court’s ‘instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,” ’ Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 [ 94 S.Ct. 396 , 38 L.Ed.2d 368 ] (1970) [sic; 1973], but whether ‘the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.’ Id. at 147 [ 94 S.Ct. at 400 ].” 1”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 449 F. Supp. 333 - Long v. Robinson