United States v. Schweihs’s Empirical Analysis
569 F.2d 965 · 1978
Citation profile
18 federal appellate · 2 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 26 later decisions — most recently March 2000 · most notably United States v. Schweihs (1992), Derry v. State (2000)
18 federal appellate · 2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986)
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Section 2512(l)(b) is narrowly drawn. It renders criminally liable “any person who willfully ... possesses ... any electronic ... device, knowing or having reason to know that the design of such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire or oral communications.... ” This statutory language reflects a careful and studied congressional decision to leave untouched the production, distribution, and possession of electronic equipment designed for regular use in varied nonsurreptitious activities, even though the equipment is capable of being used in a surreptitious manner, and yet to ban a narrow category of devices which by virtue of their design characteristics are primarily useful for eavesdropping and wiretapping. The statute’s legislative history reveals that Congress intended to ban such devices as martini olive transmitters, spike mikes, and microphones disguised as wristwatches and fountain pens, without prohibiting possession of a legitimate electronic device merely because it is small or may be used for wiretapping or eavesdropping. “To be prohibited, the device ... [must] possess attributes that give predominance to the surreptitious character of its use, such as the spike in the case of the spike mike or the disguised shape in the case of the martini olive transmitter____” S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 2183-2184.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“The prohibitions are applicable to devices whose design renders them primarily useful for the surreptitious interception of private wire or oral communications. The statutory phrase is intended to establish a relatively narrow category of devices whose principal use is likely to be for wiretapping or eavesdropping. A device will not escape the prohibition merely because it may have innocent uses. The crucial test is whether the design of the device renders it primarily useful for surreptitious listening.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“We also agree that the “design” of these modified descramblers renders them “primarily useful for the purpose of ... surreptitious interception.” It is difficult to imagine any purpose for these modified descramblers other than the unauthorized interception of satellite television signals.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.