Basic Management Inc. v. United States’s Empirical Analysis
2008
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 5 district · 3 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 9101 (Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980) · 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (§ 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980) · 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (§ 105 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980) · 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (§ 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980) · 42 U.S.C. § 9612 (§ 112 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980) · 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (§ 113 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980) · 42 U.S.C. § 9614 (§ 114 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980)
Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · United States 77-1359 v. Kimbell Foods Inc · United States v. Bestfoods · Warren III v. City of Carlsbad
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In other words, Plaintiffs have not been damaged and are not “entitled” to money as a damaged party; but rather, Plaintiffs can only receive reimbursement for the costs they expended beyond their share of actual responsibility for the environmental damage. There is an actual dollar amount associated with those costs, and in this case, almost all of those costs have been paid directly by Plaintiffs’ insurers, and without further right of subrogation in the insurers. In other words, no party or potential party here has incurred a cost as a PRP for which they could seek “contribution” from another PRP. Allowing Plaintiffs to recover those costs “again” from Defendants would in essence allow Plaintiffs to profit from their own and prior contamination of the site simply because they are in the subsequent chain of title. The purpose of the Contribution element of CERCLA was to reallocate the remedial cost to those who were ultimately responsible for the pollution, not to provide a windfall recovery for parties who happen to be in the chain of title.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body....” 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (21). The term”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[a]ny person who receives compensation for removal costs or damages or claims pursuant to this chapter shall be precluded from receiving compensation for the same removal costs or damages or claims pursuant to any other State or Federal Law.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.